Commonwealth v. Garanchoskie

Decision Date03 January 1916
Docket Number230
Citation96 A. 513,251 Pa. 247
PartiesCommonwealth v. Garanchoskie, Appellant
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Argued September 27, 1915

Appeal, No. 230, Jan. T., 1915, by defendant, from sentence of O. and T. Northumberland Co., May T., 1914, No. 3 certified from May Q.S., 1914, No. 15, on verdict of guilty of murder of the second degree, in case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Joseph Garanchoskie. Reversed.

Indictment for murder. Before CUMMINGS, P.J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Verdict of guilty of murder of the second degree. Defendant was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment. Defendant appealed.

Errors assigned were rulings on evidence and instructions to the jury referred to in the opinion of the Supreme Court.

The third, fourth, fifth and tenth assignments of error are sustained, judgment reversed and a new trial ordered.

D. W Shipman, with him John W. Timmes, for appellant. -- Under the Act of April 27, 1909, Section 1, P.L. 179, defendant's wife was incompetent to testify against him.

The Act of April 11, 1899, P.L. 41, applies only to trials of misdemeanors; it was never intended to open the door so as to permit the wife to contradict her husband when on trial for his life.

It was improper to permit the cross-examination of the defendant as to whether or not he had committed other crimes, or to admit evidence as to other criminal acts committed by defendant to rebut the evidence of good character produced by defendant.

It was error to exclude evidence of a former difficulty between defendant and deceased in that defendant apprehended danger from an attack by deceased.

Frank H. Strouss, District Attorney, S. L. Gribbin and J. A. Welsh submitted paper book for Commonwealth.

Before BROWN, C.J., MESTREZAT, POTTER, STEWART, MOSCHZISKER and FRAZER, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE FRAZER:

Defendant was tried for the murder of Frank Jaroskie, with whom he appears to have had quarrels prior to the alleged commission of the crime. Jaroskie was a frequent visitor at defendant's home, and the latter suspected and accused him of improper intimacy with his wife. On the night preceding the homicide, defendant, on returning from work, had an altercation with his wife concerning the condition of the house, etc., whereupon the wife sent to a near-by saloon and called in her brothers. Jaroskie came to the house shortly afterwards and quarreled with defendant. The latter then left the house to secure the assistance of a police officer. Failing in this he returned to his home and found the other persons still in the house and engaged in playing cards. Defendant and Jaroskie then shook hands and agreed to forget their differences. The entire party sat up until a late hour, when one of the wife's brothers and his wife retired to an upper room and others left the house, defendant and his wife and Jaroskie remaining in the kitchen. Defendant testified that, at an early hour in the morning while dosing in a chair by the stove, he was awakened by a noise and found his wife in a compromising situation with deceased. Upon remonstrating with him, deceased attempted to take a revolver from his pocket, whereupon defendant seized a stove poker and struck him on the head, his death resulting from the blow a few days later.

The testimony of the witnesses for the Commonwealth was to the effect that no improper intercourse between deceased and defendant's wife had taken place, but, on the contrary, defendant struck deceased while he was asleep. The jury returned a verdict of murder in the second degree, and, from judgment entered thereon, defendant appealed.

The first assignment of error is to the admission of the testimony relative to the conduct of defendant's wife and her improper relations with deceased. In this testimony, she denied all improper acts either on the night of the homicide or at any other time during the existence of her marriage relation. The objection to this testimony was that its admission was equivalent to permitting a wife to testify against her husband, not merely for the purpose of rebutting an attack on her character, but on the very gist of the defense set up by him, which in this case was self-defense. The Act of April 11, 1899, P.L. 41, Section 2, provides that "In any criminal proceeding brought against the husband, if he makes defense at the trial upon any ground which attacks the wife's character or conduct, she shall be a competent witness in rebuttal for the Commonwealth." The language of this Act is clear and unmistakable. It applies to any criminal proceeding, and not merely to minor misdemeanors where the husband or wife has instituted the proceeding and one stands in opposition to the other, as is argued by counsel for appellant. Neither does the act apply merely to cases where the actual defense offered is such as in itself attacks her character and conduct. It is not necessary that her character or conduct should be directly in issue in the case. If, during the course of the trial, defendant in making defense offers evidence which attacks her character and conduct, even though the evidence bears directly on the actual defense in the case, which in itself makes no reference to her conduct, she becomes a competent witness in rebuttal for the Commonwealth. The first assignment of error is overruled.

The second, third, fourth and fifth assignments all raise the question of the competency of testimony to show defendant had committed other crimes not connected with the case on trial. This testimony was introduced by the...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT