Commonwealth v. G. C.
| Decision Date | 12 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | J-S64007-14,No. 93 WDA 2014,93 WDA 2014 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. G. C. Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
G.C. appeals his judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County after a jury convicted him of one count of corruption of minors.1 After review, we affirm.
G.C. was charged with one count of corruption of minors and two counts each of indecent assault and endangering the welfare of children after his daughter, H.C., disclosed that G.C. repeatedly had her remove her pants and underwear, ostensibly so that G.C. could check to see if she was wiping properly, and touched her in her vaginal area, rubbing his fingers in a circular motion. A jury convicted G.C. of one count of corruption of minors and, on December 17, 2013, the trial court sentenced him to a mandatoryterm of twenty-five years in prison pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718.2.2 G.C. was also found to be a sexually violent predator pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9792 and was directed to comply with the registration provisions of Megan's Law IV.
G.C. did not file post-trial motions. He filed a timely notice of appeal on January 9, 2014, followed by a court-ordered statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Two Rule 1925(a) opinions were filed, one by the Honorable Norman A. Krumenacker, III, who presided over G.C.'s trial, and a second by the Honorable Patrick T. Kiniry, who ruled on G.C.'s pre-trial motions.
G.C. raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the [trial] court erred in denying [G.C.'s] Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600?
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying [G.C.'s] Motion to Correct Amended Information?
3. Whether the trial court erred in "spotlighting" the jury instruction relative to [Standard Jury Instruction] 4.13(B) (Conviction Based on Victim's Uncorroborated Testimony in Sexual Offenses) during jury selection?
Brief of Appellant, at 6. G.C. first claims that Judge Kiniry erred in failing to grant his Rule 600 motion to dismiss. G.C. claims that he did not agree to several continuances requested by his trial counsel and, accordingly, the time attributable to those continuances should not be deemed excludable for purposes of Rule 600. We disagree.
We begin by noting that our standard of review with regard to claims brought under Rule 600 is whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 861 A.2d 304, 309 (Pa. Super. 2004).
The term "discretion" imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion, within the framework of the law, and is not exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge. Discretion must be exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions. Discretion is abused when the course pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.
Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 753 (Pa. 2000). Our scope of review is limited to the evidence on the record of the Rule 600 evidentiary hearing and the findings of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Hunt, 858 A.2d 1234, 1238 (Pa. Super. 2004). We must view the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Id. at 1239.
In his Rule 1925(a) opinion, Judge Kiniry provides a thorough factual and procedural history as it relates to the various continuances requested and received in this matter. Accordingly, we will not recite those facts here,other than to note that the excludable time over which the parties disagree is a total of 142 days attributable to requests made by defense counsel, but allegedly either (1) not agreed to by G.C. or (2) agreed to by G.C. only under duress.
Rule 600 requires that a defendant must be brought to trial within 365 days from the date on which the written complaint was filed against him.3 See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). With regard to the computation of time, Rule 600 provides as follows:
periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of the time within which trial must commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the computation.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1) (emphasis added).
When a defendant has not been brought to trial within the period prescribed under Rule 600, the defendant may file a written motion requesting that the charges be dismissed with prejudice. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 (D)(1). In considering the trial court's ruling on a Rule 600 motion, this Court may not ignore the dual purpose behind the Rule. Commonwealth v. Murray, 879 A.2d 309, 312 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Thosetwo equally important functions are: (1) the protection of the accused's speedy trial rights, and (2) the protection of society. Id.
Id. at 312-13 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
Rule 600 clearly provides that only "periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of the time in which trial must commence." Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1). "Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the computation." Id. The Comment to Rule 600 further provides that delay is excludable if it results from "either the availability of the defendant or the defendant's attorneyor any continuance granted at the request of the defendant or the defendant's attorney. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, Comment (emphasis added).
Here, G.C. has not alleged that the Commonwealth engaged in any misconduct or otherwise failed to exercise due diligence in bringing him to trial. Moreover, the use of the disjunctive "or" in the Comment to Rule 600 demonstrates that there is no requirement that a defendant agree to a continuance for it to be excluded from a Rule 600 computation; it is sufficient that the continuance be requested by defense counsel alone. G.C. has cited to no case law holding to the contrary. Accordingly, Judge Kiniry properly excluded 142 days attributable the continuance requests by defendant and/or defense counsel, and G.C.'s claim is without merit.
With respect to G.C.'s two remaining appellate issues, we have reviewed the briefs, the relevant law, and the record as a whole, and we find that the opinion of the Honorable Norman A. Krumenacker, III, thoroughly, comprehensively and correctly disposes of these issues. For that reason, we affirm based on Judge Krumenacker's Rule 1925(a) opinion dated March 10, 2014. The parties are directed to attach a copy of that opinion in the event of further proceedings in this matter.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
/s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CAMBRIA COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CRIMINAL DIVISION
G C (C ) appeals from his sentence imposed on December 17, 2014, On October 10, 2013, following a three-day jury trial, C was convicted of one count of: Count 3 - corruption of minors - felony of the third degree.4 The jury reached an impasse and was declared hung as to: Count 1 - indecent assault - felony of the third degree; Count 2 - endangering the welfare of children - felony of the third degree; Count 4 - indecent assault - misdemeanor of the first degree; and Count 5 - endangering the welfare of children - misdemeanor of the first degree.5 These charges arose from a series of incidents involving C daughter.
On December 17, 2013, C was sentenced to pay the costs of prosecution, pay and serve a period of incarceration of twenty-five (25) to fifty (50) years with credit for time served, this sentence was within the standard range taking into consideration the mandatory sentences established by 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9718.2, and was determined to not be RRRI eligible. A hearing was held that same day to determine if C met the standards of a being asexually violent predator and the Court found that he was and directed that he comply with the registration requirements under SORNA/Megan's Law for life. C filed a timely notice of appeal and a Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal (Concise Statement) pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) as Ordered by this Court.
In his Concise Statement C raises these...
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