Commonwealth v. Jefferson

Decision Date07 June 2021
Docket NumberNo. 1119 WDA 2018,1119 WDA 2018
Citation256 A.3d 1242
Parties COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Taylor JEFFERSON, Appellant
CourtPennsylvania Superior Court

OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.:

Appellant, Taylor Jefferson, appeals from the judgment of sentence of 42-84 months’ incarceration, imposed following his conviction of firearms not to be carried without a license.1 Herein, Appellant challenges the trial court's decision to deny his motion to suppress the seized firearm under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and, alternatively, under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. He contends that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle based solely on the inference that the registered owner of the vehicle, who had an outstanding warrant, would be found in the vehicle. After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court, in disposing of Appellant's motion to suppress, set forth the following factual history:

On April 25, 2017, around 11:00 p.m., Officers Alexandria Taylor and Nathan Detting with the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police were patrolling the Homewood area of Pittsburgh. As part of their routine patrol, the officers ran license plate numbers of various vehicles through their computer system to check for stolen vehicles and any [V]ehicle [C]ode violations.
When the officers ran the license plate of a vehicle that was being driven by [Appellant], the officers learned that there was a "full extradition warrant out of Pennsylvania" for an individual named Taylor Jefferson. The officers also learned that Taylor Jefferson was the registered owner of the vehicle. The [National Crime Information Center ("NCIC")] system that the officers used to run the license plate did not provide the officers with a picture of Mr. Jefferson, and the officers were not otherwise familiar with [him] or his name.
As the officers were attempting to validate the warrant, and before the officers had made any contact with [Appellant's] vehicle, [Appellant] pulled over to the side of the road and lawfully parked the vehicle. Officers Taylor and Detting pulled over behind [Appellant's] vehicle and activated a spotlight. The officers’ vehicle did not block [Appellant] from being able to leave the parking space. The officers pulled over behind [his] vehicle in order to identify the driver and to investigate whether he was the registered owner of the vehicle, and thus the person for whom there was an arrest warrant.
Officer Detting and Officer Taylor simultaneously approached the vehicle, with Officer Detting approaching the driver's side and Officer Taylor approaching the passenger side. [Appellant] was about to exit the vehicle, with one foot already on the ground, when the officers approached the car. Officer Detting told [him] to remain in the vehicle and asked for his identification. [Appellant] informed Officer Detting that he had left his ID at home, but he provided his full name to the officer.
As Officer Detting was speaking to [him], Officer Taylor observed [Appellant] "slowly and deliberately reach into his right sweat pants pocket" with his right hand. She was able to notice this movement because the officers had illuminated the inside of the vehicle with a spotlight. Officer Taylor was about to tell [Appellant] to remove his hand from his pocket when she saw him "start to pull his hand out of his pocket." As he pulled his hand out of his pocket, Officer Taylor saw that [Appellant] had a "good grip" on a firearm. Upon seeing the firearm, Officer Taylor drew her weapon and yelled "gun, gun, gun." Officer Detting drew his weapon, and [Appellant] promptly handed the firearm to Officer Detting. Officer Detting retrieved [Appellant's] weapon and asked [him] to exit the vehicle. [Appellant] was handcuffed, and the officers ultimately determined that [he] did not have a license to carry a concealed firearm. [Appellant] was then taken into custody.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("TCO"), 2/8/18, at 1-3 (numbering and formatting omitted).

The Commonwealth subsequently charged Appellant with firearms not to be carried without a license, persons not to possess firearms,2 and possession of a firearm with an altered manufacturer's number.3 After Appellant's preliminary hearing, the trial court dismissed the charge of possession of a firearm with an altered manufacturer's number, but held the remaining charges for trial.

Appellant filed a motion to suppress the firearm. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, and the case proceeded to a non-jury trial. The charge of persons not to possess firearms was nolle prossed , and the trial court convicted Appellant of firearms not to be carried without a license. On June 12, 2018, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 42-84 months’ (3½-7 years’) incarceration. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion for reconsideration of his sentence, which the trial court denied. He then filed a timely notice of appeal, and a timely, court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. The trial court issued a statement pursuant to Rule 1925(a), indicating its reliance on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it issued on February 8, 2018.

A panel of this Court issued a memorandum decision on August 2, 2019, reversing the trial court's suppression order and vacating Appellant's judgment of sentence. Subsequently, the Commonwealth filed a timely application for reargument before this Court en banc . We granted the Commonwealth's application for reargument on October 4, 2019, and withdrew the panel memorandum. Appellant filed a substituted brief on October 15, 2019, and the Commonwealth filed its substituted brief on November 14, 2019.

While this matter was still pending, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Kansas v. Glover , ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S.Ct. 1183, 206 L.Ed.2d 412 (2020). In response, Appellant promptly filed an application to file a supplemental brief on April 13, 2020. On May 4, 2020, we granted that application. Appellant filed a supplemental brief on May 18, 2020 ("Appellant's First Supplemental Brief"), and the Commonwealth filed its response on May 26, 2020 ("Commonwealth's First Supplemental Brief"). Appellant requested oral argument, which we granted by order dated August 6, 2020.

Subsequently, on December 22, 2020, our Supreme Court issued its decision in Commonwealth v. Alexander , ––– Pa. ––––, 243 A.3d 177 (2020) (overruling Commonwealth v. Gary , 625 Pa. 183, 91 A.3d 102 (2014) ). Appellant responded on December 30, 2020, by filing a motion for post-submission communication, which we granted by order dated January 19, 2021. In that order, we instructed the parties to submit briefs addressing the impact of Alexander on this case. Appellant filed a responsive Supplemental Brief on February 18, 2021 ("Appellant's Second Supplemental Brief"), and the Commonwealth replied on March 4, 2021 ("Commonwealth's Second Supplemental Brief").

Appellant has consistently presented the following question for our review: "Whether the trial court erred in denying [Appellant]’s motion to suppress evidence because, although the trial court correctly concluded that the police officers subjected [Appellant] to an investigative detention, the police officers did not possess reasonable suspicion to justify that seizure?" Appellant's Substituted Brief at 4; Appellant's First Supplemental Brief at 5; Appellant's Second Supplemental Brief at 5.

Our standard of review is well-settled:

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are erroneous. Where, as here, the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court's legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to our plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Jones , 605 Pa. 188, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (2010) (cleaned up).

The law recognizes three distinct levels of interaction between police officers and citizens: (1) a mere encounter; (2) an investigative detention, often described as a Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ; and (3) a custodial detention. See Commonwealth v. Jones , 874 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa. Super. 2005).
"A mere encounter can be any formal or informal interaction between an officer and a citizen, but will normally be an inquiry by the officer of a citizen. The hallmark of this interaction is that it carries no official compulsion to stop or respond," Commonwealth v. DeHart , 745 A.2d 633, 636 (Pa. Super. 2000) (internal citations and quotations omitted), and therefore need not be justified by any level of police suspicion. Commonwealth v. Polo , 563 Pa. 218, 759 A.2d 372, 375 (2000).
"In contrast, an ‘investigative detention’ ... carries an official compulsion to stop and respond.... Since this interaction has elements of official compulsion it requires reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity." DeHart , 745 A.2d at 636.
***
Finally, "a custodial detention occurs when the nature, duration and conditions of an investigative detention become so coercive as to be, practically speaking, the functional equivalent of an arrest." [ Id. ] This level of interaction requires that the police
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