Commonwealth v. Fortune

• Docket Number: 2687 EDA 2022,No. 2687 EDA 2022
• Decision Date: 29 August 2023
• Citation: 302 A.3d 780
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Lancelot FORTUNE, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

302 A.3d 780

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Lancelot FORTUNE, Appellant

No. 2687 EDA 2022

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted May 30, 2023

Filed August 29, 2023

Michael Mancuso, First Assistant District Attorney, Stroudsburg, for Commonwealth, appellant.

Jason A. LaBar, Public Defender, Stroudsburg, for appellee.

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.^*

OPINION BYSTEVENS, P.J.E.:

Appellant Lancelot Fortune appeals from the judgment of sentence entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County after a jury convicted Appellant of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of tampering with/fabricating evidence.Appellant claims the trial court erred in precluding him from offering an insanity defense and in denying the public defender's request to withdraw due to an alleged conflict of interest.We affirm.

The trial court summarized the factual background of this case:

On January 15, 2018, Pocono Township Police Department officers were dispatched to conduct a welfare call at a residence located at 145Marcelle Terrace, Pocono Township.Upon arrival, officers discovered one deceased male, identified as Richard B. Fells, in the garage and one deceased female, identified as Sharon Fortune Fells(hereinafter "Victims"), inside the residence on a couch.Both Victims appeared to have suffered multiple stab wounds.

Upon speaking with the Victim's daughter, Selina Taylor, officers learned that [Appellant] lived at the Victims’ residence on-and-off for years.Taylor stated that [Appellant] had not lived at the residence for approximately one year, but still frequented the residence.In addition, Taylor stated that [Appellant] resided at 814Sarah Street in Stroudsburg.

On January 15, 2018, a search warrant was executed at 145Marcelle Terrace and the curtilage.Passive blood drops were observed throughout the first floor of the residence.In addition, several kitchen knives with apparent blood transfer on them were observed on the kitchen counter.Further, bloody shoe print impressions were observed on the garage floor leading away from the male victim.Finally, on a piece of board located on the stairway leading to the house from the garage, a fingerprint in apparent dried blood was recovered.That same day, the fingerprint was preliminarily identified as matching the right middle finger of [Appellant].

Following the fingerprint identification, officers went to [Appellant's] residence at 814Sarah Street and encountered [Appellant], who presented with several small scratches on his face.A search warrant was executed on [Appellant's] residence and uncovered blood on the interior of the entrance, a bloody shirt from the bedroom, and a pair of black sneakers containing a tread pattern consistent with those observed in the Victims’ garage.As a result, [Appellant] was detained and transported to the PSP Stroudsburg barracks.

While in custody, [Appellant] was provided a Miranda Rights Warning and Waiver.[Appellant] waived his Miranda rights and related that he had stabbed Sharon Fortune Fells multiple times in the throat while she rested on the living room couch.In addition, [Appellant] related that he knew Richard Fells would be returning shortly and waited in hiding behind the door leading to the garage.Upon Richard Fells’ return, [Appellant] related that he stabbed the Victim multiple times in the neck and body.

After killing the Victims, [Appellant] admitted to taking the Victims’ Lincoln Navigator and leaving the scene.[Appellant] related that he drove to his apartment, changed clothes, then drove to the Philadelphia area where he watched the movie Jumanji at a movie theater in King of Prussia and stayed overnight at a hotel.In addition, [Appellant] related that he threw the murder weapon into the river at Penn's Landing and discarded clothing in the surrounding area.Following this trip to the Philadelphia area, [Appellant] returned to the scene, left the Victims’ vehicle in the driveway, and returned to his apartment.

Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 11/14/22, at 2-3.

Appellant was charged with the aforementioned offenses in connection with the Victims’ deaths.Thereafter, Appellant submitted to competency evaluations by both parties.On November 20, 2018, the trial court held a hearing pursuant to the Mental Health Procedures Act ("MHPA") at which it found Appellant was incompetent to stand trial.The trial court cited to the expert report of Dr. Robert Morrow, M.D., who diagnosed Appellant with paranoid schizophrenia and indicated that Appellant"continues to be grossly psychotic."Order, 11/20/18, at 1.Based on Dr. Morrow's recommendation, the trial court directed that Appellant be committed to a state hospital.Further, the trial court ordered that all proceedings be stayed as long as Appellant's incompetency persisted.

Nearly one year later, on September 4, 2019, at a subsequent MHPA hearing, the trial court determined that Appellant had regained competency to stand trial.The trial court based its decision on the testimony of Dr. William Hoctor, Jr., M.D., who attributed the improvement to Appellant's consistent treatment and medication.Appellant was transferred to the Monroe County Correctional Facility.

Prior to trial, Appellant filed notice of his intent to seek an insanity defense pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 568.Appellant provided that he would offer the expert testimony of Dr. Morrow, who would testify that Appellant suffered from a mental disease, namely paranoid schizophrenia.In addition, Appellant indicated that he planned to call numerous lay witnesses to testify as to Appellant's general mental health and their observations of Appellant near the time of the Victims’ murders.

On May 25, 2021, the Commonwealth filed a Motion In Limine to Preclude Insufficient Insanity Defense, emphasizing that Dr. Morrow authored an expert report indicating that while Appellant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, Dr. Morrow opined that Appellant did not meet the legal standard for insanity as there was evidence showing that Appellant had volitional control over his actions and knew what he did was wrong.

On June 15, 2021, the trial court entered an order and opinion granting the Commonwealth's motion in limine and specifically providing that Appellant was "precluded from raising a defense of insanity at trial."Order, 6/15/21, at 1.The trial court concluded that Appellant could not, as a matter of law, establish an insanity defense without presenting expert testimony concluding that Appellant was legally insane.

Appellant proceeded to a jury trial at which he was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of tampering with/fabricating evidence.Thereafter, on September 29, 2022, Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with the trial court's direction to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

I.Did the court commit an error of law in prohibiting [Appellant] to testify in order to establish the defense of insanity?

II.Did the court abuse its discretion by denying the Monroe County Public Defender's [Motion] to Withdraw from the case due to a conflict of interest?

Appellant's Briefat 4.

First, Appellant claims the trial court committed an error of law in precluding him from raising an insanity defense.Although Appellant concedes that his expert witness concluded that he was not legally insane, Appellant asserts that he should have been permitted to present an insanity defense for the jury's consideration based on the testimony of his expert and several lay witnesses as well as his own testimony.

To evaluate Appellant's specific argument, it is helpful to set forth the law applicable to an insanity defense.It is well-established that "criminal defendants may be presumed sane for purposes of determining their criminal liability."Commonwealth v. Rabold , 597 Pa. 344, 951 A.2d 329, 341(2008)(quotingClark v. Arizona , 548 U.S. 735, 766, 126 S.Ct. 2709, 165 L.Ed.2d 842(2006) ).As a result, a defendant has the burden of proving an insanity defense by a preponderance of the evidence.18 Pa.C.S.A. § 315(a)("[t]he mental soundness of an actor engaged in conduct charged to constitute an offense shall only be a defense to the charged offense when the actor proves by a preponderance of evidence that the actor was legally insane at the time of the commission of the offense").

Section 315 of the Crimes Code contains the following definition of legal insanity:

(b) Definition .--For purposes of this section, the phrase "legally insane" means that, at the time of the commission of the offense, the actor was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the acthe was doing or, if the actor did know the quality of the act, that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 315.This definition of legal insanity (often referred to as the " M'Naghten rule") is derived from the common law principle set forth in the seminal case of Regina v. M'Naghten , 9 Eng.Rep. 718(1843).SeeRabold , 951 A.2d at 348 n.1.¹Our courts have provided that:

[t]o plead the defense of insanity suggests that the defendant committed the act, but was not legally culpable.Commonwealth v. Mizell,493 Pa. 161, 164, 425 A.2d 424, 426(1981).An insanity defense focuses upon a defendant's capacity, at the time of the offense, to understand the nature and quality of his actions or whether he knew that his actions were wrong.Commonwealth v. Hughes,581 Pa. 274, 319 n. 29, 865 A.2d 761, 788 n. 29(2004).

Commonwealth v. Yasipour , 957 A.2d 734, 738–39(Pa.Super.2008).

Further, this Court has clarified that:

The rule sets forth two separate and distinct aspects of the defense in Pennsylvania:

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