Commonwealth v. Haynes
| Decision Date | 05 October 2015 |
| Citation | 2015 PA Super 214,125 A.3d 800 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Roysce HAYNES, Appellee. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Roysce Haynes, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Branden J. Albaugh, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth.
Bernice Melamud, Public Defender, Philadelphia, for Haynes.
In these cross-appeals, Roysce Haynes (“Haynes”) and the Commonwealth appeal from the judgment of sentence entered on July 1, 2014, in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. On appeal, the Commonwealth challenges the trial court's refusal to apply 42 Pa.C.S. § 9715, which mandates a life sentence for a defendant “who has previously been convicted at any time of murder,” based on the trial court's conclusion that the term “murder” excludes “murder of an unborn child.” In his cross-appeal, Haynes claims that the sentence of thirty-five to seventy years of incarceration is manifestly excessive and fails to take into consideration his mental health needs. After careful review, we conclude that neither party is entitled to relief, and we affirm the judgment of sentence.
The trial court set forth the relevant factual background of this matter as follows:
During the afternoon of September 10, 2012, Philadelphia Probation and Parole Officers Shondell Williams and Evan Moore–Mathis visited [Haynes]. As they approached his apartment, they saw him sitting on the steps outside the apartment entrance. He appeared stunned and was somewhat unresponsive to questions. His head was lowered and when asked whether the police should be summoned, he said yes. N.T. April 29, 2014, pp. 81–87.
Philadelphia Police Officer Jonathan Ransom was called to 850 Chelton Avenue in the Germantown section of Philadelphia. There he encountered [Haynes], who told him that he had been in an argument with his girlfriend, that the argument had become physical, and that he had choked her. When Officer Ransom went inside [Haynes's] apartment, he saw the decedent, Atiya Perry, lying on the floor and bleeding from the head. She had no signs of life. Officer Ransom noticed a bloody towel lying on the floor near her head. Id. at 32–46.
Dr. Marlin Osbourne, Assistant Medical Examiner, performed the autopsy on the decedent and determined that her death was a homicide achieved by strangulation. [The decedent] also had small lacerations on her left cheek. Dr. Osbourne determined that based on the size of the fetus in her uterus, she had been pregnant for seven weeks at the time of her death. Id. at 113–124.
Detective Edward Tolliver took a statement from [Haynes] the day of the killing. In it, [Haynes] acknowledged killing the decedent. He said that the decedent had been hitting him with a closed fist on the side of his head and that she had tried to use pepper spray against him, and that he choked her. He also said that the decedent had told him that she was pregnant, but that he did not believe her. Id. at 139–157. Detective Tracey Byard searched the apartment in the immediate aftermath of the murder. He did not find any mace or pepper spray anywhere in the apartment. Id. at 189. Prenatal vitamins and magazines about pregnancy were found in the apartment. Id. at 68–69.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/18/14, at 2–3 (footnote omitted).
On September 10, 2012, Haynes was arrested and charged with murder and murder of an unborn child.1 On April 30, 2014, following a jury trial, Haynes was found guilty of murder in the third degree for killing Atiya Perry and third-degree murder of her unborn child. On July 1, 2014, the trial court sentenced Haynes to a term of twenty to forty years of incarceration on the third-degree murder charge and a consecutive term of fifteen to thirty years of incarceration for third-degree murder of an unborn child. This resulted in an aggregated sentence of thirty-five to seventy years. On July 21, 2014, the Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal and on July 22, 2014, Haynes filed a timely cross-appeal. The Commonwealth, Haynes, and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P.1925.
Commonwealth's Appeal at 2067 EDA 2014
In a case of first impression, in the appeal at Superior Court Docket Number 2067 EDA 2014, the Commonwealth presents the following issue for this Court's consideration:
Did the lower court impose an illegal sentence by declining to comply with 42 Pa.C.S. § 9715?
We review an illegal-sentence claim pursuant to the following parameters:
The scope and standard of review applied to determine the legality of a sentence are well established. If no statutory authorization exists for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to correction. An illegal sentence must be vacated. In evaluating a trial court's application of a statute, our standard of review is plenary and is limited to determining whether the trial court committed an error of law.
Commonwealth v. Poland, 26 A.3d 518, 523 (Pa.Super.2011) (citation omitted).
Here, the Commonwealth avers that the trial court erred in failing to apply the sentencing requirement set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9715, which provides as follows:
Life imprisonment for homicide
(a) Mandatory life imprisonment.—Notwithstanding the provisions of section 9712 (), 9713 (relating to sentences for offenses committed on public transportation) or 9714 (relating to sentences for second and subsequent offenses), any person convicted of murder of the third degree in this Commonwealth who has previously been convicted at any time of murder or voluntary manslaughter in this Commonwealth or of the same or substantially equivalent crime in any other jurisdiction shall be sentenced to life imprisonment, notwithstanding any other provision of this title or other statute to the contrary.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9715(a) (emphasis added).
The crimes for which Haynes was convicted, third-degree murder and third-degree murder of an unborn child, are defined as follows:
§ 2501. Criminal homicide
(a) Offense defined.—A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death of another human being.
(b) Classification.—Criminal homicide shall be classified as murder, voluntary manslaughter, or involuntary manslaughter.
18 Pa.C.S. § 2501.
§ 2502. Murder
(a) Murder of the first degree.—A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the first degree when it is committed by an intentional killing.
(b) Murder of the second degree.—A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the second degree when it is committed while defendant was engaged as a principal or an accomplice in the perpetration of a felony.
(c) Murder of the third degree.—All other kinds of murder shall be murder of the third degree. Murder of the
third degree is a felony of the first degree.
18 Pa.C.S. § 2502.
§ 2604. Murder of unborn child
* * *
(c) Third degree murder of unborn child.—
(1) All other kinds of murder of an unborn child shall be third degree murder of an unborn child.
(2) The penalty for third degree murder of an unborn child is the same as the penalty for murder of the third degree.
18 Pa.C.S. § 2604(c).
The Commonwealth argues that the trial court erred in not imposing a life sentence and cites to Commonwealth v. Morris, 958 A.2d 569 (Pa.Super.2008) (en banc ) as support for its argument. Commonwealth's Brief at 7. In Morris, a case where the appellant was convicted of two separate counts of third-degree murder, an en banc panel of this Court concluded that even though both convictions arose from the same criminal incident and trial, the trial court did not err in applying 42 Pa.C.S. § 9715 and imposing a life sentence. The Morris Court concluded that while the appellant was convicted of two third-degree murders in the same trial, the “at any time” language from the statute allowed one of the murder convictions to mandate a life sentence for the other murder conviction.
The Commonwealth also argues that the term “murder” as used in the phrase “previously been convicted at any time of murder” is unambiguous and includes “murder of an unborn child.” Commonwealth's Brief at 7. Thus, the Commonwealth asserts that Haynes was “previously convicted of murder” because the jury convicted him of third-degree murder of an unborn child as well as third-degree murder of decedent, Atiya Perry. Accordingly, the Commonwealth claims the trial court imposed an illegal sentence when it did not sentence Haynes to a mandatory term of life in prison. Commonwealth's Brief at 7.
It is undisputed that 42 Pa.C.S. § 9715 provides that when a defendant “has previously been convicted at any time of murder or voluntary manslaughter in this Commonwealth or of the same or substantially equivalent crime in any other jurisdiction” it triggers the application of a life sentence for a separate third-degree murder conviction. Morris further instructs us that the order of commission or conviction of the offenses is immaterial so long as the defendant has been convicted of another “murder.” Morris, 958 A.2d at 580. However, the facts of the case sub judice raise an additional issue: does murder of an unborn child qualify as a crime contemplated by section 9715 that requires a life sentence upon a separate third-degree murder conviction? Because we conclude that murder of an unborn child is not an offense enumerated in section 9715 which triggers a mandatory life sentence,2 we affirm.
Section 9715 states that if a defendant is convicted of murder or voluntary manslaughter in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the mandatory sentence of life in prison applies if that defendant is convicted of an additional third-degree murder. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9715(a). However, section 9715(a) makes no mention of the separate crime of murder of an unborn child. This creates some ambiguity, or uncertainty, in the statute. Accordingly, we look to our well-established rules of statutory construction.
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