Commonwealth v. Insano

• Decision Date: 17 May 1920
• Docket Number: 77
• Citation: 110 A. 248,268 Pa. 1
• Parties: Commonwealth v. Insano, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

110 A. 248

268 Pa. 1

Commonwealth v. Insano, Appellant

No. 77

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

May 17, 1920

Argued April 12, 1920

Appeal, No. 77, Oct. T., 1920, by defendant, from judgment of O. & T. Jefferson Co., Jan. T., 1920, No. 1, on verdict of guilty of murder of the first degree, in case of Com. v Antonio Insano. Affirmed.

Indictment for murder. Before CORBET, P.J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Verdict of guilty of murder of the first degree upon which judgment of sentence was passed. Defendant appealed.

Errors assigned were (1) admission of written confession signed by defendant and (2) refusal of new trial.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed and the record is remitted for the purpose of execution.

W. L McCracken and W. M. Fairman, for appellant.

Jesse C. Long, with him C. J. Margiotti, for appellee.

Before BROWN, C.J., STEWART, FRAZER, WALLING, SIMPSON and KEPHART, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE KEPHART:

Appellant was found guilty of murder of the first degree. During the course of the trial a confession, signed by him, was admitted in evidence. It was objected to because the stenographer who took the statement in shorthand and reduced it to typewriting was not called as a witness to prove the written statement was the "true and correct statement made by the defendant." The customary safeguards to secure a free and voluntary confession were taken. Defendant was an Italian, who, while he understood English to some extent, spoke through an interpreter. His confession was thus translated into English, taken in shorthand, reduced to longhand, and the writing read to the defendant in Italian by the same interpreter and in English by the district attorney. Defendant then signed all pages of the writing. The interpreter and the witnesses who heard the examination, with the exception of the stenographer who was not called, testified as to what transpired. The confession was competent, the interpreter gave the stenographer all the information for her notes and, after she had transcribed it, the interpreter read the paper to defendant. The former testified his interpretation was correct, and understood by defendant, the statement was a correct transcription of defendant's story and that the district attorney read the same paper in English to defendant. The stenographer's statement would add nothing of probative value relative to the competency of the statement. The correct practice is to call the interpreter: People v. Oiler, 66 Cal. 101; People v. Randazzio, 194 N.Y. 147 (87 N.E. 112). Testimony of a shorthand reporter, based on his notes, is incompetent to prove the testimony or statements of witnesses given in a foreign language unknown to the reporter and through an interpreter: Sherer v. Harber, 36 Md. 536; People v. Ah Yute, 56 Cal. 119. See in this connection Commonwealth v. Brown, 66 Pa.Super. 519, 526.

Written statements by a defendant, deliberately and seriously prepared, are always admissible as substantive evidence in a case. It is self-harming evidence. It has no higher evidentiary value than an oral confession, but where it has been reduced to writing it has a tendency to be regarded in a more trustworthy light than an oral statement and its weight must be judged in proportion to the solemnity of its character. It is not necessary to the admissibility of a written confession that it should be signed by the accused, though it was in this case; nor is it necessary that it should be in a language understood by the accused, if in such case it is translated into a language he does understand, sentence by sentence, in his presence and hearing, and where it is admitted by the accused that he understands it and that it is correct: State v. Demarests, 6 So. 136; People v. Giro, 197 N.Y. 152; Wharton's Criminal Evidence (10th Ed.) sec. 643. Defendant admits the statement is correct. When testifying in his own behalf, he was asked if he had told officer Palmer about the attempt of the deceased to put him out of a lot on the night of the shooting. He replied: "A. No, I never made such a statement. I made a statement [referring to the confession] at the office of Mr. Long [the district attorney]; what is the use of asking me again. Q. Was that statement correct?" After a contest as to the propriety of the question and with the witness fully aware that it referred to a vital part of the case, he answered: "A. As far as I know, it is." During the entire course of his examination, defendant did not at any time deny that he had killed the deceased. If there was any doubt in counsel's mind as to the admissibility of the confession, clearly defendant's testimony made it substantive proof.

The confession was objected to before the bar of this court for the reason it was secured by duress, threats and violence. We might dispose of this by saying there was no assignment of error covering it, and the confession, when offered, was not objected to on that ground. Nowhere in the Commonwealth's evidence does it appear that any force, violence, or duress was used or attempted and defendant stated during the trial that he made the statement voluntarily; this objection, even if properly made, must of necessity be overruled.

The defense was partly self-defense and partly insanity occasioned by brooding, for a period of two weeks or more over the loss of money by theft. Defendant had accumulated the sum of $2,000, which he carried in his pocket, enclosed in an envelope. The money was stolen and, to avoid detection, waste was put in the envelope, of about the same bulk as the money. Such was defendant's story. He believed the deceased and his brother-in-law had stolen the money. The theft was not discovered until about the 6th of November, and from that time until the 17th of...