Commonwealth v. Jennings

• Docket Number: 1443-23-3
• Decision Date: 23 January 2024
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA v. LEIGH ANN JENNINGS
• Court: Virginia Court of Appeals

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COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA v. LEIGH ANN JENNINGS

No. 1443-23-3

Court of Appeals of Virginia

January 23, 2024

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAMPBELL COUNTYJ. Frederick Watson Judge

Sandra M. Workman, Assistant Attorney General(Jason S. MiyaresAttorney General, on brief), for appellant.

No brief or argument for appellee.^[1]

Present: Judges Fulton, Causey and Raphael Argued by videoconference

MEMORANDUM OPINION^[*]

JUNIUS P. FULTON, III JUDGE

On May 8, 2023, Leigh Ann Jennings was indicted in the Circuit Court of Campbell County on one count of possession of a Schedule I/II controlled substance, in violation of Code§ 18.2-250.Jennings was also charged with one count of driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of Code§ 18.2-266.Jennings filed a motion to suppress certain evidence, and on August 10, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on that motion and ultimately granted Jennings's motion.The Commonwealth filed this pre-trial appeal.For the following reasons, we reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND^[2]

At about 11:20 a.m. on December 7, 2022, Dyron Martin, an emergency medical technician for Campbell County Public Safety, went to the scene of a reported car crash on Route 501.Martin found Leigh Ann Jennings in one of the vehicles involved in the incident.After ensuring that the vehicle was turned off, Martin noticed that Jennings was disheveled dazed, and confused.Martin explained to Jennings that she had struck another car, crossed the median, and hit three more cars.Jennings stated that she could not remember what happened.Due to Jennings's appearance and condition, Martin asked if she was under the influence of anything.She replied that she and her boyfriend had "smoked some weed last night."

Martin helped Jennings out of her car and into an ambulance that had arrived on the scene.Martin asked Jennings if she had her identification.She said it was in a pink bag in her car.Martin went to the vehicle and found a pink box.Martin opened the box and saw "what appeared to be a sizeable bag of marijuana," two pipes, a jewelry screwdriver, a set of scales, and a "light bulb shaped container" with a "sugary looking crystallized product."

Virginia State Police Trooper Sica arrived on the scene at 11:34 a.m.When Trooper Sica tried to talk to Jennings in the ambulance, she appeared very confused and had "pinpoint pupils."Jennings said she left her boyfriend's house on Sage Drive but remembered nothing after that.Jennings said she wanted to get in her vehicle and drive home.Trooper Sica testified that Jennings's car was "not drivable at all."The ambulance left to transport Jennings to the hospital.Martin told Trooper Sica about the contents of the box, with what appeared to be marijuana and drug paraphernalia.Trooper Sica walked to the vehicle with Martin, and at Trooper Sica's request, Martin took the pink box out of the car and gave it to Trooper Sica.

Trooper Sica testified that the applicable police procedure under the circumstances was to conduct an inventory search of Jennings's car and subsequently to have the car towed.Specifically, Trooper Sica testified that the procedure when a non-drivable vehicle remains at the scene of an accident was to call a tow truck and "then usually conduct the inventory search of the vehicle.That way we know what is and isn't in the vehicle while it's taken to the tow lot since it's not going directly back to the driver."Trooper Sica stated that he performed what he believed to be an inventory search of the vehicle.However, Trooper Sica admitted that the impetus for his "search" was to retrieve what he believed to be drugs and accompanying paraphernalia.Further, he admitted that he did not complete any sort of "inventory list" from the search.Ultimately, the substances found in the pink box were determined to be contraband.

In support of her motion to suppress the evidence seized from the pink box, Jennings argued that the police violated her Fourth Amendment rights when they searched her car without a warrant.The Commonwealth conceded that Trooper Sica asking Martin to retrieve the box constituted a police search of the vehicle.However, the Commonwealth asserted that Trooper Sica had probable cause to believe drugs were in the car based on Jennings's impaired condition and Martin's discovery of apparent drugs and paraphernalia.The Commonwealth contended that under the automobile exception, the police were authorized to search the vehicle without a warrant, so long as they had probable cause to do so.Alternatively, the Commonwealth contended that the evidence was admissible under the doctrine of inevitable discovery, as Trooper Sica testified that it was standard police procedure to conduct inventory searches of such automobiles involved in car crashes before having them towed.

The trial court questioned whether the automobile exception applied because Jennings's vehicle was completely "totaled," and ultimately had been rendered entirely "immobile" by the events of the car crash.Further, the trial court was skeptical of any purported "inventory search," given that Trooper Sica expressly testified that his intent in carrying out the search was to retrieve the drugs and paraphernalia contained in the pink box.

Ultimately, the trial court found that Martin was acting as a community caretaker when he initially entered Jennings's car and discovered the box.Further, the trial court concluded that once Martin told Trooper Sica about the contents of the box, Trooper Sica possessed probable cause to believe that Jennings's car contained contraband.The court then opined that "the issue turn[ed] on the question of the mobility of the car, could the car actually be driven."The court concluded that because Jennings's car could not be driven, it "was not mobile" and the automobile exception therefore did not apply.The court also rejected the Commonwealth's argument concerning inevitable discovery because Trooper Sica did not follow standardized procedures in conducting an inventory search.For these reasons, the trial court granted the motion to suppress.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court erred (1) in holding that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to the set of facts in this case and (2) in holding that the doctrine of inevitable discovery did not ratify the warrantless search.We agree with the Commonwealth that the automobile exception applies, and we therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.^[3] In "an appeal by the Commonwealth of an order of the trial court suppressing evidence, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant and findings of fact are entitled to a presumption of correctness unless they are plainly wrong or without evidence to support them."Commonwealth v. Peterson, 15 Va.App. 486, 487(1992).However, this Court"review[s]de novothe trial court's application of defined legal standards such as probable cause and reasonable suspicion to the particular facts of the case."Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 356(2004)."It is the appellant's burden to show that when viewing the evidence in such a manner, the trial court committed reversible error."Aponte v. Commonwealth, 68 Va.App. 146, 156(2017)(quotingHairston v. Commonwealth, 67 Va.App. 552, 560(2017)).

The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."U.S. Const. amend. IV."This fundamental right is preserved by a requirement that searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by an independent judicial officer."California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390(1985)."Fourth Amendment jurisprudence recognizes three categories of police-citizen [contacts]: (1) consensual encounters, (2) brief, minimally intrusive investigatory detentions based upon specific, articulable facts, commonly referred to as Terry stops, and (3) highly intrusive arrests and searches founded on probable cause."Blevins v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 412, 420-21(2003)(alteration in original)(quotingWechsler v. Commonwealth, 20 Va.App. 162, 169(1995)).

"Under the Fourth Amendment, officers cannot search a place without a warrant unless one of several delineated exceptions to this warrant requirement apply."Duncan v. Commonwealth, 55 Va.App. 175, 179(2009)(citingFlippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 14(1999))."A warrantless search by the police is invalid unless it falls within one of the narrow and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement."Flippo, 528 U.S. at 13(citingKatz v. United States,389 U.S. 347, 357(1967)).

"The Fourth Amendment prohibits only 'unreasonable searches and seizures,' not reasonable ones."King v. Commonwealth, 49 Va.App. 717, 723(2007)(internal citation omitted)."[T]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application . . . [and] requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails."Saal v. Commonwealth, 72 Va.App. 413, 426(2020)(second and third alterations in original)(quotingBell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559(1979)).Further, "[c]ourts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted."Id.(quotingBell, 441 U.S. at 559).

"Under long-standing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, a police officer may, before making an arrest and without obtaining a search warrant, search a vehicle . . . so long as the officer has probable cause to do so."Curley v Commonwealth, 295 Va. 616, 621(2018)...