Commonwealth v. King

Decision Date26 November 2012
Citation57 A.3d 607
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Carolyn Ann KING, Appellant.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Enid Wolfe Harris, Kingston, Thomas B. Schmidt III, Pepper Hamilton LLP, Harrisburg, for Carolyn Ann King.

William Ross Stoycos, Amy Zapp, PA Office of Attorney General, Harrisburg, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

BEFORE: CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY, ORIE MELVIN, JJ.

OPINION

Justice SAYLOR.

In this capital post-conviction matter, Carolyn Ann King appeals from an order denying guilt-phase relief but granting a new sentencing hearing.

This Court has previously set forth the underlying facts. Briefly, on September 15, 1993, Appellant's co-defendant Bradley Martin received a prison visitation pass that allowed him to leave the Lebanon County prison where he was incarcerated. He met Appellant, with whom he was romantically involved, and failed to return to prison as required. Instead, the two traveled to Palmyra, Lebanon County, where they called upon Guy Goodman, with whom Martin was acquainted. Goodman, who was seventy-four years old, had visited Martin in prison, identifying himself as Martin's friend.

After arriving at Goodman's home, Martin struck Goodman over the head with a vase, and the pair disabled Goodman by tightly binding his wrists, ankles, and neck. They then placed various wrappings around his head, sealing them with duct tape. Finally, they carried Goodman into the basement, tying him even more securely and wrapping him in a bedspread, and then leaving him to suffocate while they stole his checkbook and credit card and fled in his car. During their flight, Appellant and Martin used Goodman's credit card and checks to pay their expenses.

Martin and Appellant were eventually apprehended in Arizona, at which time Appellant was advised of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and provided a statement to the authorities, inculpating herself and Martin in Goodman's death. Appellant repeated her confession to Lebanon County detectives who were investigating the incident. Martin also inculpated himself to the county detectives after waiving his Miranda rights. Shortly after Appellant was returned to Lebanon County, the common pleas court, per the Honorable Robert J. Eby, appointed M. Jannifer Weiss, Esq., of Lebanon, Pennsylvania, to represent her. Martin was represented by separate counsel.

Appellant and Martin were tried together in the Lebanon County Court of Common Pleas before Judge Eby after their motions for severance were denied. Martin declined to testify at trial, but Appellant testified in her own behalf, and her tape-recorded confession was played for the jury. At the conclusion of the guilt phase, the jury found both defendants guilty of first-degree murder, aggravated assault, robbery, theft by unlawful taking, flight to avoid apprehension, escape, and conspiracy. During the penalty phase, the Commonwealth presented two aggravating factors with respect to Appellant, namely, that the killing was perpetrated during the commission of a felony, and that it was committed by means of torture. See42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(6), (8). In her mitigation case, Appellant presented evidence concerning her age at the time of the crime, her relatively minor role in the homicide, and the “catch-all” mitigating factor relating to her character and record and the circumstances of the offense. See id. §§ 9711(e)(4), (7), (8). At the conclusionof the hearing, the jury returned a death sentence for each defendant, having found all aggravating circumstances presented and no mitigating factors for either defendant. On direct appeal, this Court concluded that the trial court erred in permitting the jury to consider the torture aggravator, but affirmed the death sentences because at least one aggravating circumstance remained as to each defendant, and the jury found no mitigating circumstances. See Commonwealth v. King, 554 Pa. 331, 374, 721 A.2d 763, 784 (1998). The Supreme Court denied Appellant's petition for a writ of certiorari. See King v. Pennsylvania, 528 U.S. 1119, 120 S.Ct. 942, 145 L.Ed.2d 819 (2000).

On February 14, 2000, Appellant filed a timely, pro se petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), see42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546. Thereafter, she was given permission to file a counseled, amended petition, and her execution was stayed pending final resolution of her claims. See Commonwealth v. King, 561 Pa. 144, 748 A.2d 1232 (2000) (per curiam). New counsel for Appellant filed amended and supplemental petitions, raising numerous claims for collateral relief predicated on trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness.1 The PCRA court conducted an extensive, five-day hearing at which, inter alia, trial counsel stated that she was largely unprepared for the penalty phase, and forensic psychological and psychiatric experts testified concerning mitigation evidence that could have been presented in the penalty phase.2

The PCRA court ultimately denied Appellant's request for a new trial, finding all her guilt-phase claims meritless. It did, however, grant Appellant a new penalty hearing based on its determination that her trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present any mental-health mitigating evidence. See Commonwealth v. King, No. CP–38–CR–10898–1993, Order at iii (C.P.Lebanon, July 23, 2010) (referencing “readily available evidence of [Appellant]'s history of post-traumatic stress disorder, sexual abuse, child abuse, domestic violence, depression, and drug abuse”). Appellant appealed the portion of the order dismissing her guilt-phase claims, and the Commonwealth cross-appealed, seeking reversal of the court's decision to grant a new penalty hearing. The Commonwealth later withdrew its cross-appeal, leaving Appellant's original appeal as the sole matter for resolution.3 Our present task, therefore, is limited to evaluating the guilt-phase post-conviction claims that Appellant advances on appeal.

Since all such claims relate to an alleged deprivation of the Sixth Amendment right to competent counsel, see McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449 n. 14, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970), Appellant may only obtain relief if she pleads and proves by a preponderance of the evidence that her conviction resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel that, under the circumstances, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. See42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). The Pennsylvania test for ineffectiveness is, in substance, the same as the two-part performance-and-prejudice standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), although this Court has divided the performance element into two sub-parts dealing with arguable merit and reasonable strategy. Thus, to succeed on an ineffectiveness claim, a petitioner must establish that: the underlying legal claim has arguable merit; counsel had no reasonable basis for her action or inaction; and the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result. See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 158–60, 527 A.2d 973, 975–76 (1987). To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068;accord Commonwealth v. Cox, 603 Pa. 223, 243, 983 A.2d 666, 678 (2009). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding. See Commonwealth v. Ali, 608 Pa. 71, 86–87, 10 A.3d 282, 291 (2010). No relief is due, however, on any claim that has been waived or previously litigated, as those terms have been construed in the decisions of this Court. See42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3).

In her brief to this Court, Appellant raises several issues pertaining to the representation she received at trial. In the first such issue, Appellant contends that she is entitled to a new trial because of Attorney Weiss's inexperience in handling capital cases. Appellant does not argue actual ineffectiveness, that is, that Weiss's performance was deficient and that such deficiency resulted in Strickland prejudice. Rather, she maintains that she was constructively denied her Sixth Amendment right to counsel on the grounds that Weiss was a civil practitioner with little relevant experience. In short, she asserts that prejudice should be presumed because Weiss's handling of her case amounted to structural error under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). See id. at 658–59, 104 S.Ct. at 2046–47. In support of her presumed (or per se ) prejudice claim, Appellant proffers that Weiss had never before tried a capital case, and had only tried one criminal case, which involved a drug charge; the funding restrictions imposed by the Lebanon County Court relating to counsel's fees and those of defense investigative experts put Appellant at a substantial disadvantage in light of the Commonwealth's more extensive resources; and Weiss would not have met the criteria embodied in Rule of Criminal Procedure 801, which this Court adopted in 2004 to govern the appointment of counsel in death-penalty cases. SeePa.R.Crim.P. 801 (relating to qualifications for defense counsel in capital cases).

Because counsel is presumed to be competent, it is ordinarily the defendant's burden to demonstrate that a constitutional violation has occurred. Cronic affirmed this general precept, but also recognized a narrow category of circumstances that are so likely to cause harm that prejudice should be presumed because the cost of litigating the issue is unjustified. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658, 104 S.Ct. at 2046. The Cronic Court...

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