Commonwealth v. Jones-Williams
| Docket Number | 27 MAP 2021 |
| Decision Date | 20 July 2022 |
| Citation | 279 A.3d 508 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Akim Sharif JONES-WILLIAMS, Appellee |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Alisa Rebecca Hobart, Esq., Berks County District Attorney's Office, Michael F. J. Piecuch, Esq., Snyder County DA's Office, for Amicus Curiae Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association.
Peter E. Kratsa, Esq., West Chester, for Amicus Curiae Pennsylvania Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
Leonard Sosnov, Esq., Harrisburg, Defender Association of Philadelphia, for Amicus Curiae Defender Association of Philadelphia.
Timothy Jon Barker, Esq., Stephanie Elizabeth Lombardo, Esq., David Winslow Sunday, Esq., York County District Attorney's Office, for Appellant.
Shawn Michael Dorward, Esq., The Dorward Law Firm LLC, for Appellee.
OPINION
This appeal concerns the warrantless seizure of blood after it had already been drawn and preserved by hospital personnel. For the following reasons, we affirm the Superior Court's holding that the evidence at issue should have been suppressed and remand for a new trial.
On July 5, 2014, at around 4:42 p.m., Akim Jones-Williams (Appellee) drove his car at approximately two miles per hour across train tracks. An approaching train collided with the car and pushed it nearly one-quarter mile before it stopped. Upon arriving at the scene, emergency personnel found Appellee outside the vehicle. Appellee's fiancé, Cori Sisti, and their daughter, S.J., were still inside the car. Medics declared Sisti dead at the scene, but transported Appellee and S.J. to York Hospital for medical treatment.1
Lieutenant Steven Lutz was the officer in charge after the accident. Several individuals told Lieutenant Lutz that they smelled burnt marijuana coming from Appellee and the car. Therefore, at approximately 6:00 p.m., Lieutenant Lutz directed Sergeant Keith Farren to interview Appellee at the hospital and obtain a "legal blood draw." Sergeant Farren explained that a "legal blood draw" refers to seeking consent or reading an implied consent form to a suspect before seizing their blood for testing. However, when Sergeant Farren arrived at the hospital, Appellee was restrained in a hospital bed fading in and out of consciousness and unable to respond to basic questions. As such, Sergeant Farren could not communicate to Appellee the consent of the form. Nevertheless, Sergeant Farren later learned that hospital personnel drew Appellee's blood at 5:56 p.m. The record does not establish why that blood was drawn, but it is clear that it was drawn prior to Sergeant Farren's arrival.
At 7:30 p.m., Sergeant Farren completed paperwork requesting the hospital's lab to transfer Appellee's blood sample to the National Medical Services ("NMS") laboratory for testing to determine the presence of alcohol or controlled substances. Three days later, on July 8, 2014, the hospital laboratory transferred the blood sample to NMS, which was subsequently analyzed on July 15, 2014. The resulting toxicology report revealed that Appellee's blood contained Delta-9 THC, the active ingredient in marijuana.
Lieutenant Lutz arrested Appellee on April 2, 2015. Following a preliminary hearing, Appellee was held for trial on charges of homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence ("DUI"); homicide by vehicle; endangering the welfare of a child ("EWOC"); recklessly endangering another person ("REAP"); DUI: controlled substance – schedule I; DUI: controlled substance – schedule I, II, or III metabolite; DUI: general impairment; careless driving; careless driving – unintentional death; aggravated assault while DUI; and aggravated assault by vehicle.2
On October 26, 2015, Appellee filed an omnibus pre-trial motion, in which he moved to suppress the blood test results. He argued that police lacked probable cause that he was driving under the influence, that his blood was seized without a warrant and without satisfying the exigency exception, and that 75 Pa.C.S. § 3755 did not justify the seizure in the absence of exigent circumstances.3 A suppression hearing was held on December 21, 2015 at which Lieutenant Lutz explained that he believed the blood could be obtained through a "legal blood draw." However, different from Sergeant Farren's definition, Lieutenant Lutz testified that the legal blood draw theory was supported by Section 3755 rather than through obtaining consent:
[Lieutenant Lutz]: I believe the vehicle code allows you to have a legal blood drawn [sic]. I believe it's underneath 3755. I'm not quite sure. But it allows the Commonwealth to, if they have probable cause, to have a legal blood drawn. ... That was the section that I was using for Officer Farren to have legal blood drawn.
N.T., 12/21/15, at 84. Lieutenant Lutz acknowledged that he could have requested a warrant:
Id . at 83. Sergeant Farren's testimony made no mention of Section 3755. Instead, as mentioned supra , he sought to obtain Appellee's blood by reading him an implied consent form. In fact, the paperwork he completed to request that the hospital transfer the previously drawn blood sample to NMS also made no mention of 3755, but rather stated underneath his signature: "I am requesting this test in accordance with 75 Pa.S.C.A. 1547."4 Commonwealth's Exhibit 18. Sergeant Farren also testified that he could have obtained a warrant:
Following the hearing, the court requested briefing on the issues from both parties. Appellee argued that Officer Farren's seizure of his blood sample was illegal and unsupported by the exigency exception or Section 3755. With respect to exigency, he directed the court's attention to Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), which held that there is no per se rule that alcohol dissipation in the blood stream creates exigent circumstances. McNeely also emphasized that the Fourth Amendment requires police to obtain a warrant where it can be done so reasonably without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search. With respect to Section 3755, Appellee argued that the statute alone could not overcome the warrant requirement and protections of the Fourth Amendment; but, to the extent the statute was valid, Appellee argued that Section 3755 was not satisfied here because there was not probable cause to believe he violated the motor vehicle code at the time hospital personnel took his blood. In response, the Commonwealth argued that McNeely did not cast doubt on the constitutionality of Section 3755, as McNeely dealt exclusively with exigent circumstances. The Commonwealth's briefing did not assert that exigent circumstances justified this blood draw, but instead argued that the statutory implied consent scheme was valid and therefore the blood draw was permissible under Section 3755 :
All binding precedent preserves our implied consent scheme under Sections 1547 and 3755 as an exception to the warrant requirement. McNeely offers nothing to disturb this case law, as that case solely involved the exigent circumstances exception. Blood from a defendant obtained pursuant to probable cause under § 3755 is constitutionally valid as an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8. The police here did legally obtain [Appellee's] blood pursuant to § 3755. Accordingly, [Appellee's] motion to suppress evidence obtained from his blood draw at York Hospital should be denied.
Commonwealth's Memorandum, 1/29/16, at 27.
On April 27, 2016, the trial court denied Appellee's motion to suppress. The court reasoned that the blood test results were admissible under the exigent circumstances exception based on the totality of the circumstances, regardless of Section 3755 or implied consent:
Trial Ct. Order, 4/27/16, at 10 (emphasis added).
Appellee was thereafter tried by a jury between January 9 through January 13, 2017, during which the Commonwealth introduced his blood test results. The jury found him guilty of various DUI offenses, homicide by vehicle, EWOC, REAP, aggravated assault while DUI, aggravated assault by vehicle, and careless driving. The trial court subsequently sentenced him to four to eight years of imprisonment followed by one year of probation. After Appellee's post-sentence motion challenging the weight of the evidence and his sentence was denied, he appealed to the Superior Court.
In his appeal to the Superior...
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