Commonwealth v. Iacino

• Decision Date: 30 May 1980
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, v. Joseph P. IACINO, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

415 A.2d 61

490 Pa. 119

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, v. Joseph P. IACINO, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

May 30, 1980

Argued March 7, 1980.

Charles F. Gilchrest, Routman, Moore, Goldstone &amp Valentino, Sharon, for appellant.

Samuel J. Orr, IV, Dist. Atty., David B. Douds, Asst. Dist. Atty Mercer, for appellee.

Before EAGEN C. J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, NIX, LARSEN, FLAHERTY and KAUFFMAN, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

O'BRIEN, Justice.

Appellant, Joseph P. Iacino, was convicted by a jury of misapplication of entrusted property and conspiracy. Post-verdict motions were denied and appellant was ordered to pay fines totaling $1,000 and sentenced to a prison term of eleven and one-half to twenty-three months. The Superior Court affirmed, Commonwealth v. Iacino, 265 Pa.Super. 375, 401 A.2d 1355 (1979), and we granted appellant's petition for allowance of appeal.

Appellant's conviction was based on the disappearance of a high-lift owned by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT). At the time of the disappearance, appellant was employed as a maintenance supervisor for PennDOT in Mercer County. Appellant was charged with improperly causing the sale of the high-lift and conspiring with three other individuals. ^[1]

The instant prosecution was initiated by way of presentments issued by a special investigating grand jury impaneled to investigate a widespread series of crimes by supervisory personnel of PennDOT in Mercer County. The same grand jury was involved in the cases, decided today, of Commonwealth v. Bestwick, 489 Pa. 603, 414 A.2d 1373 (1980), and Commonwealth v. Skarica, 489 Pa. 636, 414 A.2d 1390 (1980). Consequently, a number of appellant's allegations of error can be disposed of on the basis of Bestwick, supra.

Appellant first argues that the indictments should have been quashed because of the failure to afford him a preliminary hearing. We decided this issue adversely to appellant in Part II of Commonwealth v. Bestwick, supra, and we thus find this allegation of error meritless.

Appellant asserts that the indictments should have been quashed because the district attorney's petition for an investigative grand jury was insufficient as a matter of law to justify impanelment of the grand jury. As a corollary, appellant argues that the insufficient written petition could not legally be supplemented by the presentation of evidence at the in camera hearing. We find both arguments without merit. Commonwealth v. Bestwick, id. (Part I).

Appellant next argues that the court order authorizing the grand jury investigation did not limit the scope of the investigation with sufficient definiteness and precision and thus authorized an investigation broader in scope than requested in the petition for an investigative grand jury. As a necessary corollary, appellant alleges that the investigative grand jury unlawfully exceeded its lawful scope of inquiry by investigating the disappearance of the high-lift. As authority for both arguments, appellant cites Commonwealth v. Soloff, 175 Pa.Super. 423, 107 A.2d 179 (1954), where the court held that an indictment may be challenged because the investigative grand jury's investigation went beyond the scope of the petition seeking impanelment of said grand jury. That petition alleged:

". . . (T)hat there existed widespread conspiracies to cheat and defraud the City of Pittsburgh of its properties, supplies and labor; that certain city officials had received money, property and other valuable things to influence their official conduct; that city officials and employes had failed to comply with certain statutes relating to the awarding of contracts; that gambling establishments, lotteries and houses of prostitution operated with the wilful, knowing and corrupt connivance of public officials and employes of the City of Pittsburg and Allegheny County, and that said officials and employes had accepted bribes for permitting such illegal operations." Id. at 425, 107 A.2d at 179-80.

The defendants in Soloff were city policemen charged with acts of police brutality. The court stated:

"We think it clear that the matters of public concern which the Attorney General alleged in his petition and which the grand jury was summoned to investigate did not include an isolated instance of overzealous law enforcement or police brutality. On the contrary, the conclusion is inescapable that the Attorney General sought to unearth evidence indicating that the Pittsburgh police and public officials protected criminals for financial gain." Ibid. at 427, 107 A.2d at 180.

We believe Soloff is distinguishable from the instant controversy.

The petition seeking impanelment of the instant grand jury alleged:

"1. Supervisory personnel have extorted political assessments from persons seeking contracts with the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. Specifically, there is evidence that one or more private operators of snow removal equipment have been required to pay $100.00 in order to lease equipment to the Commonwealth. Said acts being in violation of 'An Act to Prohibit Assessments and Demands for Contributions for Political Purposes; and Providing a penalty, 1939, April 6, P.L. 16, 25 P.S. § 2374 and § 3023 of the Crimes Code of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.'

"2. Supervisory personnel of the Mercer County Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, District 1-4, have, on a systematic basis, required lessors of equipment to Pennsylvania Department of Transportation to make cash payments based on a percentage of the earnings from the state. All of which is in violation of the Crimes Code section cited in # 1, above.

"3. Certain individuals, with the aid and assistance of supervisory personnel of Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, District 1-4, have formed a paper corporation and were paid for work that was never performed, said offenses being in violation of 18 P.S. § 4836 and § 3922 of the new Crimes Code of Pennsylvania.

"4. The evidence concerning the above specific crimes would indicate that these are not isolated incidents but rather are part of a widespread and systematic scheme by which a large number of persons have conspired to obtain money and property for themselves and/or the Democratic Party. All of which is in violation of Section 903 of the Crimes Code of Pennsylvania, and 18 P.S. § 4302 of the prior Crimes Code of Pennsylvania." (Emphasis added.)

The petition further alleged:

"The scope of the grand jury investigation requested by your petitioner would include the specific crimes alleged in this petition which are supported by information gathered by the 'Gleason Committee' and other legislative and executive committees and departments. Said information indicates the existence of a system of related crimes and a conspiracy to cover up said crimes." (Emphasis added.)

The court's order granting the district attorney's petition stated:

". . . The grand jury investigation is necessary to discover what may be criminal acts which seriously affect and injure the public and to obtain evidence leading to the indictment and prosecution of persons who have committed specific crimes within the statutory period and within the jurisdiction of the court. Such crimes may include the illegal solicitation of political contributions from persons and corporations desiring to have contracts within the Commonwealth and by private persons through collaboration with government employees, to obtain by theft and deception public monies, and similar or related crimes involving official corruption. There is reasonable cause to believe that a grand jury investigation will result in the discovery of such offenses and the issuance of indictments." (Emphasis added.)

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