Commonwealth v. Koehler, No. 768 CAP

• Decision Date: 24 April 2020
• Docket Number: No. 768 CAP
• Citation: 229 A.3d 915
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. John Joseph KOEHLER, Jr., Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

229 A.3d 915

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee

v.John Joseph KOEHLER, Jr., Appellant

No. 768 CAP

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted: July 19, 2019

Decided: April 24, 2020

OPINION

JUSTICE WECHT

On December 7, 2015, John Koehler filed his second petition for collateral relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA").² Koehler seeks, inter alia, the reinstatement of his appellate rights nunc pro tunc in order to appeal anew to this Court from the denial of his first PCRA petition. The PCRA court dismissed the petition, holding that it was without authority to grant relief. We conclude that the PCRA court erred as a matter of law, as we hold that a PCRA court possesses the authority to grant the form of relief that Koehler seeks in the event that the petitioner establishes the merits of his claim. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the PCRA court, and we remand for further proceedings.

In 1996, a jury found Koehler guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and related offenses arising from the killing of his girlfriend and her nine-year-old son, and sentenced Koehler to death. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed. Commonwealth v. Koehler , 558 Pa. 334, 737 A.2d 225 (1999) (" Koehler I "). Koehler's judgment of sentence became final after the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari review. See Koehler v. Pennsylvania , 531 U.S. 829, 121 S.Ct. 79, 148 L.Ed.2d 41 (2000).

In 2001, Koehler filed a timely PCRA petition. Therein, Koehler included a claim for relief from his death sentence due to ineffectiveness of counsel during the penalty phase. Koehler alleged that counsel failed to investigate and present mitigation evidence that, as a child, Koehler had been a witness to and a victim of domestic violence. The PCRA court denied relief following a hearing, and Koehler appealed. This Court again affirmed. Commonwealth v. Koehler , 614 Pa. 159, 36 A.3d 121 (2012) (" Koehler II "). Justice Baer authored the opinion, which was joined by former Chief Justice Castille and Justices Eakin, Todd, McCaffery, and Orie Melvin. Justice (now Chief Justice) Saylor filed a concurring opinion. With respect to Koehler's mitigation claim, the Court held that the mitigation evidence Koehler presented at the PCRA hearing "pale[d] in comparison with the aggravating circumstances found by the jury" at trial. Id . at 151. Accordingly, the Court found no prejudice resulting from the claim of counsel ineffectiveness.

On December 7, 2015, Koehler filed a second PCRA petition, this time asserting that his due process rights had been violated during his 2012 appeal in Koehler II . Koehler premised this assertion upon the involvement of Justice Eakin in a well-publicized email scandal that included the exchange of religiously, racially, and sexually offensive emails. See Commonwealth v. Taylor , ––– Pa. ––––, 218 A.3d 1275 (2019) ; Commonwealth v. Blakeney , 648 Pa. 347, 193 A.3d 350 (2018) ; Commonwealth v. Robinson , ––– Pa. ––––, 204 A.3d 326 (2018).

On October 8, 2015, the Philadelphia Inquirer reported that media outlets had come into possession of a number of emails exchanged with Justice Eakin through a private email account within a network of law-enforcement officials, prosecutors, and judges. The Inquirer described several of the emails, including the following:

[A] joke about a woman who complains to her doctor that her husband "beats me to a pulp" when he comes home drunk. The doctor advises her to swish sweet tea in her mouth and not to swallow until her husband is asleep. The punchline from the doctor: "You see how much keeping your mouth shut helps?"³

Viewing this email as suggesting a disregard for victims of domestic violence, Koehler alleged that Justice Eakin's participation in Koehler II raised a risk of actual judicial bias as well as the appearance of bias.

A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date that the judgment becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).⁴ A judgment becomes final "at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review." Id . § 9545(b)(3).

Recognizing that his second PCRA petition was facially untimely, Koehler asserted that he met the timeliness exceptions for governmental interference and newly discovered facts. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii). With respect to the governmental interference exception, id . at § 9545(b)(1)(i), Koehler argued that government officials had concealed the email scandal. As to the newly discovered facts exception, id . at § 9545(b)(1)(ii), Koehler argued that he first learned of Justice Eakin's involvement in the email scandal when media outlets began to report it.

Recognizing that information continued to develop with regard to the scope of Justice Eakin's role in the email scandal and the content of the emails, Koehler asserted that, in an abundance of caution, he filed his petition within sixty days of the October 8, 2015 publication of the Philadelphia Inquirer news article summarizing the contents of some of the emails. This article alerted Koehler to the facts that formed the basis of his claims, and Koehler asserted that he could not have discovered these facts any earlier with the exercise of due diligence.

On the merits, Koehler averred that his right to due process was violated by Justice Eakin's involvement in Koehler II , which created an unacceptable risk of actual bias⁵ as well as the appearance of impropriety, and compromised the integrity, fairness, and impartiality of this Court's review of his appeal. Reviewing the evidence presented at the hearing on his first PCRA petition, Koehler highlighted descriptions of the physical abuse suffered by Koehler, his mother, and his siblings, at the hands of his abusive and alcoholic father, and the effect that such abuse had upon Koehler's development. Premised upon the domestic violence "joke" included in Justice Eakin's emails, Koehler asserted that his claim about counsel's failure to develop and present mitigation evidence of Koehler's family dysfunction and abuse could not have been reviewed fairly by Justice Eakin.

Koehler also suggested that the sheer volume of communications between sitting Justices of this Court and the Commonwealth's prosecutors created the appearance of impropriety. Koehler believed that both the ex parte nature of the communications with prosecutors and the content of the emails as described in the media "impugn the legitimacy of the judicial process" provided by this Court in Koehler II . PCRA Petition at 19 (citing Commonwealth v. Basemore , 560 Pa. 258, 744 A.2d 717, 733 (2000) ). According to Koehler, this judicial bias amounted to a structural defect in Koehler II that rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair and unconstitutional. See Johnson v. United States , 520 U.S. 461, 468-69, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (recognizing that the participation of a partial judge is a structural error).

Koehler contended that he established violations of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as various provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution. In particular, Koehler relied upon his state constitutional right to life and liberty ( PA. CONST. art. I, § 1 ); his right to trial by jury ( PA. CONST. art. I, § 6 ); his right of access to open courts ( PA. CONST. art. I, § 11 ); his right to due process and to the effective assistance of counsel ( PA. CONST. art. I, § 9 ); his right not to be subject to cruel punishment ( PA. CONST. art. I, § 9 ); and his right to habeas corpus ( PA. CONST. art. I, § 14 ). To remedy this deprivation, Koehler sought discovery, leave to amend the petition as needed, an evidentiary hearing, and a Commonwealth response, and he further requested that his "convictions and death sentence be vacated, and a new trial and/or sentencing be ordered, post-conviction proceedings reopened, or such further relief as [the PCRA court] deems appropriate." PCRA Petition, 12/7/2015, at 21.

In November 2016, Koehler sought discovery, and later sought leave to amend his petition. Believing that Koehler's petition asked the PCRA court to rule either that Justice Eakin engaged in judicial misconduct or that Justice Eakin should have recused from consideration of Koehler II , the PCRA court held that the petition was "beyond the original jurisdiction and authority of this court." PCRA Ct. Order, 6/26/2016. Accordingly, on June 26, 2016, the PCRA court transferred the case to this Court. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(a) (providing for the transfer of erroneously filed matters).

In response to this Court's subsequent request for briefing on the question of the Court's jurisdiction, Koehler asserted that, despite the PCRA court's transfer, this Court lacked jurisdiction and that the Court should remand the matter back to the PCRA court. The Commonwealth acknowledged that it would be prudent for this Court to remand the case back to the PCRA court.

On November 2, 2016, this Court accordingly remanded the case to the PCRA court for disposition of Koehler's PCRA petition, citing to the original jurisdiction of the PCRA courts, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(a) ("Original jurisdiction over a proceeding under this subchapter shall be in the court of common pleas."). Commonwealth v. Koehler , 639 Pa. 374, 160 A.3d 782 (2016) (per curiam ).

Upon remand, Koehler again sought discovery and leave to amend the PCRA petition. On February 23, 2017, the PCRA court provided notice of its intent to dismiss the PCRA petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 909(B). Pointing to the fact that Koehler's sole claim was that his due process and other constitutional rights were violated during this Court's consideration of Koehler II , the PCRA court opined that a PCRA appeal is not part of the "truth determining process" for...