Commonwealth v. Gamble
| Decision Date | 19 October 1869 |
| Citation | 62 Pa. 343 |
| Parties | The Commonwealth <I>versus</I> Gamble. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Before THOMPSON, C. J., READ, AGNEW, SHARSWOOD and WILLIAMS, JJ.
QUO WARRANTO. An information was filed in the Middle District, No. 80, to May Term 1869, by the Attorney-General, April 5th 1869, setting out that James Gamble had, since March 16th 1869, and still did exercise, the office, &c., of a judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming county. Upon the suggestion of the Attorney-General the writ in this case was issued, to which the defendant pleaded, that by the Act of February 28th 1868 the county of Lycoming was erected into a separate judicial district, called the Twenty-ninth Judicial District; that by said act the qualified electors of the district were authorized to elect a president judge for said district, to serve for the term of ten years from the first Monday of December then next; that the defendant was, on the second Tuesday in October 1868, elected president judge of said district, to serve for the term above mentioned, was commissioned by the governor of the Commonwealth, took the oath of office and has since continued to exercise it by virtue of the election and commission.
Strong and Meredith (with whom was Black), for the defendant. —The defendant, prior to the passage of the repealing act, was constitutionally the president judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming county. That assured him the office for ten years and placed him beyond legislative control: Commonwealth v. Mann, 5 W. & S. 403. The Act of March 16th 1869 conflicts with this. His right was to exercise a public employment as well as receive the salary: Finch 162; 3 Kent's Com. 154; Answer of the Judges, 2 Greenl. R. 481; People v. Bangs, 23 Ill. 547; People v. Garey, 6 Cowen 642; s. c. 9 Id. 640; McCollum's Case, 1 Id. 550; State v. Messmore, 14 Wis. 163. The Act of 1869 is an attempt to reorganize a court, and cannot as such be sustained. The gift of power to remove a judge by impeachment or address excludes power to remove in any other manner; Lowe v. Commonwealth, 4 Metc. (Ky.) 237; Commonwealth v. Sutherland, 3 S. & R. 145; Hoke v. Henderson, 4 Dev. 1; Page v. Hardin, 8 B. Monroe 648. The act denies the power of Lycoming county to choose their own judges. They cited also 3 Cruise's Dig. 92, Office, pl. 1.
S. G. Thompson and B. H. Brewster, Attorney-General, for Commonwealth.—The Act of 1869 has the sanction of judicial authority and legislative practice. (They cited a large number of Acts of Assembly organizing, changing, &c., judicial districts.)
A law will not be declared unconstitutional unless the violation is plain, clear and palpable: Sharpless v. The City, 9 Harris 164; Speer v. School Directors, 14 Wright 156; Livingston v. Moore, 7 Peters 469; Falconer v. Campbell, 2 McLean 195; Tracy v. Pendleton, 11 Harris 171; Resp. v. McClean, 4 Yeates 399. The legislature can pass all laws not prohibited: 2 P. F. Smith 474. The legislature has power to alter the structure of courts: Commonwealth v. Martin, 2 Barr 244; Bank of Kentucky v. Schuylkill Bank, 1 Pars. R. 181; Foust v. Commonwealth, 9 Casey 339; Kilpatrick v. Commonwealth, 7 Id. 211; Livingston v. Moore, supra; Brien v. Commonwealth, 5 Metc. 516; People v. Kane, 23 Wend. 414; Clark v. Commonwealth, 5 Casey 137.
Judgment was entered against the Commonwealth July 3d 1869, no opinion being then delivered.
The opinion of the court was delivered, October 19th 1869, by THOMPSON, C. J.
On the 28th of February 1868, Lycoming county being part of the Eighth Judicial District of the Commonwealth, was by Act of Assembly of that date, erected into a new district, to be called the Twenty-ninth, and afterwards, at the ensuing general election, the respondent, James Gamble, was duly elected, and subsequently commissioned, as president judge of the district, took the oath of office and entered upon the performance of his duties as judge of the courts in it.
On the 16th of March 1869, an Act of Assembly was passed and approved by the governor, repealing the above act creating the Twenty-ninth District, transferring it to and constituting it part of the Fourth Judicial District, in which the Hon. Robert G. White is president and Henry W. Williams is assistant law judge. The respondent, being of opinion that the act was invalid, and considering it his duty so to treat it, continued to discharge the duties of president judge of the district; whereupon, the Attorney-General, in the name of the Commonwealth, sued out a writ of quo warranto, to test the right of the respondent to exercise the jurisdiction and perform the duties and functions of judge of the courts of the district; — and this brings before us the inquiry, whether the legislature had the power to deprive him of all jurisdiction and power under his commission, granted in pursuance of the Constitution, and to transfer the exercise of the same to other judges, neither elected nor commissioned for that purpose. The essence of the inquiry under the facts is, whether the legislature, by a mere legislative act, can remove a judge from the exercise of the duties and jurisdictions of his office, and appoint another, or others, to fill his place?
Pursuant to his election, Judge Gamble received a commission from the governor, the tenure of which was, by the Constitution, to continue for ten years, on the only condition that he should so long "behave himself well." Having taken the office and entered upon the performance of its duties, its duration was assured to him by the Constitution for the full period mentioned, subject to be terminated only by death, resignation or breach of condition, which breach could not be legislatively determined, but only by a trial before the Senate on articles of impeachment duly preferred, or in case the breach amounted to total disqualification, perhaps by address of two-thirds of each branch of the legislature. These are the ordained constitutional remedies in such cases, and there can be no others: Lowe v. The Commonwealth, 4 Metc. (Ky.) Rep. 237.
These constitutional provisions, and another requiring that adequate compensation shall be provided by law for the judges, which shall not be diminished during the continuance of their offices, not only give precision, but inviolability, to the tenure of the judicial office, by any but the constitutional mode referred to. Their object and effect were undoubtedly to establish the complete independence of the judiciary, not only in its operations among the people, but as against possible encroachments by the other co-ordinate branches of the government. Possessing neither the power of the purse nor the sword, as the executive and legislative branches, without using the expression in an entirely figurative sense, may be said to do, the judiciary was by far the weakest branch of the government; and as its operations were necessarily to affect individual interests in the community, it was obviously proper, in order to secure its independence against the action of the other branches more liable to be swayed by impulse, or operated upon by individual, party or sectional influence, to protect it by express constitutional barriers; and it was so done. Nowhere is this, as an essential principle of the Constitution, better expressed than by Rogers, J., in The Commonwealth v. Mann, 5 W. & S. 403. Among other remarks of the learned judge, are the following: "The independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and rights of individuals from the effect of those ill humors which the acts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes create among the people themselves, and which, although they speedily give place to better information and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and severe oppression of the minor party in the community."
An independent judiciary must ever be a cardinal principle of constitutional government. It was adopted in forming the Federal Constitution, both in regard to the express tenure of the office, and in providing a fixed compensation, undiminishable during the continuance of the office. And so in every state in the Union, this independence is secured, during the tenure of the office, by constitutional provisions, and judges are made secure from interference from any quarter, with the exercise of their jurisdiction and powers, excepting in the modes prescribed in the several constitutions. These provisions were not the result of a wise philosophy or far-seeing policy merely. They resulted, rather, from severe trials — experience — in the country from which we have largely derived our laws and many of our principles of liberty. History has preserved numerous melancholy examples of the want of a judiciary independent by law, before it was accomplished in England. The tyrannical reigns of Charles II. and James II. are so full of them, that the revolution of 1688 could scarcely have been other than a consequence of them. A short time after the revolution, and by the English acts of settlement, it was declared that the salaries of the judges should be ascertained and established by law; and by statute 1 Geo. III. they were secured absolutely during the commissions of the judges, which are for life, on the same condition as ours — of good behavior. We must regard this as a clearly established principle of our Constitution. The judicial office is created by the Constitution and so is its tenure, and the compensation is protected by it when once fixed by the legislature. The amenability of the judges is also provided for, and this excludes all other modes. Thus is independence supposed and intended to be secured by the Constitution. It must follow, therefore, that any legislation which impinges on this feature of the Constitution is invalid. Not only...
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