Commonwealth v. Gable

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Writing for the Court: SCHAFFER, Justice
• Citation: 187 A. 393,323 Pa. 449
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. GABLE.
• Decision Date: 07 October 1936

187 A. 393
323 Pa. 449

COMMONWEALTH
v.
GABLE.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Oct. 7, 1936.

187 A. 394

Appeal No. 167, March term, 1936, from sentence of Court of Oyer and Terminer and General Jail Delivery, Cambria County, September term, 1935, No. 6; John H. McCann, President Judge.

Jacob Gable was convicted of first-degree murder, and he appeals.

Judgment affirmed, and record remitted, with directions.

Argued before KEPHART, C. J., and SCHAFFER, MAXEY, DREW, LINN, STERN, and BARNES, JJ.

J. H. Connell, Jr., of Cresson, for appellant.

Stephens Mayer, Dist. Atty., of Johnstown, for the Commonwealth.

SCHAFFER, Justice.

This is a case of first-degree murder. The jury fixed the penalty at death. The condemned, appealing to us from the sentence, submits three questions: (1) May the commonwealth introduce in evidence his written confession when it contains references to the commission by him of other crimes not connected with the homicide? (2) The defense being insanity, was it error for the trial judge to review in detail the evidence of the commonwealth and to instruct the jury that if they believed it, their duty was to find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree with the death penalty, without at that specific time referring expressly to the affirmative defense of insanity? (3) The defense being insanity, was it improper for the judge to refuse to instruct the jury that in the event of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, it would be his duty to commit the defendant to a state institution for the insane ?

The murder was a most cruel one. Its revolting details need not be recited. It is sufficient to say that the victim was a woman almost eighty years old who was a neighbor of defendant, living across the street from his home. He was twenty years of age and had been out of school for about four years. He had not worked for many months before the killing and was apparently loafing around, living by his wits. The deceased was in her home alone. This the defendant knew. He thought there was considerable money in the house and entered it shortly after midday for the purpose of stealing the money. He encountered the deceased, struck her with his fist, beat her with objects in the room, including a tea kettle and an electric iron, and stabbed her to death. He then ransacked the house, stealing such money and other articles as he could find. Shortly after its commission the crime was discovered. The defendant was arrested the following day. He made a confession in writing, in which the details of the killing were recited. He repeated them on the witness stand when called as a witness in his own behalf. As before stated, the defense was insanity. The attempted proof of it did not impress the jury, nor does it us.

In answering the first question submitted, it may be stated that it has been presented to us more than once, and our conclusion has been that if a voluntary confession is made to police officers, the whole is admissible in evidence, even though it may contain admissions of other offences unrelated to the one for the commission of which the defendant is on trial, Com. v. Weston, 297 Pa. 382, 147 A. 79; Com. v. Dague, 302 Pa. 13, 152 A. 839. But in this case there is a further reason why the confession in its entirety was not objectionable. In it the defendant admitted all the details of the crime. These admissions unerringly established that the murder was of the first degree. They, as fully as in any case that can be imagined, warranted the death penalty. Therefore the mentioning of other offenses could not have prejudiced the defendant; he had himself shown the enormity of his crime, its degree, and the warrant for the penalty.

187 A. 395

The other crimes recited were not makeweights for his conviction; under his own story no makeweights were required. When he took the witness stand, he repeated what he had stated in the confession in full detail. His defense was, not that he had not committed the crime, but that at the time he was irresponsible, urged to do what he did by an overmastering impulse. The confession in its entirety was properly placed in evidence. Com. v. Mellor, 294 Pa. 339, 144 A. 534.

As to the second question stated, that the trial judge did not expressly refer to the defense of insanity in connection with his review of the commonwealth's evidence, and his instruction that if the jury believed it, their duty was to find a first-degree verdict with the death penalty, it is sufficient to say that a reading of the charge shows full instructions on the insanity defense. A court cannot be convicted of error in the order in which it gives a jury instructions, provided the instructions are adequate when announced.

The third question involves the...