Commonwealth v. Hampton

• Decision Date: 12 February 2019
• Docket Number: No. 3149 EDA 2017,3149 EDA 2017
• Citation: 204 A.3d 452
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Jerome HAMPTON, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

204 A.3d 452

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania

v.Jerome HAMPTON, Appellant

No. 3149 EDA 2017

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted October 1, 2018

Filed February 12, 2019

Reargument Denied April 15, 2019

Dean M. Beer, Public Defender, and Lee B. Awbrey, Public Defender, Norristown, for appellant.

Kevin R. Steele, District Attorney, Todd N. Barnes, Assistant District Attorney, and Robert M. Falin, Assistant District Attorney, Norristown, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

OPINION BY BOWES, J.:

Jerome Hampton appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI"). We vacate the judgment of sentence, reverse the order denying suppression, and remand for further proceedings.

The trial court set forth the factual and procedural background underlying the instant appeal as follows:

Police Officer Kathleen Byrne,^{[1 ]} of Lower Salford Township, Montgomery County, was on patrol in a marked police vehicle on October 30, 2016, at approximately 3:22 a.m. While stopped on Freed Road at the intersection of Main Street, a vehicle proceeded past her on westbound Main Street. The officer turned westbound onto Main Street and moments later the vehicle's left turn signal activated and the vehicle turned into a field on property belonging to a church. The driver, later identified as [Appellant], stopped the vehicle in the grass in front of the church's office building. Officer Byrne pulled behind the vehicle [without activating the overhead lights or siren on her police cruiser]. [Appellant] turned off the vehicle and he and a female passenger got out. The female passenger approached Officer Byrne and told the officer that she had been giving [Appellant] directions on how to get to her home and he had turned too soon.

Officer Byrne requested identification from [Appellant] and the passenger and had them return to [Appellant's] vehicle. The officer returned to her patrol car and learned that [Appellant's] driver's license had been suspended for driving-under-the-influence-related offenses. [Although not immediately, at some point during the encounter, Officer Byrne turned on her spotlight.]

The officer returned to [Appellant's] vehicle and he admitted to knowing his license had been suspended. During this interaction, Officer Byrne detected an odor of alcohol coming from inside the vehicle and observed that [Appellant's] eyes were glassy. [Appellant] told the officer he had had two shots about two hours before. Based on the results of field sobriety tests and a preliminary breath test that showed the presence of alcohol, Officer Byrne arrested [Appellant] for suspicion of driving under the influence. [Appellant] agreed to a chemical test of his breath, which showed a blood alcohol concentration of .161 percent.

The Commonwealth charged [Appellant] with driving under the influence and related offenses. He filed a motion to suppress, which the [trial] court denied after a hearing [on August 28, 2017. Following the hearing, Appellant] proceeded to a stipulated bench trial, at which he was found guilty of one count of driving under the influence, high rate.... Later that day, [the trial] court sentenced [Appellant] to 1-5 years in prison for the DUI offense^[2]

[Appellant] filed a timely post-sentence motion, seeking application of the Recidivism Risk Reduction Incentive ("RRRI"). [The trial] court granted the motion. [Appellant] then filed a timely notice of appeal and, after being appointed new counsel and granted an extension of time, complied with [the trial] court's directive to produce a concise statement of errors under [Pa.R.A.P.] 1925(b).

Trial Court Opinion, 12/22/17, at 1-3 (original footnotes and unnecessary capitalization omitted, footnotes added).

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

I. Whether the police had reasonable suspicion or probable cause which merited following Appellant's vehicle. Whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed to justify the search and seizure of the Appellant. Whether all evidence derived from the illegal stop and seizure must therefore be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.

II. Appellant challenges the illegal intrusion on the grounds that Officer Byrne alleges that she thought Appellant's car may have been disabled or the passenger experiencing a medical issue where such a belief was unreasonable under the circumstances and a mere pretext for an illegal stop, detention and seizure or Appellant's person and property. The public safety exception of the [c]ommunity [c]are[taking] [d]octrine^[3] does not apply.

III. The trial court erred in failing to suppress the results of the breath test and/or in determining that Appellant voluntarily consented to the breath test.

Appellant's brief at 7 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

The standard of review for the denial of a motion to suppress evidence is as follows:

We may consider only the Commonwealth's evidence and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error. An appellate court, of course, is not bound by the suppression court's conclusions of law.

Commonwealth v. Livingstone , 174 A.3d 609, 619 (Pa. 2017) (citation omitted). In reviewing questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Id. (citation omitted).

In arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, Appellant maintains that, at the moment Officer Byrne pulled behind his stopped vehicle in her marked police vehicle, and blocked his means of egress, he was subjected to an investigative detention or seizure that was not supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause, nor rendered valid under the public servant exception of the community caretaking doctrine. In its brief, the Commonwealth asserts that the trial court correctly determined that the initial interaction between Officer Byrne and Appellant was a mere encounter until she smelled alcohol, at which time she developed a reasonable suspicion of DUI, thereby warranting an investigative detention.

To secure the right of citizens to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, courts in Pennsylvania require law enforcement officers to demonstrate ascending levels of suspicion to justify their interactions with citizens to the extent those interactions compromise individual liberty. See Commonwealth v. Reppert , 814 A.2d 1196, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2002) (en banc ). For this purpose, courts in Pennsylvania have defined three types of police interaction: a mere encounter, an investigative detention, and a custodial detention. A mere encounter is characterized by limited police presence, and police conduct and questions that are not suggestive of coercion. Such encounters do not obligate the citizen to stop or respond and, consequently, need not be supported by any level of suspicion. See id. Thus, the hallmark of a mere encounter is that the subject is free to decline to interact with the police or to answer questions, and is also free to leave at any time. See Commonwealth v. DeHart , 745 A.2d 633, 636 (Pa.Super. 2000).

If, however, a police presence becomes too intrusive, the interaction must be deemed an investigative detention or seizure. An investigative detention, by implication, carries an official compulsion to stop and respond. Id. Since this interaction has elements of official compulsion it must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person seized is engaged in criminal activity and may continue only so long as is necessary to confirm or dispel such suspicion. Commonwealth v. Strickler , 563 Pa. 47, 757 A.2d 884, 889 (2000). Finally, an arrest or custodial detention must be supported by probable cause to believe the person is engaged in criminal activity. Id.

At issue herein is whether Officer Byrne's interaction with Appellant constituted an investigative detention or seizure. To decide whether a seizure has occurred, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the demeanor and conduct of the police would have communicated to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to decline the officer's request or otherwise terminate the encounter. See Strickler , supra at 890 ("holding that courts must consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether a seizure occurred."). A variety of factors may influence this determination, including "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." Livingstone , supra at 621 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall , 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). As our High Court has explained, "subtle factors as the demeanor of the police officer, the location of the confrontation, the manner of expression used by the officer in addressing the citizen, and the content of the interrogatories or statements" must be considered. Commonwealth v. Jones , 474 Pa. 364, 378 A.2d 835, 839-40 (1977). An additional factor is whether the police officer physically prevents the citizen from leaving. See Commonwealth v. Greber , 478 Pa. 63, 385 A.2d 1313, 1316 (1978) (plurality) (holding that detaining appellees by blocking their automobile constituted a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). Thus, the focal point of our inquiry must be whether, considering the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have thought he was being restrained had he been in the defendant's shoes. Reppert , supra , at 1201-02.

As our Supreme Court has observed:

The United States

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