Commonwealth v. Iacobino

• Citation: 178 A. 823,319 Pa. 65
• Decision Date: 13 May 1935
• Docket Number: 250
• Parties: Commonwealth v. Iacobino, Appellant
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

178 A. 823

319 Pa. 65

Commonwealth v. Iacobino, Appellant

No. 250

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

May 13, 1935

Argued April 15, 1935

Appeal, No. 250, Jan. T., 1935, by defendant, from judgment and sentence of O. & T. Lackawanna Co., Dec. Sessions, 1934 No. 47, in case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Dominick Iacobino. Judgment affirmed and record remitted for purpose of execution.

Indictment for murder. Before LEWIS, J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Commission appointed to examine into sanity of defendant at time of arraignment and at time of commission of crime charged. Further testimony taken to assist court in fixing punishment. Defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree, and penalty fixed as death. Defendant appealed.

Error assigned, among others, was sentence and judgment of court.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed, and the record is remitted for the purpose of execution.

Harold A. Scragg, with him Joseph Marzzacco, for appellant.

John W Murphy, Assistant District Attorney, with him Michael J. Eagen, District Attorney, for appellee.

Before FRAZER, C.J., SIMPSON, KEPHART, SCHAFFER, MAXEY, DREW and LINN, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE KEPHART:

Dominick Iacobino, charged with killing Colandrucci, upon being arraigned, pleaded guilty generally to the charge of murder. The court proceeded to take testimony to determine the degree of the crime. The defendant was present at all times, and, with his counsel, took an active part in the examination of witnesses.

At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's evidence, counsel for defendant moved for the appointment of a commission to inquire into defendant's sanity at the time of trial. The court appointed a commission consisting of a lawyer and two psychiatrists to examine defendant. The commission heard both counsel for Commonwealth and defendant. They reported defendant sane at the time of the commission of the offense and at the time the report was filed. Counsel for defendant then requested the court to permit further testimony to assist the court in fixing the proper punishment. Defendant claimed he was intoxicated when the crime was committed and the testimony thus offered and received in no way bore on the question of the defendant's sanity, but consisted of testimony regarding the facts of the case, to the degree of defendant's intoxication, and his general reputation.

After considering all the testimony and the report from the commission appointed to determine the condition of defendant's mind, the court found him guilty of murder in the first degree, and fixed the penalty as death. A careful examination of the record shows all the ingredients of murder of the first degree. Defendant killed two men and seriously wounded three others in revenge for some grievance in connection with a game of cards, and the court below did not abuse its discretion in fixing the penalty at death. The accused had ample time for reflection and deliberation when he left the beer garden, went to his home some hundred and sixty feet away, procured the revolver and stiletto, and returned to the garden where the assaults were made. Those causes which, it is argued, acted to prevent reflection and precipitate inconsiderate action incompatible with the death penalty were not sufficient for us to hold that the court acted unwisely, much less abused its discretion. Such evidence was contradicted by the Commonwealth and the court did not err in entering the judgment and imposing the sentence.

Defendant contends that the Commonwealth must affirmatively prove beyond a reasonable doubt not only the essential ingredients of murder in the first degree, which includes the specific intent to take life, but proof that defendant's mind at the time of the commission of the offense was capable of forming such specific intent to take the life of his victim. When an accused enters a plea of guilty to an indictment charging murder, he does not plead guilty to murder in the first degree (Com. v. Berkenbush, 267 Pa. 455, 461); the plea, without further action, was sufficient to sustain the charge of murder in the second degree; if the Commonwealth wished to raise the degree the burden was on it to prove the essential elements of the higher degree: Com. v. Bednorciki, 264 Pa. 124; Com. v. Tompkins, 267 Pa. 541; Com. v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 18. It must show beyond a reasonable doubt a killing that was "wilful, deliberate and premeditated." The specific intent to take life, "the main distinction of murder in the first from that of the second degree" (Com. v. Gibson, 275 Pa. 338, 342; Com. v. Robinson, 305 Pa. 302) existed in this case.

Intention to kill may be shown by the defendant's acts or words or by all the circumstances of the case; it may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon upon a vital part: Com. v. Green, 294 Pa. 573, 584; Com. v. Troup, 302 Pa. 246, 253. But, no case has gone to the extent of holding that the Commonwealth, in addition to proving circumstances indicating such intent beyond a reasonable doubt, must also show the mental capacity of defendant to formulate the intention manifested by his words or actions.

In criminal, as in other matters, sanity is presumed. The defense of insanity is an affirmative one and must be established by the defendant by "fairly preponderating evidence," showing an unsound mind at the time the act was done. The presumption of sanity, which is the normal condition of man, "holds good, and is the full equivalent of express proof until it is successfully rebutted": Com. v. Gerade, 145 Pa. 289, 297; see Com. v. Kilpatrick, 204 Pa. 218; Com. v. Calhoun, 238 Pa. 474; Com. v. Sushinskie, 242 Pa. 406; Com. v. Molten, 230 Pa. 399; Com. v. Scovern, 292 Pa. 26, 34. Similarly, when the defense is intoxication, the burden is on the defendant to establish that his intoxication was such as to prevent forming any intent. "The mere intoxication of the defendant will not excuse or palliate his offense unless he was in such a state of intoxication as to be incapable of conceiving any intent. If he was, his grade of offense is reduced to murder in the second degree": Com. v. Cleary, 135 Pa. 64; Com. v. Detweiler, 229 Pa. 304, 308. The burden to establish the fact of intoxication is by "fairly preponderating evidence": Com. v. Walker, 283 Pa. 468, 475; Com. v. Troy, 274 Pa. 265, 271; Com. v. Prescott, 284 Pa. 255, 257-8. The same rule applies where the influence of drugs is relied upon to negative intention: Com. v. Morrison, 266 Pa. 223.

Where mental capacity at the time of the act is an issue, the Commonwealth is aided by the presumption of sanity, it is not required to prove affirmatively mental capacity to commit the act. As stated in Com. v. Morrison, supra (page 229), "The general presumption is that every man is normal and is possessed of ordinary faculties; such defenses as intoxication, insanity and aphasia (or a mind not conscious of its acts), are affirmative defenses and the burden is on the defendant to establish them. . . . The Commonwealth cannot undertake the burden of showing a sound mind when it does not know the nature of the defenses, and can become acquainted with it only when offered."

Defendant objects to the fact that the court below, in finding the crime to have been murder of the first degree, and in fixing the penalty as death, took into consideration the report of the commission appointed to inquire into the condition of defendant's mind both at the time of his arraignment for trial and when the offense was committed. Defendant contends that so considering the report deprived him of his constitutional right to be confronted with and to cross-examine all witnesses who might appear against him, since he was afforded no opportunity to examine the commission in open court, particularly as to their finding that he was sane at the time the offense was committed. A defendant charged with a crime who invokes a statutory or common law remedy to determine his sanity before trial or after conviction has no constitutional right to be confronted by or cross-examine witnesses or the members of the commission appointed to ascertain that fact. Such inquiries are for the determination of a fact apart, separate and distinct from that of guilt of the crime itself, as to which trial or sentence may or may not be ordered. The appointment is not demandable of right and if it is contended the members appointed are biased or otherwise incompetent, objection, with the reasons therefor, should be made to the court at the time of appointment. The court may then determine whether it has made a mistake in the selection of persons to inform its conscience. Where witnesses are produced, and they may be by either side, it is customary for counsel to appear and examine or cross-examine them if necessary. The matter is entirely in the control of the court appointing these officers, who in the interest of justice will see that the accused is not prejudiced by the course of the investigation.

The record does not support defendant's contention. Defendant's counsel in requesting the inquiry said ". . . the sole issue in this case is not what his mental condition was on the day of the crime but what his mental condition is to-day,...