Commonwealth v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 17 July 1958
• Citation: 187 Pa.Super. 2,144 A.2d 249
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Charles JACKSON, Appellant. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Gilbert R. JACKSON, alias 'Sweet Man', Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

144 A.2d 249

187 Pa.Super. 2

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Charles JACKSON, Appellant.

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Gilbert R. JACKSON, alias 'Sweet Man', Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

July 17, 1958.

The opinion of Judge Hess follows:

Defendants Charles Jackson and Gilbert R. Jackson, alias Sweet Man, were tried by a jury under bills of indictment charging: (1) robbery by assault and force; and (2) assault and battery. The jury returned a verdict of guilty against both defendants, and the proceeding is now before the court en banc on defendants' motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial.

Defendants were tried along with one Margaret Miller, alias Margaret 'Midge' Williams, she being charged with being an accessory before the fact to robbery in an indictment to No 9 September Sessions, 1957. The Commonwealth contended that Margaret Miller, along with the two defendants in the present case and two other individuals, Simuel Franks and George Hightower, planned to rob one John Briggs; that Franks and Hightower did in fact commit the robbery with the aid of defendants; and that thereafter defendants in the instant case, and the three individuals named, divided the proceeds of the robbery among themselves. Simuel Franks pleaded guilty and at the trial was the Commonwealth's chief witness. George Hightower is a fugitive from justice. Defendants contended that they had no part in the planning or commission of the robbery, received no part of the proceeds, and that Gilbert R. Jackson was not present at the time the offense was committed. The testimony was very much in conflict, but the jury has seen fit to believe the evidence submitted by the Commonwealth, and for the purpose of considering the motions now before the court we must accept such testimony as well as the reasonable inferences which properly could be derived from that testimony as being correct. Commonwealth v. Nestor, 183 Pa.Super. 350, 132 A.2d 369; Commonwealth v. Schuster, 158 Pa.Super. 164, 44 A.2d 303.

The jury was justified in finding that the Miller woman met the victim at the Hand-in-Hand Cafe on two different occasions, on each of which the victim drank to such an extent that he was considerably under the influence of intoxicating liquor. On May 8, 1957, as the victim was leaving the Hand-in-Hand Cafe he was physically assaulted by Franks, and at the same time robbed of between $250 and $300 by Hightower. While the robbery was taking place, defendants were in or about the premises but took no part in the actual assault and robbery. Thereafter the defendants, along with Franks and Hightower met and divided among themselves the proceeds of the robbery. The jury could also find that while the victim and the Miller woman were drinking together, the former was exhibiting considerable sums of money; that the woman contacted Franks and told him to tell the defendants that she wanted to see them and that '* * * there's a guy in the Hand-in-Hand with a roll of money.' (N.T. p. 22.) There is little evidence of a definite agreement among the defendants and the others to rob Briggs, but there is sufficient to warrant a jury to infer that in fact such plan was formulated. The testimony most damaging to the defendants was actually elicited by counsel for the defendants while cross-examining Franks. It is true that most of the evidence connecting the defendants with the crime came from the lips of Franks, an admitted participant in the robbery. The jury was particularly cautioned about accepting this testimony but has seen fit to accept it as credible evidence, a determination reserved solely for the jury under our system of jurisprudence.

Motion in Arrest of Judgment

Defendants contend that there is no evidence sufficient to convict them of having been principals in the second degree to the crime charged. 'A principal in the second degree is one who is present when a felony is committed by another, and who aids or abets in its commission: * * *'. Commonwealth v Parmer, 364 Pa. 11, 13, 70 A.2d 296. Under the testimony, the jury was warranted in finding that both defendants were present at the time the crime was committed. They contend, however, that there is no evidence to justify a finding that they 'aided or abetted' in the commission of the offense. 'One is an aider and abettor in the commission...