Commonwealth v. Glenn

• Decision Date: 16 May 2023
• Docket Number: 534 WDA 2022,J-S01037-23
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. CHRISTOPHER DALE GLENN Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

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COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. CHRISTOPHER DALE GLENN Appellant

No. 534 WDA 2022

No. J-S01037-23

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

May 16, 2023

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 6, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-04-CR-0000329-2022.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS J.^[*]

MEMORANDUM

COLINS, J.

Christopher Dale Glenn appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following him pleading guilty to possessing a firearm as a prohibited person and receiving stolen property.^[1] For these offenses, Glenn was aggregately sentenced to five to ten years of imprisonment.^[2] On appeal Glenn's counsel contends that there are no non-frivolous issues to raise on his behalf and has correspondingly filed a petition to withdraw from representation and an Anders brief. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). After reviewing the record, both through the lens of the Anders brief and independently, we affirm Glenn's judgment of sentence and additionally grant counsel's petition to withdraw.

Although somewhat difficult to discern given the sparse record, Glenn admitted to having illegally possessed a firearm and stolen vehicle while in Beaver County, Pennsylvania, on February 16, 2022. See Plea Hearing, 4/6/22, at 11-14. According to the affidavit of probable cause, police officers were called to Anthony Gilbert's house after Gilbert informed them that Glenn had refused to leave his residence. See Affidavit of Probable Cause, 2/16/22, at 1. Gilbert also conveyed that Glenn had brandished a firearm. See id. Following his arrest, police confirmed that, in addition to being the subject of multiple extradition requests, Glenn had been convicted of several prior felony offenses. See id., at 2.

Corresponding with both a written and oral plea colloquy, Glenn pleaded guilty to the two above-named crimes and was sentenced on April 6, 2022. While still represented by counsel, Glenn filed a pro se, hand-written motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was dated April 8, 2022, date-stamped by the United States Postal Service on April 18, 2022, and filed in the lower court on April 19, 2022.

Glenn filed a counseled notice of appeal from his judgment of sentence on May 3, 2022. Instead of filing a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, Glenn's counsel submitted, in a filing dated May 17, 2022, a statement of intent to file an Anders/Santiago brief, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4). Independently, Glenn, pro se, filed his own concise statement of errors complained of on appeal in a document dated May 19, 2022, and filed May 25, 2022. In his pro se concise statement, Glenn asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition, Glenn avers that he was not guilty of receiving stolen property, and as to the firearms offense, he had a valid necessity defense.^[3]

Prior to our substantive consideration of identified or latent appellate issues, we must first consider counsel's petition to withdraw. See Commonwealth v. Garang, 9 A.3d 237, 240 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted). The submission of an Anders brief demonstrates counsel's belief that the current appeal is frivolous. Accordingly, to withdraw from representation, counsel must avail himself or herself of a well-defined set of procedures. Specifically, counsel is required to:

(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that after making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has determined the appeal would be frivolous;

(2) file a brief referring to any issues that might arguably support the appeal, but which does not resemble a no-merit letter; and

(3) furnish a copy of the brief to the defendant and advise him of his right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, or raise any additional points [counsel] deems worthy of this Court's attention.

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 906 A.2d 1225, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted).

As established in Santiago, our Supreme Court further refined the Anders requirements, necessitating that counsel:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record;

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal;

(3) set forth counsel's conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and

(4) state counsel's reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

978 A.2d at 361. Substantial compliance with these enumerated requirements is legally sufficient. See Commonwealth v. Redmond, 273 A.3d 1247, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted). If counsel has adhered to Anders and its progeny, this Court must thereafter "conduct a simple review of the record to ascertain if there appear on its face to be arguably meritorious issues that counsel, intentionally or not, missed or misstated." Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 272 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc).

Our review of counsel's submissions compels a conclusion that there has been minimal compliance with Anders. Counsel's petition to withdraw as counsel merely cross references the Anders brief and does not evidence any kind of conscientious examination of the record. See Petition to Withdraw as Counsel, filed 10/7/22, at 2.^[4] Moreover, the Anders brief simply states that counsel "reviewed the transcript of [Glenn's] plea and sentencing. [Counsel] has reviewed the lower court file and the client case file." Anders Brief, at 9.

As to the brief's other contents, counsel cursorily highlights the limited appellate claims one may raise after accepting a guilty plea and summarily concludes that there are no meritorious issues present. In its entirety, this section, which serves to demonstrate the frivolousness of the present appeal, spans approximately one page in length. In addition, the "facts" section of the Anders brief solely discusses the procedural history of this case (with some overview of Glenn's plea colloquy) and does not contain a single fact underpinning Glenn's crimes.

Although we do not condone counsel's marginal effort in outlining and analyzing legal or factual issues that may be present in this appeal, our review of this case has not been materially hampered. Accordingly, we find that counsel has nominally complied with Anders, and we therefore proceed to review the substantive claims addressed in counsel's brief.

In short, the Anders brief concludes that there are no presentable issues to argue before this Court. Specifically, Counsel indicates that there was nothing jurisdictionally infirm as to the trial court's acceptance of Glenn's guilty plea nor was there any evidence that the court imposed an illegal sentence. Moreover, counsel avers that Glenn's guilty plea, both in its oral and written form, was constitutionally and procedurally valid.

"Generally, a plea of guilty amounts to a waiver of all defects and defenses except those concerning the jurisdiction of the court, the legality of the sentence, and the validity of the guilty plea." Commonwealth v. Reichle, 589 A.2d 1140, 1141 (Pa. Super. 1991) (citations omitted).^[5] As to jurisdiction, "[t]he complaint and criminal information both recite the situs of the offense as occurring in Beaver County, Pennsylvania." Anders Brief, at 9; see also Plea Hearing, 4/6/22, at 11 (outlining the court's inquiry into whether Glenn was present in Beaver County when he committed his crimes). "[E]ach court of common pleas within this Commonwealth possesses the same subject matter jurisdiction to resolve cases arising under the Pennsylvania Crimes Code[.]" Commonwealth v. Bethea, 828 A.2d 1066, 1075 (Pa. 2003). Much like counsel, we see no jurisdictional basis for Glenn to contest his guilty plea.

On the question of whether the court imposed an illegal sentence, Glenn's firearm conviction was graded as a first-degree felony, see 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a.1)(1.1), and the receiving stolen property charge was determined to be a third-degree felony, see 18 Pa.C.S. § 3903(a.1) (specifying automobiles). As to the former crime, Glenn admitted that he "had been convicted of an offense that prohibited [him] from otherwise having or possessing a firearm." Plea Hearing, 4/6/22, at 12; 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(b).

The court imposed a five-to-ten-year term of incarceration at the former offense and a concurrent three-and-a-half-to-seven-year term at the latter conviction. The maximum sentence for a first-degree felony is twenty years of incarceration, see 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103(1), and seven years of incarceration for a third-degree felony, id., at § 1103(3). In accordance with these statutory precepts, the court did not exceed its authority in imposing either of Glenn's discrete sentences. See Commonwealth v. Berry, 887 A.2d 479, 483 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations omitted).

Regarding the sufficiency of Glenn's guilty plea, "[a] defendant wishing to challenge the voluntariness of a guilty plea on direct appeal must either object during the plea colloquy or file a motion to withdraw the plea within ten days of sentencing. Failure to employ either measure results in waiver." Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 609-10 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted). There is no evidence that Glenn objected to his guilty plea during the colloquy and, as stated supra, Glenn's filing of a pro se motion to withdraw was a legal nullity.^[6]

Even if a plea-related claim was not waived, the record establishes Glenn's knowing acquiesce to the plea's contents. Under Pennsylvania...