Commonwealth v. Lawson

• Decision Date: 08 April 2014
• Citation: 90 A.3d 1,2014 PA Super 68
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Charles LAWSON, Appellant.

90 A.3d 1

2014 PA Super 68

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee

v.Charles LAWSON, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted Jan. 6, 2014.

Filed April 8, 2014.

Todd M. Mosser and David S. Nenner, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Hugh J. Burns, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J., SHOGAN and FITZGERALD ^*, JJ.

OPINION BY SHOGAN, J.:

Appellant, Charles Lawson, appeals from the order denying his third petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541–9546. Appellant contends, inter alia, that the use of prior juvenile conduct as a predicate offense for imposition of a mandatory life sentence pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9715¹ violates Miller v. Alabama, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the history of this case as follows:

[Appellant] was convicted of third-degree murder on October 26, 1992, after a bench trial [for a murder committed when he was thirty-three years old]. This court denied [Appellant's] post-verdict motions and sentenced [Appellant] to a mandatory term of life imprisonment for murder ¹, two and one-half years for possession of an instrument of crime, concurrent to the life sentence, and five to ten years for aggravated assault, consecutive to possession of an instrument of crime, but concurrent to the life sentence. [Appellant] filed a direct appeal. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed [Appellant's] convictions Commonwealth v. Lawson, No. 453 Philadelphia 1993 (Pa.Super. August 31, 1993). [Appellant] did not seek allocatur with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Therefore, [Appellant's] sentence became final on or about September 30, 1993, upon the expiration of the thirty-day window for seeking allocat[u]r.

¹ The life term was mandatory because petitioner had previously been convicted of third-degree murder in 1978 when he was seventeen (17) years old. See42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9715.

On August 19, 1996, [Appellant] timely filed a PCRA petition, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541, et seq., based on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. This Court held an evidentiary hearing and then dismissed the petition after finding that [Appellant] had failed to prove the elements required on the claim of ineffectiveness of counsel. The Superior Court affirmed the dismissal, Commonwealth v. Lawson, No. 5112 Philadelphia 1997 (Pa.Super. August 12, 1999) and, thereafter, the Supreme Court denied [Appellant's] request for allocatur on January 11, 2000.

On July 15, 2004, [Appellant] filed a second PCRA petition, alleging after-discovered evidence. On January 25, 2005 [Appellant] filed an “Objection to District Attorney's Letter/Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's (PCRA) Petition.” On May 23, 2005, this Court dismissed [Appellant's] second PCRA petition as untimely and the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed that dismissal on March 1, 2006. Commonwealth v. Lawson, 898 A.2d 1130 (Pa.Super.2006). The Supreme Court denied allocat[u]r on July 19, 2006. Commonwealth v. Lawson , 903 A.2d 537 (Pa.2006).

On August [20], 2012, [Appellant] filed his third PCRA petition. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania filed its Motion to Dismiss on February 27, 2013, and, on March 15, 2013, this Court dismissed [Appellant's] PCRA petition without a hearing. [Appellant] then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Response to the Commonwealth's Motion to Dismiss on April 1, 2013, asking this Court to vacate its March 15, 2013, dismissal of the PCRA petition, to provide [Appellant] with notice of the reasons for this Court's dismissal, to deny the Commonwealth's Motion to Dismiss and to schedule an evidentiary hearing.

PCRA Court Opinion, 7/1/13, at 1–2 (footnote in original). On April 12, 2003, prior to the PCRA court addressing Appellant's motion for reconsideration, Appellant filed this appeal.

Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

1. Did the PCRA court err when it summarily dismissed Appellant's Amended Petition without providing notice pursuant to Pa.R.Cr[im].P. 907?

2. Did the PCRA Court err when it dismissed Appellant's Amended Petition as untimely, by holding that Miller v. Alabama [––– U.S. ––––], 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)[,] was inapplicable?

Appellant's Brief at 4.

Our standard of review of an order denying PCRA relief is whether the record supports the PCRA court's determination and whether the PCRA court's decision is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Phillips, 31 A.3d 317, 319 (Pa.Super.2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Berry, 877 A.2d 479, 482 (Pa.Super.2005)). The PCRA court's findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Pa.Super.2001)).

We must first address whether Appellant satisfied the timeliness requirements of the PCRA. The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional threshold and may not be disregarded in order to reach the merits of the claims raised in a PCRA petition that is untimely. Commonwealth v. Murray, 562 Pa. 1, 753 A.2d 201, 203 (2000). Effective January 16, 1996, the PCRA was amended to require a petitioner to file any PCRA petition within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence “becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Where a petitioner's judgment of sentence became final on or before the effective date of the amendment, a special grace proviso allowed first PCRA petitions to be filed by January 16, 1997. See Commonwealth v. Alcorn, 703 A.2d 1054, 1056–1057 (Pa.Super.1997) (explaining application of PCRA timeliness proviso ).

However, an untimely petition may be received when the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that any of the three limited exceptions to the time for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii), are met.² A petition invoking one of these exceptions must be filed within sixty days of the date the claim could first have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). In order to be entitled to the exceptions to the PCRA's one-year filing deadline, “the petitioner must plead and prove specific facts that demonstrate his claim was raised within the sixty-day time frame” under section 9545(b)(2). Carr, 768 A.2d at 1167.

Our review of the record reflects that Appellant's judgment of sentence became final on September 30, 1993, thirty days after this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence and the time for filing a petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expired. See42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 1113. Accordingly, Appellant's judgment of sentence became final prior to the effective date of the PCRA amendments. Appellant's instant PCRA petition, filed on August 20, 2012, does not qualify for the grace proviso as it was neither Appellant's first PCRA petition, nor was it filed before January 16, 1997. Thus, the instant PCRA petition is patently untimely.

As previously stated, if a petitioner does not file a timely PCRA petition, his petition may nevertheless be received under any of the three limited exceptions to the timeliness requirements of the PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). If a petitioner asserts one of these exceptions, he must file his petition within sixty days of the date that the exception could be asserted. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

In his first issue, Appellant correctly asserts that the PCRA court failed to comply with Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 by not providing Appellant with notice that it intended to dismiss Appellant's PCRA petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. However, “our Supreme Court has held that where the PCRA petition is untimely, the failure to provide such notice is not reversible error.” Commonwealth v. Davis, 916 A.2d 1206, 1208 (Pa.Super.2007) (citing Commonwealth v. Pursell, 561 Pa. 214, 749 A.2d 911, 917 n. 7 (2000)). Thus, the failure of the PCRA court to provide the Rule 907 notice does not entitle Appellant to relief. Davis, 916 A.2d at 1208.See also Commonwealth v. Kutnyak, 781 A.2d 1259, 1263 (Pa.Super.2001) (recognizing that under Pursell, absence of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1507 (now Rule 907) notice, standing alone, does not provide basis for reversal of dismissal of untimely PCRA petition).

However, Appellant also attempts to invoke the third exception to the PCRA timeliness requirements, i.e., “the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively,” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b)(1)(iii), in his second issue on appeal. Appellant contends that the PCRA court erred in not applying the United States Supreme Court's decision in Miller, supra, to his case. We disagree.

In Miller, the Court held that sentencing a juvenile convicted of a homicide offense to mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Accordingly, such sentences cannot be handed down unless a judge or jury first considers mitigating circumstances. Id. at 2475. The holding in Miller was limited to those offenders who were juveniles at the time they committed their crimes.³Id. at 2460.See also,Commonwealth v. Batts, ––– Pa. ––––, 66 A.3d 286 (2013) (applying Miller to a juvenile offender on direct appeal, and concluding that the Pennsylvania constitutional prohibition against cruel punishment does not provide broader protection than the United States Constitution); Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 764 (Pa.Super.2013) (refusing to extend Mille...