Commonwealth v. Gilbert

Decision Date25 January 2022
Docket Number37 WDA 2021
Citation269 A.3d 601
Parties COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. James Manasseh GILBERT, Appellant
CourtPennsylvania Superior Court

Thomas D. Brasco Jr., Erie, for appellant.

John H. Daneri, District Attorney, Erie, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*

OPINION BY COLINS, J.:

Appellant, James Manasseh Gilbert, appeals from the judgment of sentence following his conviction of first-degree murder1 and related offenses. We affirm.

The evidence at trial was as follows. Appellant and Marinda Matasowski ("the victim") were parents to a son, J.M., who was one-year old at the time of his mother's death. On the evening of August 2, 2018, the victim called her mother, Kimberly Lobaugh, and Ms. Lobaugh agreed to babysit J.M. during the victim's overnight shift as a certified nursing assistant at a hospital.

The victim and Appellant arrived at Ms. Lobaugh's home shortly after 10 p.m. and brought J.M. inside. Upon entering, Appellant asked Ms. Lobaugh "[c]an we go downstairs and talk?" N.T., 11/4/19, at 60. The victim then handed J.M. to Ms. Lobaugh and the four of them walked downstairs into the bottom floor of Ms. Lobaugh's split-level home. Sensing something was wrong from Appellant's behavior, Ms. Lobaugh asked Appellant "[w]hat's going on?" and stated "[w]hatever is wrong, whatever's going on, we can try to work it out." Id. at 63. Appellant then stated, "I just want to talk to [the victim] and tell her that I love her" and asked her to go upstairs with J.M. Id. at 64-65.

Soon after leaving Appellant and the victim alone downstairs, Ms. Lobaugh heard her daughter scream. Ms. Lobaugh went downstairs and saw Appellant with a knife in his hand stabbing himself in his chest and the victim laying on the floor. Appellant said to Ms. Lobaugh "I don't know why I did it" and hugged her and J.M. Id. at 67.

Patrick Matasowski, the victim's brother who lived with Ms. Lobaugh, came downstairs from his room after hearing his mother scream. As he was walking down the stairs, he saw Appellant coming upstairs from the lower level with blood on his clothing and saying that he had to go to the hospital. Mr. Matasowski accompanied Appellant out to the victim's car to drive him to the hospital. Mr. Matasowski then returned to the house to get the keys to the car whereupon he discovered that the victim was severely injured. Mr. Matasowski removed J.M. from the room where the stabbing had occurred and returned to help provide first aid to his sister.

Officer Mark Fritz of the Millcreek Township Police Department was the first officer to respond to the scene. When he arrived, Appellant was outside of Ms. Lobaugh's house by the garage. Officer Fritz described Appellant as having a "[v]ery calm, focused" demeanor. N.T., 11/5/19, Vol. I, at 74. Upon noticing the blood on Appellant, Officer Fritz asked Appellant if he was injured. Appellant informed the officer that he had stabbed himself in the chest. Officer Fritz then asked Appellant whether he had a weapon, to which Appellant responded, "I think I killed her, she's in there, she's the devil." Id. Other officers responding to the scene discovered a 12-inch-long blood-stained kitchen knife in close proximity to the victim's body and determined that the brand of the knife was consistent with the kitchen knife set in the apartment Appellant and the victim shared.

Appellant was charged with general criminal homicide, aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, and possessing an instrument of crime.2 He proceeded to a jury trial in November 2019. The trial court charged the jury as to first- and third-degree murder and further instructed the jury as to a defense of diminished capacity due to voluntary intoxication, which could reduce the murder conviction from first-degree to third-degree murder but would not serve as a defense to any other charge. N.T., 11/6/19, at 120-25. On November 6, 2019, a jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder, aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, and possessing an instrument of crime. On December 20, 2019, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of imprisonment of life without parole. Appellant's timely appeal followed.3

Appellant raises four issues in this appeal. First, Appellant argues that the trial court improperly barred the testimony of a psychiatrist who treated Appellant for mental health issues at Erie County Prison, following Appellant's arrest. Second, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the Commonwealth to call a rebuttal witness to testify about her experience of smoking marijuana that had been found in Appellant's apartment after Appellant had testified that he was experiencing ill effects from smoking marijuana at the time of the stabbing. Third, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting testimony regarding incidents of domestic violence between Appellant and the victim on the theory that Appellant had "opened the door" to such testimony. Finally, Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of his September 11, 2018 summary harassment conviction.4

The issues presented in this appeal each relate to evidentiary rulings made by the trial court. "The admissibility of evidence is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only where there is a clear abuse of discretion." Commonwealth v. Clemons , 650 Pa. 467, 200 A.3d 441, 474 (2019) (citation omitted). The trial court will be found to have abused its discretion only where its "judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will." Commonwealth v. Lekka , 210 A.3d 343, 354 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

Appellant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting Dr. Sean Su, a psychiatrist employed part-time by Erie County Prison, from testifying regarding his treatment of Appellant in the weeks following his arrest. While Appellant acknowledges that Dr. Su would not meet the standard necessary for him to testify as an expert with respect to a diminished capacity defense, Appellant contends that Dr. Su would have provided relevant testimony as a fact witness regarding his diagnosis of Appellant with psychosis and major depressive disorder and Appellant's reports of auditory hallucinations and other mental health symptoms.

Because the Commonwealth charged Appellant with criminal homicide generally and instructed the jury that they could find him guilty of first-degree or third-degree murder, see N.T., 11/6/19, at 120, Appellant asserts that the testimony of Dr. Su regarding Appellant's mental state would be particularly relevant to the question of whether Appellant lacked the specific intent to kill necessary to show that he should be convicted of murder of the first degree. Appellant argues that the trial court's decision to preclude Dr. Su's testimony deprived Appellant of his due process right to defend himself of the criminal charges against him.

The record reveals that Appellant filed a pre-trial motion for psychological examination, in which he described Appellant's mental health history and attached various records related to his treatment. Among the records attached to this motion was an August 23, 2018 report by Dr. Su, in which he indicated that Appellant suffered major depressive disorder with psychosis and that he reported auditory hallucinations. Motion for Psychiatric5 Examination, 5/10/19, ¶30, Exhibit 8. The trial court granted Appellant's motion.

Although an evaluation was performed, Appellant did not ultimately call the psychologist who performed the evaluation to testify at trial. Instead, Appellant notified the Commonwealth that he intended to call Dr. Su. to testify about his after-the-fact diagnosis of Appellant. The Commonwealth noted its objection based upon relevance to the extent Dr. Su would provide general testimony related to Appellant's mental state but would not offer testimony that was sufficient to show that Appellant lacked capacity to kill the victim. N.T., 10/23/19, at 29-30; N.T., 11/4/19, at 11-13; N.T., 11/5/19, Vol. I, at 14-15. Appellant stated that Dr. Su would not testify regarding Appellant's state of mind at the time of the killing, nor would Appellant seek to assert a diminished capacity defense based upon a mental disorder. N.T., 10/23/19, at 30; N.T., 11/4/19, at 15; N.T., 11/5/19, Vol. I, at 13. Instead, Appellant indicated that Dr. Su would testify as a fact witness regarding his diagnosis of Appellant with major depressive disorder and psychosis approximately three weeks after the incident in question. N.T., 10/23/19, at 31-32; N.T., 11/4/19, at 13-15; N.T., 11/5/19, Vol. I, at 13-14, 16.

The trial court sustained the Commonwealth's objection. N.T., 11/5/19, Vol. I, at 25. The court explained its reasoning in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion as follows:

Appellant conceded that neither Dr. Su, nor any other medical professional, would offer the requisite psychiatric testimony to support a diminished capacity defense. However, when pressed on relevancy, counsel admitted that Dr. Su's testimony would "[go] to the assertions of the Commonwealth that my client acted deliberately, maliciously, premeditatively ." [N.T., 11/5/19, Vol. I, at 20 (emphasis supplied).]
There is no difference between the stated proffer and the defense of diminished capacity. First degree murder is a homicide "committed by an intentional killing." 18 Pa.C.S.[ ] § 2502(a). An "intentional killing" is a "[k]illing by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing. " 18 Pa.C.S.[ ] § 2502(d) (emphasis supplied). By counsel's own admission, the proffered evidence would have put Appellant's capacity to commit an intentional killing at
...

To continue reading

Request your trial
2 cases
  • Commonwealth v. Hartleb
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • March 6, 2023
    ... ... appear in the trial transcript. This failure to set forth the ... statements that he challenges or cite to the portion of the ... record on which this claim is based waives any argument based ... on these alleged statements. Commonwealth v ... Gilbert , 269 A.3d 601, 612 & n.7 (Pa. Super. 2022) ... In addition, Appellant made no objection to any statements in ... the Commonwealth's closing argument during or after its ... closing argument. N.T. Trial, 9/15/21, at 183-214 ... Appellant's claim for relief based on alleged ... ...
  • Commonwealth v. Hernandez-Sandoval
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • December 6, 2022
    ...develop argument for appellant, nor will it "scour the record to find evidence to support an argument"). See also Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 269 A.3d 601, 612 (Pa.Super. 2022) (stating: "An appellant's failure to properly develop an argument with citations to the relevant portions of the reco......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT