Commonwealth v. Liptak
| Decision Date | 11 April 1990 |
| Citation | 392 Pa.Super. 468,573 A.2d 559 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. William J. LIPTAK, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Submitted Jan. 10, 1990.
David A. McGowan, McKeesport, for appellant.
Paul H. Millin, Dist. Atty., Tionesta, for appellee.
Before McEWEN, BECK and HUDOCK, JJ.
This is an appeal from two orders entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Forest County, Criminal Division. On December 29, 1987 Appellant, William J. Liptak (hereinafter "Liptak"), pled guilty, in writing, to violating 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(a) (). Liptak subsequently received notice of license suspension from the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. After unsuccessfully attempting to appeal his license suspension, Liptak petitioned the trial court to withdraw his guilty plea and have the case remanded for a hearing before the magistrate or, in the alternative, for an allowance of appeal nunc pro tunc. The first order subject to the instant appeal struck this petition; [1] the second order entered the same day, denied a motion requesting the same relief. We affirm.
Liptak contends that the guilty plea itself was the result of misrepresentations made to him by the officer who issued the citation. He alleges that the officer assured him that no further suspensions would be imposed on his driving privileges were he to simply plead guilty to the charge involved. Liptak maintains that he accordingly pled guilty and requested no hearing before the magistrate, thereby relinquishing his right to a de novo hearing, before the Court of Common Pleas, from any adverse adjudication by the magistrate.
Liptak challenges the court's ruling by arguing that it abused its discretion in failing to grant a hearing on his petition where it contained arguably sufficient grounds for relief striking the petition where it was unanswered and where it contained arguably sufficient grounds for relief, and denying the petition where it not only contained arguably sufficient grounds for relief, but also where it contained grounds for the assertion of certain defenses at a hearing before the magistrate or Court of Common Pleas.
The Commonwealth responds by arguing that in Pennsylvania appeals from summary convictions following a guilty plea do not lie. Furthermore, the Commonwealth points out that appeals from summary convictions must be filed within 30 days of conviction, a requirement which Liptak failed to meet, and that no provisions in state criminal procedure exist for the allowance of petitions for remand or appeal nunc pro tunc, a relief which Liptak requests.
We begin our analysis with the Commonwealth's assertion that appeals from summary convictions following a guilty plea do not lie. Recently, in Commonwealth v. Bassion, 390 Pa.Super. 564, 568 A.2d 1316 (1990), this Court concluded differently. There, the Court concluded that "[t]he appropriate method of challenging the propriety of a summary conviction, whether after hearing or by plea, is by a timely appeal to the court of common pleas pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 86." Id. at ----, 568 A.2d at 1318. (emphasis supplied). In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the language of Rule 86(g), "that such an appeal is the exclusive means of challenging a summary conviction." Id. (emphasis in original). The court, reconciling the lack of appellate authority in Pennsylvania supporting the view "that one who pleads guilty to a summary charge and pays the fine and costs cannot thereafter take an appeal pursuant to Rule 86[,]" confidently commented "we have no doubt that a right of appeal does exist for 'one who pleads guilty to a summary offense.' " Id., at n. 3. This of course renders unnecessary any discussion of Liptak's arguments pertaining to whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his petition to withdraw his guilty plea since it is now clear that such relief would have been inappropriate as Liptak's remedy would have been to appeal to the court of common pleas for trial de novo.
However, Liptak did not commence his appeal within the 30 day time period proscribed in Rule 86. Thus, we must determine whether he is entitled to appeal nunc pro tunc. We recognize that judicial extensions of time are specifically prohibited by Section 5504 of the Judicial Code, except to relieve fraud or its equivalent. Commonwealth v. Englert, 311 Pa.Super. 78, 457 A.2d 121 (1983). Where the party seeking leave to appeal nunc pro tunc demonstrates that the delay in the filing the appeal was precipitated by extraordinary circumstances involving fraud or a wrongful or negligent act of a court official resulting in injury to that party, the court may allow enlargement of the time for appeal or appeal nunc pro tunc. See, Commonwealth v. Bassion, supra; Commonwealth v. Englert, supra.
In Commonwealth v. Englert, supra, we held that a defendant who was convicted after a hearing by a district justice of a summary violation under the Vehicle Code cannot appeal nunc pro tunc on the basis that he was unaware of the suspension which would result as a collateral consequence. We point out in that case that the defendant "did not allege that his failure to file a timely appeal had been caused by 'fraud or its equivalent' " and that, "thus, there is no legal or equitable reason for allowing an untimely appeal." Englert, at 83, 457 A.2d at 123, 124. However in Commonwealth v. Bassion, supra, we found that the giving of incorrect and inaccurate information to an accused by the district justice or by his or her staff may, if established, amount to a breakdown in the court's operation warranting the allowance of an appeal nunc pro tunc. See also, ...
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