Commonwealth v. Hinds

Decision Date20 April 2021
Docket NumberSJC-12953
Citation166 N.E.3d 441,487 Mass. 212
Parties COMMONWEALTH v. Adrian HINDS.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Elaine Fronhofer, for the defendant.

Joseph G.A. Coliflores, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Rebecca Kiley, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Michael Tumposky, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.

LOWY, J.

In March 2016, the defendant, Adrian B. Hinds, fought with Miranda Arthur-Smith and Nathaniel Cherniak. As a result, the defendant was indicted on two counts of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon resulting in serious injury, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (c ) (i).1 The defendant, who is black, claimed that Cherniak, who is white, had initiated the attack out of racial animus and that the defendant acted in self-defense.

To support this argument, the defendant proposed having two experts testify at trial about the cultural significance of a symbol that Cherniak had tattooed on his arm. The defendant alleged that the symbol -- which he claimed was the number 211 -- was affiliated with groups that espoused white supremacist ideology.2 After holding voir dire for each expert, the judge excluded both experts on reliability grounds under the Daubert- Lanigan standard. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585-595, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 25-26, 641 N.E.2d 1342 (1994). At trial, the Commonwealth alleged that the defendant attacked Arthur-Smith and Cherniak without justification. The defendant subsequently was convicted on both counts of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon resulting in serious injury.

On appeal, we consider, among other issues, whether the judge erred in excluding the defendant's experts. We conclude that the judge abused his discretion in excluding one of the experts. Because this error was prejudicial, we reverse and remand for a new trial.3

Background. We summarize the evidence at trial, reserving certain facts for our discussion of the issues. We start by noting what was undisputed. The defendant and the victims knew each other before the fight. At the time of the incident, the defendant lived with his mother in the same Westfield apartment building as Arthur-Smith and Cherniak, who lived together. Indeed, the defendant and Cherniak were even friendly with one another, but the friendship ended approximately six months before the fight that gave rise to this case. As will become apparent, the parties agreed on few other details.

1. The Commonwealth's case. Cherniak testified that his relationship with the defendant soured when the defendant accused him of being with the Russian mafia, a Mexican cartel, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, and of being an undercover agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration. Cherniak further testified that several days before the altercation, the defendant confronted him in the apartment building with a hammer and said that Cherniak was going to be sent to a concentration camp.

Arthur-Smith testified that the altercation began when she was pushed to the ground after leaving the apartment building to head to her car. She felt something strike the back of her head and, after turning over, recognized the defendant as the attacker. She testified that the defendant struck her from four to five times with a hammer. Arthur-Smith claimed that the defendant smelled as if he had not bathed in some time and that during the attack the defendant said to her: "That's for messing with my mother." As the attack ensued, Arthur-Smith yelled out Cherniak's name.

Cherniak testified that upon hearing Arthur-Smith yelling his name, he left their apartment with a knife. When Cherniak opened the front door of the building, he saw the defendant standing over Arthur-Smith, who was bleeding. At that point, Arthur-Smith's pet dog ran out of the building, causing Arthur-Smith to stand up to chase the dog. The defendant went inside the building. Cherniak, too, went inside, heading back to his apartment to retrieve pepper spray; he then returned outside. Thereafter, the defendant went back outside, hammer again in hand. Cherniak sprayed the defendant with the pepper spray, and the defendant struck Cherniak with the hammer several times. After this, the defendant entered his car and drove away.

2. The defendant's case. The defendant offered a different version of events. To begin, the defendant testified that while living in the Westfield apartment building, both he and his mother experienced several racially charged incidents and that their cars’ tires had been slashed while parked near the apartment complex.4 The defendant did not testify that Cherniak was behind these incidents. He did, however, testify that his friendship with Cherniak ended when Cherniak repeatedly asked the defendant to sell drugs for him, assuming that the defendant was a drug dealer because, as the defendant testified that Cherniak said, "You're black, you drive a Porsche, and you're only twenty-something years old." Further, the defendant testified that Cherniak told the defendant that he had been a member of a "biker club" or "gang" in New York City.5

In contrast to Cherniak and Arthur-Smith's testimony, the defendant testified that the altercation began when he heard a loud bang outside his apartment, which the defendant believed was the door to the building slamming shut. The defendant was in the shower when he heard the noise.6 Because his car previously had been vandalized, he looked out the window to check on it. From his apartment window, the defendant saw Arthur-Smith and Cherniak standing near his car and Cherniak using a knife to slash his rear tire.7 Seeing that Cherniak had a knife, the defendant grabbed a hammer before leaving his apartment.

The defendant testified that he verbally confronted Arthur-Smith and Cherniak when they returned inside the apartment building. Standing in the building's hallway, Cherniak responded to the defendant by saying something to the effect of "What are you going to do about it?" Arthur-Smith then sprayed the defendant with pepper spray, making it difficult for the defendant to keep his eyes open. The defendant saw Cherniak pull out a knife. The defendant then went toward the door leading outside, swinging his hammer as he went. Arthur-Smith sprayed the defendant as she backed out through the exterior door. As the defendant reached the steps that led down from the building's exterior door, he heard what sounded like someone falling. Cherniak then followed the defendant out of the building and started to slash his knife at the defendant. In return, the defendant swung his hammer at Cherniak, making contact with him several times. When the defendant realized that he could get by Cherniak and reenter the building, he did so, returning to his apartment.8

Once inside, the defendant testified that he decided to try to find his mother, who was not home at the time, and to warn her about what had happened.9 The defendant brought his hammer with him as he went back outside. When the defendant left the building, Cherniak was standing near the defendant's car. Cherniak sprayed the defendant with the pepper spray, and the defendant responded by swinging the hammer towards Cherniak. The defendant made contact with Cherniak, causing him to stop spraying the pepper spray. The defendant then got into his car and drove away, eventually pulling over due to the damage to one of his tires.10

3. Percipient witnesses. Although there were three other percipient witnesses who saw parts of the fight and testified at trial, none of these witnesses saw who the initial aggressor was. The first witness, who was located near the parking lot at the time, testified that he saw the defendant standing over Arthur-Smith outside the building and then Cherniak running outside. That witness did not hear Arthur-Smith yell Cherniak's name. The second witness, who was inside her apartment at the time, testified to hearing a commotion outside and seeing a black man and a white man fighting when she looked out her window.

Finally, the third witness testified that from inside her apartment she heard scuffling, grunting, and loud talking, though not yelling. After looking out a window, which looked directly out over the parking lot, she saw a black man and a white man fighting and a woman running after a dog. She further saw the black man go back into the apartment building, then return outside with a hammer. At this point, the white man sprayed the black man with something, and the black man hit the white man in the head with the hammer. After fighting, the black man got in his car and drove away.

4. Procedural history. The jury found the defendant guilty on two indictments charging assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon resulting in serious bodily injury, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (c ) (i). The defendant appealed, and we transferred the case to this court sua sponte.

Discussion. 1. Expert testimony. At trial, the defendant argued that he acted in self-defense. The defendant's theory of the case was that Cherniak and Arthur-Smith were motivated to attack him by racial animus. Corroborating this theory was a tattoo Cherniak had on his arm. The defendant argued that the tattoo was of the number 211 and that this symbol was used by both the 211 Crew -- a white supremacist prison gang -- and the 211 Bootboys -- a white supremacist group operating out of New York City. According to the defendant, Cherniak's tattoo signaled his affinity to beliefs espoused by these groups. To support this theory, the defendant sought to introduce the testimony of two experts: Dr. Sophie Bjork-James, who has a doctorate in cultural...

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