Commonwealth v. Hill
| Decision Date | 30 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 36 WAP 2019,36 WAP 2019 |
| Citation | 238 A.3d 399 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Bryan HILL, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
In this opinion, we address whether Bryan Hill ("Appellant") has raised a non-waivable federal double jeopardy challenge to the legality of his sentence imposed for two guilty verdicts of driving under the influence ("DUI") of alcohol stemming from one act of DUI, and if so, whether the claim has merit.1 We conclude that Appellant's double jeopardy claim, solely as it relates to his second sentence for DUI, implicates the legality of his sentence, rendering the claim immune from waiver. Regarding the substance of that claim, we need not reach a definitive conclusion that Appellant's sentence violates double jeopardy because his sentence is illegal on non-constitutional grounds.2 Accordingly, we vacate in part the Superior Court's judgment, as well as Appellant's second DUI sentence.
In the early morning hours of April 22, 2015, several Penn Hills police officers, including Sergeant Joseph Blaze, were investigating a report of shots fired.3 That investigation lead Sergeant Blaze to the intersection of Frankstown Road and Robinson Boulevard. As the sergeant drove through that intersection with a green light, he heard tires squealing and observed a dark gray vehicle speeding directly at him. Appellant was driving that vehicle. Appellant's vehicle entered the intersection in an uncontrolled skid and nearly hit Sergeant Blaze's police car. The sergeant turned his vehicle around and pursued Appellant. Other officers soon joined in the pursuit.
Sergeant Blaze and Officer Dustin Hess eventually observed Appellant walking away from his vehicle, which was parked in a residential driveway. As Appellant approached the front door of that residence, the officers noticed that he appeared to be intoxicated. Officer Hess ordered Appellant to stop so the officers could speak with him, but Appellant ignored the directive, choosing instead to pound on the front door of the home and to exclaim to the officers, inter alia , "I didn't almost hit you ... I wasn't going too fast ... I made it home." N.T., 10/14/2016, at 14-15. The officers ultimately escorted Appellant to the Penn Hills police station for chemical testing. Appellant, however, was belligerent and uncooperative. He refused to take a breathalyzer test.
Relevant to this appeal, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with two counts of DUI. More specifically, on July 1, 2016, the Commonwealth issued a criminal information charging Appellant with one count of DUI-general impairment, allegedly in violation of 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(a)(1) and 3804(c)(1) ("Count 1") and a second count of DUI-general impairment, allegedly in violation of 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(a)(1) and 3804(a)(1) ("Count 2").
To understand these charges, which are at the center of this appeal, it is necessary for us to explain the substance of the relevant portions of Sections 3802 and 3804 of the Vehicle Code. Section 3802 is entitled "Driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance." 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802. Subsection 3802(a)(1), for which Appellant was charged in both Counts 1 and 2, is entitled "General impairment" and states:
An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the individual is rendered incapable of safely driving, operating or being in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1).
Section 3804 of the Vehicle Code is entitled "Penalties" and provides specific, mandatory sentences for violations of Subsection 3802(a)(1) (DUI-general impairment), all of which, as explained below, include mandatory minimum sentences. Subsection 3804(c)(1), which Appellant was charged with violating in Count 1, states, in pertinent part, as follows:
75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(c)(1).
Subsection 3804(a)(1), which Appellant was charged with violating in Count 2, states, in pertinent part, as follows:
75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(a)(1).
Thus, Count 1 charged Appellant with DUI-general impairment ( 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) ) coupled with the penalty provision for refusing to submit to a breath test ( 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(c)(1) ), and Count 2 charged Appellant with DUI-general impairment ( 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) ) coupled with the generic penalty provision for DUI-general impairment ( 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(a)(1) ). Appellant filed several pre-trial motions; however, he did not object to being charged with these two separate counts of DUI.
Following a bench trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty of, inter alia , the two-previously mentioned counts of DUI. Appellant did not object to the verdict. In December of 2016, the court sentenced Appellant. For Count 1, the court sentenced Appellant consistent with Subsection 3804(c)(1) of the Vehicle Code () by, inter alia , imposing a sentence of three to six days of incarceration, followed by six months of probation. Regarding Count 2, the court did not sentence Appellant consistent with the DUI statutory scheme. Rather, the court chose to sentence Appellant pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(a)(2) by entering a "determination of guilt without further penalty."4
As we will discuss below, this sentencing option factors into our disposition of this appeal; thus, we pause to explain it. In so doing, we observe that Section 9721 of the Sentencing Code is entitled "Sentencing generally," and as that title implies, Section 9721 applies to the general practice of sentencing in criminal matters. Subsection 9721(a)(2), i.e. , the provision that the trial court elected to employ in sentencing Appellant for his second conviction for DUI-general impairment, grants trial courts the discretion, in determining the sentence to be imposed, to select "[a] determination of guilt without further penalty." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(a)(2). However, that discretion is limited.
Indeed, Subsection 9721(a.1) of the Sentencing Code sets forth several limitations to a court's ability to sentence a defendant pursuant to Subsection 9721(a), which is inclusive of Subsection 9721(a)(2). Relevant to this matter, Subsection 9721(a.1)(1) states that Subsection 9721(a) "shall not apply where a mandatory minimum sentence is otherwise provided by law." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(a.1)(1). Notably, Appellant did not object to his sentences. Further, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, but he did not raise any issues concerning his two DUI convictions or sentences. That motion eventually was deemed denied by operation of law.
Appellant then appealed to the Superior Court. While he presented several issues to the Superior Court that are not relevant to his current appeal to this Court, he again did not challenge his two DUI convictions or sentences on double jeopardy or any other grounds. The Superior Court affirmed Appellant's judgment of sentence in an unpublished memorandum. Commonwealth v. Hill , 209 A.3d 1089 (Pa. Super. 2019) (unpublished memorandum). Appellant then filed a petition for allowance of appeal ("PAA") in this Court. Commonwealth v. Hill , 76 WAL 2019.
Appellant raised two issues in his PAA. Pertinent to the instant matter, Appellant argued, for the first time, that he is "entitled to have his conviction and sentence at Count 2 vacated, as that conviction and sentence violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution." PAA at 44. Thus, Appellant asserted, his double conviction and sentence for one act of DUI resulted in an illegal sentence - a claim that he allegedly was not required to preserve in the trial court. Stated differently, Appellant asked this Court to examine whether a double jeopardy claim relating to his second DUI conviction and sentence implicated the legality of his sentence, rendering his claim non-waivable, and if so, whether that claim warranted appropriate relief.
We granted Appellant's PAA, limited to the following issues, as rephrased by the Court in its order granting allocatur :
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Commonwealth v. MacFarlane
... ... lodged with the trial court ... In ... general, issues not properly raised and preserved before the ... trial court "are waived and cannot be raised for the ... first time on appeal." Pa. R.A.P. 302(a); see also ... Commonwealth v. Hill, 659 Pa. 359, 238 A.3d 399, 407 ... (2020) (noting issues not raised in trial court are waived ... and cannot thereafter be raised for first time on appeal). An ... appellate issue implicating the legality of one's ... sentence, however, is an exception to the issue ... ...