Commonwealth v. Galette

• Decision Date: 17 December 2020
• Docket Number: No. 862 EDA 2019,862 EDA 2019
• Citation: 245 A.3d 1079 (Table)
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Cedric GALETTE, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

245 A.3d 1079 (Table)

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Cedric GALETTE, Appellant

No. 862 EDA 2019

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Filed: December 17, 2020

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:

Appellant, Cedric Galette, appeals from the February 28, 2019 judgment of sentence imposing three days’ incarceration, six months’ probation, and a suspension of his driver's license for twelve months after the trial court found Appellant guilty of driving under the influence of a controlled substance ("DUI-controlled substance"). ¹ We affirm.

The trial court summarized the factual history as follows:

[O]n January 18, 2017, [Officer Patrick Dooley] observed [Appellant] traveling at a high rate of speed westbound in a black Ford Escape while [Officer Dooley] was traveling eastbound on [Rhawn Street as he was approaching Verree Road, ² in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania]. Officer [ ] Dooley stated, "[Appellant's] vehicle was traveling at a high rate of speed. The vehicle [maneuvered from] the left lane [of travel and] went into the right shoulder bike lane [on the roadway]. [While driving, Appellant] passed approximately six vehicles. [Appellant] timed the [traffic signal and drove] through the intersection, at which time [Officer Dooley] made a U-turn and activated [his] lights and sirens [on his police cruiser in order] to pull [Appellant] over." After Officer Dooley activated his lights and sirens, [Appellant] continued [driving onto] "Pine [R]oad, crossed Pine Road, and made a sharp U-turn into the Dunkin Donuts parking lot." [Appellant] then exited the driver's side of the vehicle and moved quickly to the Dunkin Donuts [building, whereupon] Officer [Dooley] stopped him and asked [Appellant] what was going on. [Appellant] stated that someone was having a medical emergency. Officer Dooley then went to the passenger side of [Appellant's] vehicle to see what the medical emergency was and called for the medics. However, once the medics arrived, the passenger, who identified himself as [Appellant's] son, refused medical [assistance].

Trial Court Opinion, 12/18/19, at 1-2 (record citations, extraneous capitalization, and original brackets omitted).

On August 3, 2018, Appellant was charged with the aforementioned crime. ³ At the conclusion of a bench trial on November 29, 2018, the trial court found Appellant guilty of DUI-controlled substance. On February 28, 2019, the trial court sentenced Appellant to three days’ incarceration in a county facility, as well as a maximum of six months’ probation to run consecutive to Appellant's incarceration. The trial court also suspended Appellant's driver's license for twelve months, ordered Appellant to attend Alcohol Highway Safety School, and ordered Appellant to receive a drug and alcohol assessment and treatment at a Greater Philadelphia Health Action facility. On March 7, 2019, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court subsequently denied. This appeal followed. ⁴

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. Was not the evidence insufficient to support the verdict, as the evidence did not support the conclusion that Appellant was driving under the influence of a controlled substance, or that his ability to drive was impaired where no drugs or paraphernalia were found on Appellant's person or in his vehicle, no chemical testing was introduced, no standardized field sobriety tests were conducted, no expert testimony was elicited regarding [phencyclidine ("PCP")] and the ability to drive and the traffic violations committed by Appellant were consistent with a response to an emergency situation rather than the actions of an impaired driver, especially as there was no collision and no swerving?

2. Was not the evidence presented by the Commonwealth so contradictory as to be insufficient to support the verdict of guilt where the Commonwealth presented two different versions of what Appellant may have been under the influence of, and inconsistent versions of the indicia of impairment, all without presenting any expert evidence on his ability to drive, and thus was so unreliable that any finding, and therefore the verdict of guilt, must have been based on surmise and conjecture, and thus insufficient as a matter of law pursuant to Commonwealth v. Karkaria , 625 A.2d 1167 (Pa. 1993) ?

3. Even were it to be determined that there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict, would not such a verdict be so contrary to the weight of the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice, where the trial testimony was vague, inconsistent and incredible and should not a new trial have been granted in the interests of justice so that right could prevail, as the jury's verdict, ^[5] based upon such testimony, was speculative and conjectural?

Appellant's Brief at 5-6.

Appellant's first two issues, in sum, challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, for which our standard of review and scope of review are well-settled.

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proof or proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all the evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier[-]of[-]fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Pappas , 845 A.2d 829, 835-836 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted), appeal denied , 862 A.2d 1254 (Pa. 2004) ; see also Commonwealth v. Brown , 52 A.3d 1139, 1163 (Pa. 2012) (stating, that in reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, "the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier[-]of[-]fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt" (emphasis in original)).

[T]he [trier-of-fact's] individualized assessment of the credibility of the trial evidence is, as a general principle, not to be questioned by an appellate court as part of its review, even if the evidence is conflicting. [C]ourts presume the [trier-of-fact] resolved evidentiary disputes reasonably so long as sufficient evidence supports the verdict. [M]ere inconsistency and conflicts in witnesses testimony, by itself, will not furnish a basis for an appellate court to reverse a conviction [ ] on the grounds of evidentiary insufficiency.

Brown , 52 A.3d at 1165 (citations omitted). Rather, the trier-of-fact's resolution will only be disturbed "in those exceptional instances [ ] where the evidence is so patently unreliable that the [trier-of-fact] was forced to engage in surmise and conjecture in arriving at a verdict based upon that evidence." Id. , citing Commonwealth v. Karkaria , 625 A.2d 1167, 1170 (Pa. 1993). When a witness's in-court testimony is inconsistent with a prior statement and the veracity of that inconsistency is tested on cross-examination, the testimony may be "sufficient evidence upon which a criminal conviction may properly rest" because the trier-of-fact can reasonably credit the in-court testimony over the prior statements. Brown , 52 A.3d at 1168. "[I]t is the [trier-of-fact's] ability to make in-person observations of the witness at the time of trial, as he or she explains the reasons for the prior statement, which is most crucial to its assessment of the witness's credibility." ⁶ Id. at 1169. To preserve a sufficiency claim, the appellant's Rule 1925(b) statement must specify the element or elements upon which the evidence was insufficient. Commonwealth v. Williams , 959 A.2d 1252, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2008).

Section 3802(d)(2) of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, in pertinent part, states,

(d) Controlled substances. --An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle under any of the following circumstances:

...

(2) The individual is under the influence of a drug or combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the individual's ability to safely drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2). In order to convict a defendant under Section 3802(d)(2), the Commonwealth must demonstrate "that [the defendant] was under the influence of a drug to a degree that impairs his or her ability to safely drive or operate a vehicle." Commonwealth v. Williamson , 962 A.2d 1200, 1204 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation and original quotation marks omitted), appeal denied , 980 A.2d 608 (Pa. 2009). Section 3802(d)(2) "does not require proof of a specific amount of a drug in the driver's system. It requires only proof that the driver was under the influence of a drug or combination of drugs to a degree that the ability to drive is impaired." Commonwealth v. Tarrach , 42 A.3d 341, 345 (Pa. Super. 2012), citing Williamson , 962 A.2d at 1204 and Commonwealth v. Griffith , 32 A.2d 1231, 1238 (Pa. 2011). "[E]xpert testimony is not necessary to establish impairment [due to a controlled substance] under [ Section] 3802(d)(2) where there exists other independent evidence of impairment." Commonwealth v. Gause , 164 A.3d 532, 538 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal...