Commonwealth v. Hornberger
| Decision Date | 09 October 1970 |
| Citation | 270 A.2d 195,441 Pa. 57 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Charles H. HORNBERGER, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
John B. Stevens, jr., Public Defender (submitted) Ralph W. D. Levan, Asst. public Defender, Reading, for appellant.
Robert L. VanHoove, Dist. Atty. (submitted), Elliott B. Goldstan First Asst. Dist. Atty., Grant E. Wesner, Asst. Dist. Atty Reading, for appellee.
Before BELL C.J., and JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, and POMEROY, JJ.
This is an appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Berks County denying appellant's motion for a new trial.
On March 24 1961, appellant, Charles Hornberger, was convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree for the death of his wife, Arlene Hornberger, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. At the conclusion of the trial, appellant's appointed counsel moved for a new trial, alleging (1) that the verdict was contrary to the evidence, (2) that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence, and (3) that the trial Judge erred in admitting into evidence a 'confession' made by the defendant. These motions were denied on December 29, 1961. No appeal was taken at that time.
On April 15, 1966, appellant filed a petition under the Post Conviction Hearing Act, alleging the violation of numerous constitutional rights and the presence of numerous errors in the trial record. The Court, by an Order dated June 1, 1966, held that all matters raised in the petition except the voluntariness of the confession had been disposed of by the Court when it denied the post-trial motions. The Court ordered a hearing limited to the issue of the voluntariness of the confession. The hearing was held on June 29, 1966, at which time appellant was represented by the staff of the Public Defender of Berks County. After the hearing, the petition was dismissed. Hornberger then appealed to this Court.
In Commonwealth v. Hornberger, 430 Pa. 413, 243 A.2d 341, this Court, in a unanimous Opinion by Justice O'BRIEN, affirmed the Order of the PCHA Judge.
On August 5, 1968, this appellant filed a second petition under the Post Conviction Hearing Act. In this petition, he reiterated the allegations made in his first petition, adding only the contention or claim that the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient to prove premeditation and malice beyond a reasonable doubt. A hearing on this petition was held on October 21, 1968, at which appellant was again represented by the Berks County Public Defender. At that hearing, the district attorney argued that the issues raised in the petition had been finally litigated in the prior proceedings. He did agree that the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to prove malice and premeditation was the only issue not specifically raised in the prior PCHA petition, but he contended that this question or issue had been resolved by the post-trial motions and that appellant had waived any right to again raise this issue.
The lower Court dismissed the PCHA petition on the ground that the issues presented therein had been finally litigated in the earlier proceedings. However, the Court stated that the appellant had never had the opportunity to appeal from the denial of his post-trial motions, and granted appellant leave to appeal to this Court from the judgment of sentence entered after the original denial of his motion for a new trial. Counsel then filed the present appeal.
As we have already rejected appellant's contention that his confession was involuntary, Commonwealth v. Hornberger, 430 Pa. 413, 243 A.2d 341, supra, the sole issue remaining on this appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict of guilt of murder in the first degree.
Before we review the evidence, we shall set forth the principles of law which govern our review of such an issue.
1. It is hornbook law that the test of the sufficiency of the evidence--irrespective of whether it is direct or circumstantial, or both--is whether, accepting as true all the evidence and all the reasonable inferences therefrom, upon which if believed the jury could properly have based its verdict, it is sufficient in law to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime or crimes of which he has been convicted. Commonwealth v. Ewing, 439 Pa. 88, 264 A.2d 661 (Filed April 22, 1970); Commonwealth v. Commander, 436 Pa. 532, 260 A.2d 773; Commonwealth v. Frye, 433 Pa. 473, 252 A.2d 580.
2. It is well settled that a jury or a trial Court can believe all or a part of or none of a defendant's statements, confessions or testimony, or the testimony of any witness. Commonwealth v. Ewing, 439 Pa. 88, 264 A.2d 661, supra; Commonwealth v. Winebrenner, 439 Pa. 73, 265 A.2d 108 (Filed April 28, 1970); Commonwealth v. Kirkland, 413 Pa. 48, 195 A.2d 338.
3. Legal malice exists not only where there is a particular ill will, but also whenever there is a wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, wanton conduct, cruelty, recklessness of consequences and a mind regardless of social duty. It may be found from the attending circumstances, and, like the specific intent to kill, may be inferred from the intentional use, without legal excuse or justification, of a deadly weapon on a vital part of another human being. Commonwealth v. Winebrenner, 439 Pa. 73, 265 A.2d 108, supra; Commonwealth v. Commander, 436 Pa. 532, 260 A.2d 773, supra; Commonwealth v. Ewing, 439 Pa. 88, 264 A.2d 661, supra.
4. While murder consists of a killing with legal malice, the essential difference in a non-felony murder-killing between murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree is that murder in the first degree requires a specific intent to take the life of another human being. Commonwealth v. Ewing, 439 Pa. 88, 264 A.2d 661, supra; Commonwealth v. Commander, 436 Pa. 532, 260 A.2d 73, supra; Commonwealth v. Finnie, 415 Pa. 166, 202 A.2d 85.
5. The specific intent to kill, which is necessary to constitute, in a non-felony murder, murder in the first degree, may be found from a defendant's words or conduct or from the attendant circumstances, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, and may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the body of another human being. The use of a gun on a vital part of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial