Commonwealth v. Jamison
| Decision Date | 14 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1355 MDA 2021 |
| Citation | 284 A.3d 501 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Tremaine Divine JAMISON, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Demetrius W. Fannick, Public Defender, Kingston, for appellant.
Gerry Scott, IV, Assistant District Attorney, Wilkes-Barre, for Commonwealth, Appellee.
Appellant, Tremaine Divine Jamison, appeals from the judgment of sentence of 18 to 40 years’ incarceration, imposed after he pled guilty to third-degree murder.1 For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
On May 31, 2017, Appellant shot and killed Devon Brown (Victim) following an argument and fight between them. N.T. Trial at 50-60, 77-78, 81-95, 115-31, 284-93, 389-91. Appellant fled the scene after the shooting and was found by the police approximately two years later in Georgia in 2019, id. at 56-58, 345-48, 391, and was charged with an open count of criminal homicide and with possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. Criminal Information. Appellant moved to sever the firearms charge and that motion was granted on April 1, 2021. Trial Court Order, 4/1/21.
Appellant's jury trial on the homicide charge commenced on May 24, 2021. At trial, the Commonwealth sought a conviction of first-degree murder and Appellant in his opening statement asserted that he was not guilty because he shot Victim in self-defense. N.T. Trial at 34-35, 41-42. The Commonwealth called 13 witnesses at trial, including several eyewitnesses who testified that Appellant struck Victim first in the fight and pulled out a knife when Victim was unarmed and that after Victim also got a knife, Appellant went to retrieve a gun and shot Victim from a distance. Id. at 50-60, 85-95, 125-31, 285-95.
On the third day of trial, after the Commonwealth rested its case, Appellant entered a guilty plea to third-degree murder and the Commonwealth in exchange amended the criminal homicide charge to third-degree murder. N.T. Trial at 440-52; N.T. Guilty Plea at 2-11. Before the trial court accepted Appellant's guilty plea, Appellant signed a plea agreement and written plea colloquy and the trial court conducted an oral colloquy in which it confirmed that Appellant understood that he could be sentenced to 40 years in prison and understood the third-degree murder charge to which he was pleading guilty and the rights that he was giving up by pleading guilty. N.T. Guilty Plea at 3-11; Plea Agreement; Written Guilty Plea Colloquy. During the oral colloquy, Appellant expressed the view that he was not guilty and that the Commonwealth had gotten witnesses to lie, but repeatedly reaffirmed that he wanted to plead guilty notwithstanding these beliefs when the trial court advised him that he could proceed with the trial. Id. at 7-11.
Appellant's sentencing was scheduled for July 29, 2021. N.T. Guilty Plea at 11. On July 22, 2021, Appellant, represented by new counsel, filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in which he asserted that the guilty plea was not voluntary and knowing, that he should be allowed to withdraw the plea because he is innocent of the charges, and that he entered the plea because his trial counsel was unprepared. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea ¶8. On August 31, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, at which Appellant testified but did not call any other witnesses. N.T. Motions Hearing, 8/31/21, at 4-16. Following Appellant's testimony and argument by Appellant and the Commonwealth, the trial court denied the motion to withdraw the plea on the ground that the guilty plea was voluntary and knowing and that Appellant's assertion of innocence was not a sufficient basis for withdrawal of the plea because he had not proffered a plausible claim of innocence and withdrawal of the plea would substantially prejudice the Commonwealth. Id. at 22-24; Trial Court Order, 8/31/21. On September 23, 2021, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 18 to 40 years’ imprisonment for third-degree murder. Sentencing Order. This timely appeal followed.
Appellant presents the following single issue for our review:
Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the Defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty prior to sentencing?
Appellant's Brief at 2. We review the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea for abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Baez , 169 A.3d 35, 39 (Pa. Super. 2017) ; Commonwealth v. Islas , 156 A.3d 1185, 1187 (Pa. Super. 2017).
Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying withdrawal of his plea because he asserted that he is innocent of the charges and because his plea was not voluntary and knowing. Neither of these arguments has merit.
Where a defendant requests to withdraw his guilty plea before he is sentenced, the trial court has discretion to grant the withdrawal and that discretion is to be liberally exercised to permit withdrawal of the plea if two conditions are present: 1) the defendant demonstrates a fair and just reason for withdrawing the plea and 2) it is not shown that withdrawal of the plea would cause substantial prejudice to the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo , 631 Pa. 692, 115 A.3d 1284, 1291-92 (2015) ; Baez , 169 A.3d at 39 ; Islas , 156 A.3d at 1188 ; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 591(A) (). Appellant's request to withdraw his guilty plea fails on both of these grounds.
A plausible claim of innocence, supported by some facts or evidence in the record, constitutes a fair and just reason for allowing pre-sentence withdrawal of a guilty plea. Commonwealth v. Garcia , 280 A.3d 1019, 1023, 1025-27 (Pa. Super. 2022) ; Islas , 156 A.3d at 1191-92. Where, however, the defendant merely makes a bare assertion that he is innocent without any proffer of any supporting basis for that claim, the trial court in its discretion may deny withdrawal on the ground that the defendant has not shown a fair and just reason for withdrawal of the plea. Commonwealth v. Norton , 650 Pa. 569, 201 A.3d 112, 120-23 (2019) ; Carrasquillo , 115 A.3d at 1292-93 ; Commonwealth v. Hvizda , 632 Pa. 3, 116 A.3d 1103, 1105, 1107 (2015) ; Baez , 169 A.3d at 39-41.
Appellant's assertion of innocence here was nothing more than a bare claim of innocence. Appellant testified at the hearing only that he believed that he was innocent because he acted in self-defense, without stating any basis for his self-defense claim or pointing to any evidence or facts on which a claim of self-defense could be found plausible or colorable. N.T. Motions Hearing, 8/31/21, at 5. As the trial court found, N.T. Motions Hearing, 8/31/21, at 23-24, the evidence introduced by the Commonwealth at trial showed that Appellant shot Victim from a distance at a time when Victim posed no danger to him and therefore did not support a plausible claim of self-defense. N.T. Trial at 53-56, 91-94, 128-31, 290-95; see 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(b)(2). Appellant pointed to no evidence to the contrary. Rather, the only claim that Appellant made concerning this evidence was his subjective belief that the Commonwealth's witnesses lied, a belief that he held at the time that he chose to plead guilty. N.T. Motions Hearing, 8/31/21, at 15; N.T. Guilty Plea at 7-9. Appellant pointed to no evidence that contradicted the witnesses’ testimony or showed other facts concerning the crime and made no claim that he learned any new facts concerning the Commonwealth's witnesses or evidence after his plea. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Appellant's claim of innocence was not a sufficient reason to permit pre-sentence withdrawal of his guilty plea.
Moreover, even if Appellant's claim of innocence satisfied the requirement of a fair and just reason for withdrawal of the plea, it could not support withdrawal of the plea because the record established that withdrawal of the plea would cause substantial prejudice to the Commonwealth. Where a guilty plea is entered during a jury trial after the Commonwealth has called witnesses and presented a substantial portion of its case in chief, withdrawal of the plea is properly denied because such a plea withdrawal permits a defendant to obtain a second trial before a new jury rather than returning the parties to the situation they were in at the time of the plea and therefore causes the Commonwealth to suffer substantial prejudice. Commonwealth v. Whelan , 481 Pa. 418, 392 A.2d 1362, 1364 (1978) (plurality opinion) (); Commonwealth v. Morales , 452 Pa. 53, 305 A.2d 11, 13 (1973) (); Baez , 169 A.3d at 41-42 (); Commonwealth v. Prendes , 97 A.3d 337, 353, 355 (Pa. Super. 2014), impliedly overruled on other issue by Commonwealth v. Hvizda , 632 Pa. 3, 116 A.3d 1103 (2015) (); Commonwealth v. Ammon , 275 Pa.Super. 324, 418 A.2d 744, 748 (1980) (). Here, Appellant entered his plea on the third day of his jury trial, after the...
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