Commonwealth v. King

Docket Number1530 MDA 2022,J-S24006-23
Decision Date11 September 2023
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ERIC MONTAGUE KING Appellant
CourtPennsylvania Superior Court

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 25, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-18-CR-0000002-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E [*]

MEMORANDUM

BENDER, P.J.E.

Appellant Eric Montague King, appeals from the judgment of sentence of an aggregate term of 45 to 90 months' imprisonment, plus three years' probation, imposed after a jury convicted him of three counts of indecent assault and four counts of harassment. Appellant was also deemed to be a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP), subject to lifetime registration requirements under the Sexual Offenders Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.51-9799.75. On appeal, Appellant challenges the trial court's denial of his pretrial motion to sever his charges into three separate cases pertaining to each victim in this case, as well as the facial constitutionality of SORNA. After careful review, we affirm.

Appellant was charged with the above-stated offenses based on evidence that he assaulted three separate women on three different dates in Avis, Pennsylvania. Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion to sever the charges pertaining to each of the three victims. On April 29, 2021, the court filed an opinion and order denying Appellant's motion to sever. Appellant's case proceeded to a jury trial on December 16, 2021. There, the victims each testified.

First, S.G. testified that she lives alone in Avis, Pennsylvania. N.T. Trial, 12/16/21, at 29. S.G. testified that in the "evening time" on September 5, 2020, she "was in [her] yard doing yard work" when a large man came up from behind her and "grabbed [her] breasts." Id. at 31, 32, 35, 40. S.G. identified the man who grabbed her as Appellant. Id. at 38. S.G. testified that after grabbing her from behind, Appellant tried "to drag [her] to [her] back door." Id. at 33. However, S.G. fought him, "trying to get him off of [her]" and, after S.G.'s dogs began barking inside her house, Appellant let her go and "ran off." Id. at 33-34, 40. S.G. testified that she had seen Appellant watching her from a dog park next to her house just before the attack. Id. at 35-36. S.G. testified that she did not report the attack to police until September 8, 2020, because she "was in shock" and she "couldn't think straight." Id. at 31. A few days after she reported the incident to police, she again saw Appellant at the dog park watching her while she was outside. Id. at 36-37. She called 911 to report that Appellant "was stalking [her] house." Id. at 36.

Second, L.H. testified for the Commonwealth. She explained that in September of 2020, she lived alone in Avis, Pennsylvania. L.H. testified that on September 23, 2020, she contacted police to report that approximately one week earlier, she had been walking her dog around noon when she met a tall, black man who was also walking dogs. Id. at 51, 60, 62. L.H. identified Appellant as the man she met that day. Id. at 53. L.H. explained that Appellant asked if he could walk with her, and she yes. Id. at 54. As they walked, Appellant "started telling [L.H.] how sexy [she] was and how [she] was turning him on. [L.H.] told him not to talk to [her] like that, that [she] didn't like it." Id. L.H. stated that Appellant continued to talk about sex, saying he wanted to go to her house and have sex with her. Id. L.H. told Appellant she was not interested and "stop talking to [her] like that." Id. at 55.

L.H. testified that she attempted to walk away from Appellant, but he followed her. Id. Because she was afraid to go home with Appellant following her, she continued walking, eventually coming to a ballpark where Appellant asked if she wanted to sit down. Id. at 55-56. L.H. testified that once she sat down, Appellant sat right "beside [her] and put his arm around [her] and was rubbing [her] back and touching [her] butt and touching [her] boobs." Id. at 56. When Appellant leaned in to kiss her, L.H. turned her head and Appellant "nipped [her] … on the neck." Id. L.H. told Appellant to stop and used her arms to block him from touching her breasts. Id. at 57, 58. Once L.H. told Appellant she wanted to leave, he said he would stop touching her; however, Appellant continued to tell L.H. that she was "turning him on" and he then "reached down in his pants and started masturbating." Id. at 58. At that point, L.H. got up and left, but Appellant followed her for another 15 or 20 minutes before he told her he wanted to go home and then left. Id. at 59.

L.H. testified that she immediately told her neighbor what had happened, but she did not call the police until "about a week or so later." Id. at 60. She claimed that she "didn't know what to do" and she did not want to go through "something like this[,]" meaning a trial. Id. at 72, 74. However, L.H. "thought about all the other women that walk around Avis[,]" and because she "was concerned … he might do the same to them or maybe something even more[,]" L.H. finally decided to report the incident to police. Id. at 74. Several weeks after this incident, L.H. was again walking her dog when she ran into Appellant. Id. at 63. Appellant began "hollering to [her]" and approached her, telling her he was sorry and he did not mean to disrespect her. Id. at 63-64.

Third, J.H. testified for the Commonwealth. J.H., who was 81 years old at the time of trial, testified that on Wednesday, November 4, 2020, she went alone to a store in Avis, Pennsylvania.[1] Id. at 77-78, 79. As she was putting the items she purchased in the trunk of her car, a "black man walked over … [a]nd … said, ['C]an I help you?'" Id. at 78. J.H. identified that man in court as Appellant. Id. at 80. After Appellant put the items in J.H.'s trunk, he asked if he could "get in [her] car for five minutes[,]" to which J.H. said no. Id. at 78. J.H. testified that Appellant then "attempted to hug me. And he touched me between my legs in my private area, my vagina." Id. J.H. got into her car, locked the door, and started "shaking and crying." Id. After she sat in her car for a few minutes, she saw Appellant pull out in his vehicle, but "he didn't go anyplace." Id. at 81. When J.H. finally pulled out, Appellant followed her through several turns before driving away from her. Id. at 81-82. The next day, J.H. called the store and reported the incident, and store employees said they would report it to the police. Id. at 80-81. When J.H. had heard nothing from the police by Saturday, she called the police on Monday and talked to an officer about what had happened. Id. at 81.

Based on the testimony of these witnesses, the jury convicted Appellant of the above-stated offenses. He was sentenced to the term set forth supra on August 5, 2022. That same day, the court designated Appellant as an SVP. Appellant filed a timely, post-sentence motion for modification of his sentence, which the court denied on October 6, 2022. Appellant then filed a timely notice of appeal, and he complied with the trial court's subsequent order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. On December 12, 2022, the court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion relying, in part, on the April 29, 2021 opinion and order denying Appellant's severance motion. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/12/22, at 2.

Herein, Appellant states two issues for our review:

1.Did the trial court err in failing to sever the criminal charges in this matter, despite the fact that witness credibility was the central factual issue to be determined by the jury as no physical evidence existed to substantiate the crimes charged?
2. Is … []SORNA[] unconstitutional on its face and therefore [is] the trial court's designation of [Appellant] as a[n SVP] unconstitutional?

Appellant's Brief at 4.

Appellant first contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to sever the charges pertaining to each of the three victims in this case. "[W]hether or not separate indictments should be consolidated for trial is within the sole discretion of the trial court and such discretion will be reversed only for a manifest abuse of discretion or prejudice and clear injustice to the defendant." Commonwealth v. Kurtz, 294 A.3d 509, 531 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cousar, 928 A.2d 1025, 1037 (Pa. 2007) (citation omitted)).

Here, Appellant argues that "the Commonwealth's charges did not involve a common scheme, [or] common location, and … Appellant was clearly unduly prejudiced by the Commonwealth's successful attempt to take the jury's attention off of the fact that there were significant holes in the victim[s'] testimony and place it on the 'cumulative' evidence that … Appellant is simpl[y] a 'monster' preying on elderly women." Appellant's Brief at 11. He insists that, "[t]aken individually," the victims' testimony was "objectively weak[,]" but "when taken one after the other, … Appellant was subjected to testimony that showed a 'propensity to commit criminal conduct' by any reasonable observer." Id. at 12. Thus, he claims that the court denied him a fair trial by failing to sever the charges pertaining to each victim.

Appellant's argument is unconvincing. First, this Court has explained:

Pursuant to Rule of Criminal Procedure 582, "[o]ffenses charged in separate indictments or informations may be tried together if … the evidence of each of the offenses would be admissible in a separate trial for the other and is capable of separation by the jury so that there is no danger of confusion." Pa.R.Crim.P. 582(A)(1)(a).
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