Commonwealth v. Lehman
| Decision Date | 23 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 601 WDA 2021 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Ronnie LEHMAN, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Suzanne M. Swan, Pittsburgh, for appellant.
Amy E. Constantine, Assistant District Attorney, Pittsburgh, for Commonwealth, appellee.
While residing at a halfway house as a condition of parole, Ronnie Lehman (Lehman) used a controlled substance and overdosed. Although he was "at liberty" on parole1 at the time, Lehman was charged and convicted under 18 Pa.C.S. § 5123(a.2), which prohibits the possession of a controlled substance by a "prisoner or inmate." After he was sentenced to a prison term of 35 to 90 months on that count and his judgment of sentence was affirmed on direct appeal, Lehman timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief,2 contending that his trial counsel performed ineffectively in failing to assert that his parolee status precluded conviction. The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (PCRA court) summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the underlying claim lacked legal merit. Because this ruling rests on a misapprehension of the nature of parole, the PCRA court's order denying post-conviction relief cannot stand.
In 2018, Lehman was residing in a halfway house called Renewal as a condition of parole. Early one morning, Lehman was discovered at Renewal, unconscious on a bathroom floor. First responders found on his person a hypodermic needle and bags of heroin. Lehman was taken to a hospital where he recovered.
Following his overdose, the Commonwealth charged Lehman with three counts: Providing Contraband to a Confined Person ( 18 Pa.C.S. § 5123(a) ); Possession of a Controlled Substance ( 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16) ); and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia ( 35 P.S. § 780-116(a)(32) ). Defense counsel moved to dismiss the three counts pursuant to the Drug Overdose Response Immunity Act, 35 Pa.C.S. § 780-113.7, which shields overdose victims from being prosecuted for certain enumerated offenses, including the latter two counts above.
In response to defense counsel's motion, the Commonwealth nolle prossed the controlled substance and paraphernalia charges. The contraband charge was amended to an alleged violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 5123(a.2) (), which is not an enumerated offense under the Act. Lehman was ultimately found guilty of that sole remaining count and was sentenced to a prison term of 35 to 90 months.
On direct appeal, Lehman argued in part that the contraband charge should have been dismissed under the Act. However, we affirmed Lehman's judgment of sentence, holding that the Act did not afford him immunity because the crime of possession of contraband by an inmate was not an enumerated offense. See Commonwealth v. Lehman , 231 A.3d 877, 883 (Pa. Super. 2020) ; see also Commonwealth v. Lehman , 238 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2020) ().
In a concurring opinion, two of the three judges on the panel questioned whether it was proper to assume that parolees residing in halfway houses like Renewal were "inmates" or "prisoners" under the contraband statute. See Commonwealth v. Lehman , 231 A.3d 877, 884 (Pa. Super. 2020) (Pellegrini, J. concurring, joined by Bender, P.J.E.). However, since Lehman's counsel had not raised the issue, its merits could not be reached. See id.
Lehman filed a timely PCRA petition, asserting that his trial counsel performed ineffectively by failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence based on his parolee status. That is, Lehman argued that his status as a parolee, if raised, would have precluded the Commonwealth from proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he was an "inmate" or a "prisoner" under Section 5123(a.2).
The PCRA court issued a notice of intent to dismiss Lehman's petition and an order summarily dismissing the petition was entered. Lehman timely appealed, and in its 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court reasoned that Lehman's counsel was not ineffective. See PCRA Court 1925(a) Opinion, 7/21/2021, at 4. The PCRA court determined that Lehman could qualify as an "inmate" or a "prisoner" because he was committed to Renewal against his will. See id.
Lehman now raises one claim in his appellate brief:
Did the [PCRA] court abuse its discretion in denying the PCRA petition, as amended, without a hearing insofar as [Lehman] established the merits of the claim that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction under 18 Pa.C.S. § 5123(a.2), insofar as Mr. Lehman was not a "prisoner" or "inmate" at the time he unlawfully possessed a controlled substance; and prior counsel were ineffective for not raising this issue at trial or on appeal?
Appellant's Brief, at 4 (suggested answer omitted).3
II .
Lehman's only issue in this appeal is whether the PCRA court erred in dismissing his ineffectiveness claim, which was predicated on counsel's failure to argue that Lehman could not be found guilty under Section 5123(a.2) as a matter of law due to his status as a parolee.
To assert a meritorious ineffectiveness claim, a petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that there is merit to the underlying legal claim, that there was no reasonable basis for counsel's conduct, and that the petitioner suffered prejudice. See generally Commonwealth v. Pierce , 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987). In this context, prejudice is a reasonable likelihood that but for counsel's deficient performance, the petitioner would have had a more favorable verdict. See Commonwealth v. Hanible , 612 Pa. 183, 30 A.3d 426, 439 (2011).
As to the underlying merit prong (which is the only prong now in dispute), Lehman contends that since he voluntarily resided at Renewal as a parolee and he was free to leave the premises (albeit in violation of parole), he could not qualify as a prisoner or inmate, precluding his conviction. The Commonwealth responds that a parolee may be treated as an inmate if the parolee has been "committed to" the custody of a halfway house.
To resolve this question of statutory interpretation, we begin by reviewing the plain language of Section 5123(a.2), which provides that "[a] prisoner or inmate commits a felony of the second degree if he unlawfully has in his possession or under his control any controlled substance in violation of Section 13(a)(16) of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act." "Inmate" is defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 5123(e) as "a male or female offender who is committed to , under sentence to or confined in a penal or correctional institution." (Emphasis added).
As a community corrections center, Renewal indisputably qualifies as a correctional institution. See 61 Pa.C.S. § 5001.
The parties also seem to agree that Lehman was not a "prisoner" or "confined" at the time of his overdose. The narrow issue here is whether a parolee may be considered an "inmate" for the purposes of Section 5123(e) by virtue of being "committed to" a halfway house.4
The phrase "committed to" is not defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 5123 or elsewhere in the Criminal Code; it is simply part of the definition of an "inmate." However, as employed in Section 5123 and other relevant statutes and taken in full context, "committed to" necessarily refers to a class of offenders held or incarcerated in correctional facilities against their will.5
It is significant that Pennsylvania courts have long recognized that parolees "are not similarly situated with pre-release inmates" because parolees are "at liberty" rather than in official detention or incarceration. Meehan v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole , 808 A.2d 313, 317 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) ; see also 61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(2.3) ().
Accordingly, "parolees , who are at liberty on parole while at [a community corrections facility or center]" are a distinct class of offenders from "pre-release inmates , who are deemed to be in official detention , for purposes of credit for time spent at [a community corrections facility or center]." Commonwealth v. Davis , 852 A.2d 392, 397 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citing Meehan , 808 A.2d at 317 ) (emphasis added); Jackson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole , 568 A.2d 1004 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990) (same); see also Cox v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 493 A.2d 680 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985) (same) (seminal case explaining that parolees are generally not entitled to credit time on a sentence while receiving in-patient drug treatment because the restrictions on liberty are not commensurate with incarceration.).6
The rules and regulations establishing the parole system further support our conclusion that parolees are not "inmates" who are "committed to" a community corrections center. The Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole may place parolees in these centers when they are released from prison as a condition of parole – if they do not agree to go, then they continue serving their prison sentences. Parolees who violate a condition of parole by engaging in prohibited drug use may be sent to these centers for treatment.
Renewal is a community corrections center located in downtown Pittsburgh. As explained in Medina v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole , 120 A.3d 1116 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015), and Harden v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole , 980 A.2d 691, 699 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009), community corrections centers are operated by private entities under contract with the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.7
As a matter of law, a parolee may only reside at Renewal or any community corrections center pursuant to a parole agreement, which is a contract wherein a parolee accepts conditions, subject to stipulated consequences in the event that those conditions are violated. See 37...
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