Commonwealth v. Kemp

• Citation: 150 N.E. 172,254 Mass. 190
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. KEMP.
• Decision Date: 06 January 1926
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

254 Mass. 190

150 N.E. 172

COMMONWEALTH

v.KEMP.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Plymouth.

Jan. 6, 1926.

Report from Superior Court, Plymouth County; Albert E. Avery, Special Judge.

Joseph I. Kemp was found guilty of violation of law relating to pilots, and the case was reported. Remanded to superior court for discharge of defendant.Dudley P. Ranney, Asst. Dist. Atty., of Boston, for the commonwealth.

Miles Wambaugh and Blodgett, Jones, Burnham & Bingham, all of Boston, for defendant.

RUGG, C. J.

[1][2] This case comes before us by report under G. L. c. 278, § 30, after the defendant was found guilty. Specific questions of law are stated in the report. Before considering those questions it is necessary to determine our jurisdiction over the case. That lies at the threshold and must first be decided. Eaton v. Eaton, 233 Mass. 351, 364, 124 N. E. 37, 5 A. L. R. 1426;Lonergan v. American Railway Express Co., 250 Mass. 30, 40, 144 N. E. 756. That question arises in this way. The defendant, on his appeal to the superior court, waived in writing his constitutional right to a trial by jury and was tried without a jury. The offense with which he was charged was a misdemeanor and not a felony. The case was heard upon a statement of agreed facts, which included the whole evidence desired to be presented by either party. The question is, whether a trial on the merits and a finding of guilty by a judge alone without a jury is permissible under the law so that the question of law may be reported. Under the circumstances here disclosed there may be such trial and finding. The point is very nearly concluded by previous decisions. It was said in the leading case of Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray, 329, 341, that the object of article 12 of the Declaration of Rights, securing the right of trial by jury in prosecutions for crime, ‘is to secure a benefit to the accused, which he may avail himself of or waive, at his own election.’ In Commonwealth v. Whitney, 108 Mass. 5, it was held that a defendant might be sentenced in the superior court upon his conviction in a police court where he had been found guilty by a judge alone, provided he failed to enter and prosecute his appeal and was defaulted. Such failure on his part was said to be a waiver of his constitutional right to a trial by jury. Blatchelder v. Commonwealth, 109 Mass. 361;Commonwealth v. Drohan, 210 Mass. 445, 447, 97 N. E. 89;Bothwell v. Boston Elevated Railway, 215 Mass. 467, 473, 102 N. E. 665, L. R. A. 1917F, 167, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 275. ‘Even constitutional rights must be seasonably asserted.’ Lebowitch, Petitioner, 235 Mass. 357, 363, 126 N. E. 831, 832;Foster v. Morse, 132 Mass. 354, 42 Am. Rep. 438;Young v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346, 348, 352, 106 N. E. 1. In Kenney's Case, 108 Mass. 492, a sentence imposed upon conviction for a misdemeanor by a judge without a jury, where the statute provided a right of appeal to the superior court for a trial by jury but the right was not exercised, was held to be a valid sentence. In Commonwealth v. Dailey, 12 Cush. 80, it was held that a trial had by consent before a panel of eleven jurors was valid, and the verdict of guilty was upheld. The defendant was held to have waived his right to be tried by a jury of twelve men and to be precluded from thereafter objecting to a trial by eleven jurors. It was said by Chief Justice Shaw at page 83:

A defendant ‘may waive any matter of form or substance, excepting only what may relate to the jurisdiction of the court.’

[3] There is no jurisdictional requirement that all criminal trials must be by jury. The superior court is a court of original and general jurisdiction. It possesses the inherent powers of such a court under the common law, unless expressly limited, as well as those conferred by statute. G. L. c. 212, § 6. Crocker v. Justices of Superior Court, 208 Mass. 162, 94 N. E. 369,21 Ann. Cas. 1061. It is provided by G. L. c. 278, § 2, that--

‘Issues of fact joined upon an indictment or complaint shall, in the superior court, be tried by a jury drawn and returned in the manner provided for the trial of issues of fact in civil causes.’

This provision does not mean that where the facts were agreed as in the case at bar, there must still be a trial by jury. The case at bar was heard by a judge of a district court sitting in the superior court under the provisions of St. 1924, c. 485. Commonwealth v. Leach, 246 Mass. 464, 141 N. E. 301. It is provided by section 1 of that act that--

Under conditions there specified such a judge may ‘sit in the superior court at the trial or disposition with or without a jury * * * of any misdemeanor * * *.’

The implication of these words is that some trials may be had without a jury. The facts agreed in the case at bar show that there was no substantial dispute between the commonwealth and the defendant. Without going beyond the facts of the case at bar, we are of opinion that the judge had jurisdiction to deal with the case without a jury and to find and defendant guilty.

This complaint charges that the defendant assumed to act as pilot in the conduct of the steamship Meteor within the waters of the commonwealth in the town of Hull, not holding a commission as pilot and not being actually employed on said vessel for the voyage and a commissioned pilot having offered his services. The agreed facts are in substance that the steamship Meteor is an American merchant vessel of over 2,000 tons, having her home port in Boston. She is an enrolled and not a registered vessel under the laws of the United States. She is now and has been for several years regularly employed in the coasting trade between American Atlantic ports. On the voyage in question she was bound from Norfolk in the state of Virginia to Weymouth in this commonwealth. Prior to the commencement of her voyage her owners had engaged and employed the defendant to pilot the vessel from Nantasket Roads to her destination. The Meteor arrived at Nantasket Roads on December 5, 1924, and there anchored to await the arrival of the defendant. While so waiting, the complainant, holding both a valid commission granted by the Massachusetts pilot commissioners and also a valid license granted by the local inspectors of steamboats appointed under the laws of the United States, each covering the waters to be navigated by the Meteor to her port of destination, came on board, the vessel then being in need of a pilot, and offered his services, which were refused. The defendant thereafter arrived at the vessel and she got under way and proceeded to Weymouth under his pilotage. The defendant held a certificate granted by the United States local inspectors of steamboats as pilot for all waters of Massachusetts Bay, including the waters navigated by the Meteor from Nantasket Roads to Weymouth, but did not hold any commission under the pilotage laws of this commonwealth. The master of the Meteor on the voyage in question held a certificate as pilot granted by the United States inspectors of steamboats covering all waters here material, but, as he did not intend to pilot his vessel to Weymouth, that factor is regarded as irrelevant to the point to be decided.

[4] The complaint is founded on G. L. c. 103, § 35, which provides that--

‘No person unless he holds a commission as a pilot shall, if a commissioned pilot offers his services or can be obtained within a reasonable time, assume or continue to act as pilot in the charge or conduct of any vessel within the waters of this commonwealth, unless he is actually employed on such vessel for the voyage.’

A penalty for violation is established. By G. L. c. 103, § 28:

‘All coastwise steam vessels not sailing under register, * * * vessels regularly employed in the coasting trade * * * shall be exempt from compulsory payment of pilotage. * * *’

It is provided by the Constitution of the United States, art. 1, § 8, that--

‘The Congress shall have power * * * to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states. * * *’

Pilotage such as here is involved manifestly relates to commerce between the states. Hence these two sections of our statutes must be interpreted in the light of relevant statutes of the Congress and decisions of the Supreme Court of United States. It was early held that, although state laws concerning pilots and pilotage and regulations of commerce, they fall within that class of powers which may be exercised by the states until Congress acts on the subject, and such state laws are valid until displaced or abrogated by Congress. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, 13 L. Ed. 996;Commonwealth v. Breakwater Co., 214 Mass. 10, 13, 100 N. E. 1034;Commonwealth v. Nickerson, 236 Mass. 281, 292, 293,128 N. E. 273, 10 A. L. R. 1568. At first and for many years the subject of pilots was left to the several states by the express terms of a federal statute. 1 U. S. Sts. at Large, 53, 54; Commonwealth v. Ricketson, 5 Metc. 412. But later Congress acted with respect to pilots for vessels engaged in coastwise trade. The history of the federal statutes need not be traced. The present acts of Congrss on the subject are found in the following sections of Rev. Sts. of the United States. They are, so far as here material:

Section 4401 (U. S. Comp. St. § 8153): ‘All coastwise seagoing vessels * * * shall be subject to the navigation laws of the United States, when navigating within the jurisdiction thereof; * * * and every coastwise seagoing steam vessel subject to the navigation laws of the United States, and to the rules and regulations aforesaid, not sailing under register, shall, when under way, except on the high seas, be under the control and direction of pilots licensed by the inspectors of steamboats.’

Section 4444 (U. S. Comp. St. § 8206): ‘No state or municipal government...