Commonwealth v. Hagenlock

• Decision Date: 18 September 1885
• Citation: 140 Mass. 125,3 N.E. 36
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. HAGENLOCK.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

140 Mass. 125

3 N.E. 36

COMMONWEALTH

v.HAGENLOCK.¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Filed September 18, 1885.

Indictment for an assault upon one Fanny Hill.

Edgar J. Sherman, Atty. Gen., for complainant.

The ruling of the court was correct. The defendant was properly convicted of the assault. Any attempt with intent to do harm to another's person is an assault. Any act by which one is put in present bodily fear is an assault. Mortin v. Shoppee, 3 Car. & P. 373; Stephens v. Myers, 4 Car. & P. 349; S.C. Bigelow, Torts, c. 5, § 2, and note; Tuberville v. Savage, 1 Mod. 3; 3 Greenl.Ev. (Redf.Ed.) § 59; 2 Bish.Crim.Law, § 23 et seq.; Com. v. White, 110 Mass. 408;State v. Davis, 1 Ired.Law, 125. It is well settled that intoxication is no extenuation of, or defense to, an assault. Com. v. Malone, 114 Mass. 295.

John B. O'Donnell, for defendant.

BY THE COURT.

It was competent for the jury to find from the evidence that the defendant made an attempt to do harm to the person of said Fanny Hill with intent to injure her. This was an assault, although he did not, in fact, touch her person. It was a question of fact for the jury to determine whether he was so far intoxicated as to be unable to form a guilty intent. Exceptions overruled.

1 intoXication As a defense in criminal case.1. EFFECT ON RESPONSIBILITY. Drunkenness or intoxication is no excuse for crime, Cross v. State, 12 N.W.Rep. 425;People v. Blake, 4 Pac.Rep. 1; Cook v. Territory of Wyoming, Id. 887; U.S. v. Claypool, 14 Fed.Rep. 127; State v. Bullock, 13 Ala. 413;Tidwell v. State, 70 Ala. 33;Cross v. State, 55 Wis. 261;S.C. 12 N.W.Rep. 425;Friery v. People, 54 Barb. 319; People v. Robinson, 1 Park.Crim.R. 649; State v. Thompson, 12 Nev. 140;Shannahan v. Com., 8 Bush. 464; State v. Turner, Wright, (Ohio,) 20; Boswell v. Com., 20 Grat. 860;State v. Mullen, 14 La.Ann. 570;Rafferty v. People, 66 Ill. 118;McKenzie v. State, 26 Ark. 335;People v. Williams, 43 Cal. 344; State v. Hurley, 1 Houst.Crim.Cas. 28; Mercer v. State, 17 Ga. 146;Shannahan v. Com., 8 Bush. 463;Schaller v. State, 14 Mo. 502;State v. Harlow, 21 Mo. 446;People v. Cummins, 47 Mich. 334;S.C. 11 N.W.Rep. 184;State v. Grear, 28 Minn. 426;S.C. 10 N.W.Rep. 472;Kelly v. State, 3 Smedes & M. 518;Kenny v. People, 31 N.Y. 330;O'Brien v. People, 48 Barb. 274;People v. Rogers, 18 N.Y. 9;People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9;Golden v. State, 25 Ga. 527; Com. v. Hart, 2 Brewst. 546; Com. v. Dougherty, 1 Browne, 20; Com. v. Hawkins, 3 Gray, 463; State v. Bowen, 1 Houst.Crim.Cas. 91; People v. Fuller, 2 Park.Crim.R. 16; Marshall v. State, 59 Ga. 154;Estes v. State, 55 Ga. 30; People v. Willey, 2 Park.Crim.R. 19; People v. Porter, Id. 14; Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424;State v. Keath, 83 N.C. 626; U.S. v. Forbes, Crabbe, 559; Respublica v. Weidle, 2 Dall. 88;U.S. v. McGlue, 1 Curt.C.C. 1;U.S. v. Drew, 5 Mas. 28;State v. McCants, 1 Speer, 393; Cornwell v. State, Mart. & Y. 147; Reg. v. Cruse, 8 Car. & P. 546; Rex v. Grindley, 7 Car. & P. 145; Rex v. Meakin, Id. 297; Burrow's Case, 1 Lew.C.C. 75; Reniger v. Fogossa, Plowd. 19; 1 Russ.Cr. 12; 2 Bl.Comm. 25; Coke, Comm. 274a; and cannot, of itself, be set up as a defense to a prosecution for crime, because it is neither a justification nor an excuse therefor, Cline v. State, 1 N.E.Rep. 22; and in those instances where it is resorted to in order to blunt the moral responsibility, it only serves to heighten the culpability of the offender. U.S. v. Claypool, 14 Fed.Rep. 127. The old English writers lay it down that drunkenness is always an aggravation of the crime, and it has been said that there are expressions in some of the cases in the United States to the same effect. See Com. v. Hart, 2 Brewst. 546; U.S. v. Forbes, Crabbe, 559. But this has been disputed by later authorities, McIntyre v. People, 38 Ill. 515;Ferrell v. State, 43 Tex. 503; and is not now looked upon as the law in this country. It is said in a recent case that where a person, having the desire to do another an unlawful injury, drinks intoxicating liquors to nerve himself up to the commission of the crime, that the intoxication is held to aggravate the offense; but that the rule that intoxication aggravates crime is confined to this class of cases. Cline v. State, 1 N.E.Rep. 22. Evidence of intoxication, however, is admissible in some cases to show that no crime has been committed, or to determine the grade of the crime. Id.Insanity produced by protracted over-indulgence in intoxicating liquors may be said not to be an excuse for crime, but a defense in prosecution therefor. People v. Blake, 4 Pac.Rep. 1;Fisher v. State, 64 Ind. 435;Bradley v. State, 31 Ind. 492;Cluck v. State, 40 Ind. 263;Carter v. State, 12 Tex. 500;Beasley v. State, 50 Ala. 149;O'Brien v. People, 48 Barb. 274;Erwin v. State, 10 Tex.App. 700;State v. Dillahunt, 3 Har. (Del.) 551; State v. Hurley, 1 Houst.Crim.Cas. 28; State v. Till, Id. 233; Maconnehey v. State, 5 Ohio St. 77; U.S. v. Clarke, 2 Cranch, C.C. 158; Golliher v. Com. 2 Duv. 163; State v. McGonigal, 5 Har. 510; Real v. People, 42 N.Y. 270;Schlencker v. State, 9 Neb. 241;S.C. 2 N.W.Rep. 710;Bailey v. State, 26 Ind. 422; Boswell's Case, 20 Grat. 860;U.S. v. Drew, 5 Mason, 28; Rennie's Case, Lew. 76; Reg. v. Dixon, 11 Cox, 341; Reg. v. Leigh, 4 Fost. & F. 915.Where irresponsible drunkenness is relied on as a defense to a prosecution for crime, the burden of proving such drunkenness is on the defendant, and he must establish it beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Grear, 13 N.W.Rep. 140. Contrary rule commented on and disapproved. Id.2. EFFECT ON INTENT. In some cases evidence of intoxication is admissible to show that no crime has been committed, or to fix the grade of the crime. Cline v. State, 1 N.E.Rep. 22. When the offense charged embraces deliberation, premeditation, some specific intent, or the like, evidence of intoxication at the time the deed was done may be important. Id. Evidence of drunkenness is admissible on the question of intent, when the intent is an element in the constitution of the offense, and without which the offense could not be committed; and if the accused was in such a condition of mind from intoxication as to be incapable of forming such intent, it will be a complete defense. People v. Blake, 4 Pac.Rep. 1; Cook v. Territory, Id. 887. Thus, in a prosecution for maliciously shooting with intent to wound, evidence that the defendant was so much intoxicated that he could not form or have such intent is admissible. Cline v. State, 1 N.E.Rep. 22. And where the defendant was so drunk that he was incapable of forming an intent to ravish the prosecutrix, such drunkenness is a defense to a prosecution for attempted rape. State v. Donovan, 16 N.W.Rep. 206.It is said that intoxication or drunkenness on the part of the defendant cannot, in a murder trial, form a legitimate matter of inquiry as between the crime of murder in the second degree and that of manslaughter; for manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice, express or implied, and without any mixture of deliberation. People v. Langton, 7 Pac.Rep. 843. The court say in this case that the question is not a new one to the court, but that it was passed upon and the same doctrine held in the case of People v. Nichol, 34 Cal. 215, and add: “In the case of Pirtle v. State, 9 Humph. 663, the supreme court of Tennessee say that, as between the two offenses of murder in the second degree and manslaughter, the drunkenness of the offender can form no legitimate matter of inquiry.”The supreme court of Minnesota say, in case of State v. Grear, 29 Minn. 221, S.C.13 N.W.Rep. 140, that “upon the subject of intoxication as a defense to a criminal charge the court instructed the jury to the effect that if the defendant was at the time of the shooting in such a condition of mind by reason of intoxication that he did not know what he was doing, or whether his acts were right or wrong, then he is irresponsible, and incapable of entertaining a criminal intent, and must be acquitted. We are by no means prepared to concede the correctness of the general rule thus laid down with respect to the effect of voluntary drunkenness in relieving of criminal responsibility. Certainly no such rule prevailed at common law. See Com. v. Hawkins, 3 Gray, 463;People v. Rogers, 18 N.Y. 9;Hopt v. People, 104 U.S. 631. It is at the same time true that there may be a degree of intoxication which will render a person incapable of entertaining the actual specific intent to do a certain thing which is by statute made a necessary ingredient of certain offenses. State v. Garvey, 11 Minn. 154, (Gil. 95.) So, also, it may be material for the prisoner to show intoxication where the charge is of murder, and there are different degrees of that crime, according to defendant's state of mind at the time the offense was committed.”In a recent Ohio case, Cline v. State, 1 N.E.Rep. 22, the late Judge OKEY, one of the most learned and able judges that ever sat upon the Ohio or any other bench, says that “where the offense charged embraces deliberation, premeditation, some specific intent, or the like, evidence of intoxication may be important, and it has frequently been admitted. Pigman v. State, 14 Ohio, 555;Nichols v. State, 8 Ohio St. 435;Davis v. State, 25 Ohio St. 369;Lytle v. State, 31 Ohio St. 196. The leading case of Pigman v. State has been repeatedly cited with approval, People v. Robinson, 2 Parker, Crim.R. 235; People v. Harris, 29 Cal. 678;Roberts v. People, 19 Mich. 401;State v. Welch, 21 Minn. 22;Hopt v. People, 104 U.S. 631;State v. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136; and no doubt the law upon the subject is correctly stated in that case, and that the rule as there expressed is humane and just; but there is always danger that undue weight will be attached to the fact of drunkenness, where it is shown in a criminal case, and courts and juries should see that it is only used for the purpose above stated, and not as a...