Commonwealth v. Harris
| Decision Date | 03 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1981 EDA 2020 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Ronald HARRIS |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Joanna R. Hess Kunz, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellant.
Lawrence J. Goode, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellant.
Katherine A. Muns, Public Defender, Philadelphia, for appellee.
Jena M. Simonds, Public Defender, Philadelphia, for appellee.
Aaron J. Marcus, Public Defender, Philadelphia, for appellee.
I.
The Commonwealth appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) granting the pretrial motion filed by Ronald Harris (Harris) to quash charges filed against him because there was no direct evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing that he shot the victim.
Harris was charged with attempted murder and related offenses after allegedly shooting Nisheed Stewart (Stewart). When Stewart failed to show for any of the scheduled preliminary hearings, the Commonwealth presented testimony of the detective who took his statement identifying Harris as the shooter. Harris was held for court on all charges based on our then-extant decision in Commonwealth v. Ricker , 120 A.3d 349 (Pa. Super. 2015) ( Ricker I ), which held that hearsay alone is enough to establish a prima facie case. While the case was pending, our Supreme Court overruled Ricker I in Commonwealth v. McClelland , ––– Pa. ––––, 233 A.3d 717 (2020) ( McClelland II ), holding that the Commonwealth cannot rely on hearsay alone to establish a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing. Relying on McClelland II , the trial court quashed all charges because there was no direct non-hearsay evidence that Harris shot Stewart.
On appeal, the Commonwealth asserts that McClelland II is inapplicable because it did not present hearsay alone at the preliminary hearing. While conceding that it relied on hearsay evidence to identify Harris, the Commonwealth emphasizes it also presented non-hearsay evidence through its police witnesses that a crime was committed. In their view, as long as it presents some direct evidence for one element of a charged offense, then it is allowed to rely on hearsay alone for other elements of the crime, including identification of the defendant. The Commonwealth argues this expressly allowed under the rule of criminal procedure governing preliminary hearings, which provides that "[h]earsay evidence shall be sufficient to establish any element of an offense[.]" Pa.R.Crim.P. 542(E).
After review, we conclude that the trial court correctly applied McClelland II in holding there was insufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case as to each element at the preliminary hearing where the Commonwealth relied on hearsay evidence alone to establish that Harris committed the offense.
II.
On March 23, 2017, around 7:50 p.m., Philadelphia Police Officer Ryan Waltman (Officer Waltman) received a radio call of a male gunshot victim near the 3100 block of North Patton Street. When he arrived, Officer Waltman found Stewart bleeding from gunshot wounds to his right wrists and left thigh. Stewart was taken to a nearby hospital. Around 9:10 p.m., Detective John Drudin (Detective Drudin) obtained a statement from Stewart about what happened. Stewart described that Harris and his brother, Rasheed Harris, confronted him about stealing drugs from them. During the confrontation, both men pulled out guns and began firing, striking Stewart twice as he ran away. Based on this information, Detective Drudin went to the crime scene and found multiple projectiles and fired cartridge casings. He then went to his office and printed out photographs of Ronald Harris and Rasheed Harris. Detective Drudin returned to the hospital with the photographs. Stewart confirmed that the men in the photographs were the men who shot him.
The Commonwealth waited two years before finally filing its criminal complaint on May 9, 2019, at which time Harris was arrested and incarcerated for failing to post bail. In total, the Commonwealth charged Harris with eleven offenses: attempted murder, aggravated assault, intimidation, conspiracy to commit murder, possessing instruments of crime, simple assault, recklessly endangering another person, terroristic threats, and VUFA offenses 6105, 6106 and 6108.1
Stewart did not show for the first two scheduled preliminary hearings. When he failed to show for the third, the Commonwealth went ahead with the hearing and called Officer Waltman and Detective Drudin. Officer Waltman testified about responding to the call and finding Stewart with two gunshot wounds. Detective Drudin, meanwhile, testified about finding the ballistics evidence at the scene of the shooting. Through the detective's testimony, the Commonwealth presented Stewart's statement about the shooting and his photographic identification of Ronald Harris and Rasheed Harris as the men who shot him. Over Harris's objections, the municipal court admitted the hearsay evidence. At the end of the hearing, Harris argued the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case because it presented only hearsay that he was one of the shooters. The Commonwealth countered that hearsay evidence alone was enough under Ricker I . The municipal court agreed with the Commonwealth and held all charges for court except intimidation.
After being held for court, Harris filed a pretrial motion to quash the charges.2 The trial court granted the motion as to attempted murder but denied it as to the remaining charges. While the case was pending, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided McClelland II on July 21, 2020, overruling Ricker I and holding that hearsay evidence alone cannot establish a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing. See McClelland II , 233 A.3d at 734 ().
Because of McClelland II , Harris filed a motion for reconsideration of his motion to quash. At the hearing, the Commonwealth informed the trial court that homicide detectives had been unable to locate Stewart and, consequently, it would have to rely on the transcript of the preliminary hearing. Finding McClelland II applicable, the trial court granted the motion to quash all charges because "there is no admissible evidence here which connects [Harris] to the crimes for which he was charged." Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 12/28/20, at 7. After the Commonwealth filed this appeal, the trial court lowered Harris's bail to an unsecured amount on October 17, 2020, bringing his 17-month pretrial incarceration to an end.
The Commonwealth now raises this issue for review:
Did the lower court err by quashing all charges on the purported ground of [ McClelland II ], where in the instant case the Commonwealth presented both non-hearsay and hearsay evidence at the preliminary hearing, all of which was admissible and together established a prima facie case sufficient to proceed to trial on all charges?
III.
We must first determine whether we have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal from an order quashing charges bound over for trial at a preliminary hearing due to lack of evidence. See Commonwealth v. Young , 246 A.3d 887, 888 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted) (subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law and may be raised by the court sua sponte ).
Appellate review of any court order is a jurisdictional question defined by rule or statute. This principle applies to appellate review of a pretrial order. A court may consider the issue of jurisdiction sua sponte . In evaluating our jurisdiction to allow [a party's] appeal, we look to other criminal cases involving appeals of pretrial orders .... In this Commonwealth, an appeal may only be taken from: 1) a final order or one certified by the trial court as final; 2) an interlocutory order as of right; 3) an interlocutory order by permission; or 4) a collateral order.
Commonwealth v. Parker , 173 A.3d 294, 296 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
The Commonwealth asserts that the trial court's order quashing the charges is an appealable final order under Pa.R.A.P. 742. See Commonwealth's Brief at 1 ().
However, in McClelland II , after the trial court denied his habeas petition, the defendant filed an interlocutory appeal that we permitted because "extraordinary circumstances" existed to justify accepting the appeal. See McClelland II , 233 A.3d at 724-25. On appeal to our Supreme Court, the Commonwealth challenged whether interlocutory appellate review was appropriate. The Court, however, declined to consider this challenge, stating that our allowance of the appeal was "beyond the scope of the issue upon which allocatur was granted." Id. at 732 n.8. In so doing, however, the Court reiterated that "[a]n order denying or granting a writ of habeas corpus is interlocutory." Id. (citing Commonwealth v. La Belle , 531 Pa. 256, 612 A.2d 418 (1992) ).
After McClelland II , we quashed two Commonwealth interlocutory appeals involving similar circumstances. In both instances, the panels found it lacked jurisdiction to consider Commonwealth appeals from trial court orders granting habeas relief and dismissing all charges without prejudice to charges being refiled. See Commonwealth v. Hacker , 253 A.3d 252 (Pa. Super. April 1, 2021) (unpublished memorandum), reargument denied (June 8, 2021); Commonwealth v. Rogers , 2021 WL 2592241, 1302 MDA 2020 (Pa. Super. June 1, 2021) ...
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