Commonwealth v. Jennings
| Decision Date | 20 March 1981 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Robert JENNINGS, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Submitted Nov. 14, 1980.
John Halley, Pittsburgh, for appellant.
Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy Dist. Atty., Pittsburgh, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Before SPAETH, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
On January 29, 1976, a jury found the appellant guilty of Unlawfully Carrying a Firearm Without a License and Former Convict Not to Own a Firearm. A timely Motion for a New Trial and/or in Arrest of Judgment was filed and denied by the trial court. Sentencing which was imposed on July 20, 1976, consisted of 21/2 to 5 years imprisonment on the first count and a concurrent 21/2 to 5 years for the remaining offense. Judgment of Sentence was appealed to this Court and we affirmed per curiam. Commonwealth v. Jennings, 256 Pa.Super. 528, 389 A.2d 171 (1978) (HOFFMAN, dissenting).
On August 13, 1979, appellant filed a Post-Conviction Hearing Act [1] (PCHA) petition. A hearing was conducted [2] and thereafter, on October 19, 1979 the petition was denied. The present appeal is from the Order denying the PCHA petition. This Court has reviewed the record and finds the ruling entered below to be correct. Therefore we affirm the Order of the lower court.
The sole allegation raised by the appellant in his PCHA petition is that trial "counsel was ineffective for not raising the issue at trial (that t)he Commonwealth did not prove the barrel length of the weapon in (his) case." [3] (Appellant's PCHA petition, at 3) Before reaching the merits of the claim, we note that "counsel's assistance is deemed constitutionally effective once we are able to conclude that the particular course chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client's interests." (Emphasis in original) Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 604, 235 A.2d 349, 352 (1967). However, when confronted with a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, this Court utilizes a two-step analysis. The Court must first determine whether the issue underlying the charge of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit. Commonwealth v. Sherard, 483 Pa. 183, 394 A.2d 971 (1978). If the underlying issue is found to be of arguable merit, our inquiry shifts to a determination of whether the course chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis aimed at promoting his client's interests. Commonwealth v. Evans, 489 Pa. 85, 413 A.2d 1025, 1028 (1980); Commonwealth v. Sherard, supra.
In ascertaining if appellant's averment is of arguable merit, the Court starts by examining the relevant provisions of the Uniform Firearms Act (Act) with which the accused was convicted of violating. Section 6105 provides:
"No person who has been convicted in this Commonwealth or elsewhere of a crime of violence shall own a firearm, or have one in his possession or under his control." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105.
As for Section 6106, it provides in part:
The definitional section of the Act defines "firearm" as follows:
"Any pistol or revolver with a barrel less than 12 inches, any shotgun with a barrel less than 24 inches, or any rifle with a barrel less than 15 inches." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102.
A review of the instant facts reveals that the aforesaid elements were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Cropper, 463 Pa. 529, 535, 345 A.2d 645, 648 (1975). To-wit, at trial, Pittsburgh Officers Bauer and Buettner testified to seizing a .357 Magnum Blackhawk from the appellant. [4] These same witnesses identified Commonwealth's Exhibit # 3 as the weapon taken from the accused. Dr. Robert Levine, the criminalist, gave testimony regarding his test-firing (operability) of the weapon. Additionally, Officer Smolensky reported that a check with the State Police in Harrisburg disclosed that no license had been issued to the appellant to carry a weapon. Lastly, an employee for the clerk of courts of Lancaster County produced records to prove that the appellant had pled guilty in this Commonwealth to a crime of violence Robbery. Thereafter, Exhibit # 3 was offered into evidence. Appellant's counsel objected, on the grounds that a "chain of custody" had not been established. The court overruled the objection and permitted the weapon to be admitted into evidence. At the close of the Commonwealth's case, appellant's demurrer was also denied. [5] After the defense rested, the jury was charged and a side bar was held, where it was agreed by all concerned that the weapon admitted into evidence could be taken by the jurors to the deliberation room. Commonwealth v. Hobson, 484 Pa. 250, 398 A.2d 1364 (1979); Pa.R.Crim.P. 1114.
To reiterate, appellant contends that, inasmuch as every essential element of a crime must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); Commonwealth v. Todd, 477 Pa. 529, 384 A.2d 1215 (1978), the prosecution's failure to establish the barrel length of the .357 Magnum through "oral testimony of a witness ... or by an actual measurement .... permitted the jury to speculate on" this element of the offense. (Appellant's Brief, at 6) Ergo, trial counsel's failure to raise this issue at any stage of the proceeding rendered him ineffective. The Court does not agree.
In general, a jury may act only upon evidence properly laid before it in the course of a trial. IX Wigmore on Evidence § 2570 (3d Ed. 1940); 1 Jones on Evidence § 2:8 (Gard 6th Ed. 1972); 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence § 21 (1967). Here, albeit no testimony was proffered by the Commonwealth as to the dimensions of the weapon, no one disputes that it was admitted into evidence and taken by the jury for examination. The Court cannot merely dismiss this fact, [6] especially when viewed in conjunction with the instructions to the veniremen by the trial court. In particular, the trial court defined "firearm," as it appears in the Uniform Firearms Act, "to include any pistol or revolver with a barrel less than twelve inches." (Trial Tr. p. 390); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102. Thereafter, the court stated:
The Court finds that the preceding instructions fixed in the jurors' minds the requirement that before returning a verdict of guilty on either offense, they had to be satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Commonwealth proved that the appellant was found in possession of or owned a weapon having a barrel length "less than 12 inches." The manner in which the Commonwealth can prove such element is reflected in a reading of the relevant case law. For example, in Commonwealth v Todd, supra, the defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and violating Sections 6105 and 6106. The victim was shot in the head with a .38 caliber gun, but, at trial, it became evident that "(n)one of the several eyewitnesses actually saw the weapon, and the authorities never recovered the weapon used by (the defendant.)" Id., 477 Pa. at 532, 384 A.2d at 1217. In fact, the only evidence produced by the Commonwealth on the issue of barrel length was through its criminalist, who testified on direct examination that "(t)he weapon was a .38 caliber weapon and probably a Smith and Wesson ...." Id. This conclusion was premised on the markings left on the bullet removed from the deceased, which, in the expert's opinion, were similar to grooves that would be left on bullets fired from a Smith and Wesson .38 revolver. However, on cross-examination, the witness stated he could not, from an examination of the bullet, determine the length of the barrel of the revolver. Consequently, the Todd court reversed the firearm conviction and affirmed the judgment of sentence for...
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