Commonwealth v. Mangan

• Decision Date: 04 March 1936
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. MANGAN.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

293 Mass. 531

200 N.E. 911

COMMONWEALTH

v.MANGAN.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk.

March 4, 1936.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Norfolk County; R. M. Walsh, Judge.

John J. S. Mangan was convicted of operating an automobile on a public highway while under the influence of liquor. On defendant's exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.

R. G. Clark, Jr., of Brockton, for the Commonwealth.

C. F. Haywood, of Boston, for defendant.

RUGG, Chief Justice.

The defendant was tried to a jury on two complaints, one charging him with being drunk by the voluntary use of intoxicating liquor, and the other charginghim with operating an automobile on a public way while under the influence of liquor; each complaint charged that the offence was committed at Dedham on July 12, 1935. These exceptions relate to the latter complaint alone. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 90, § 24. Testimony was given by police officers in considerable detail as to the conduct, appearance and speech of the defendant after he was under arrest and in the police station at Dedham in the evening of the specified day, amply warranting a finding that at that time he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor and was drunk. There was also evidence tending to show that the defendant made many requests and asked that messages be sent for him; that no message was sent for him; that the defendant's mother telephoned about midnight to know what she could do for him, and that the defendant replied to the police officer that it was too late to do anything but asked that she notify his lawyer. The mother testified that she was told that the defendant had no message for her. The defendant testified that on the occasion in question ‘he had had two or three ten-ounce glasses of beer; that he did not stagger when asked to walk by the arresting officer; that when taken to the police station, he asked if he could have a doctor, that he was told he could’ if he was sick; that he requested that his mother, who lived in Lynn, be notified where he was, and thereafter at frequent intervals requested that messages be sent to various people including his mother and his attorney; that a police officer offered at one point to send a message for him but by reason of altercation as to its form refused to transmit it; that after being placed in a cell he ‘kicked and rattled the bars to draw’ the attention of those in the police station; that ‘he felt the beer he had drunk had a soothing effect on him * * * that by ‘felt’ he meant that he was conscious of the actual volume of it that it did not stimulate him, but soothed him.' It may be open to doubt whether his testimony as a whole was the equivalent of a denial of the charge.

The only exception is to the denial of a request that a verdict of not guilty be directed on the ground that the constitutional ‘right of the defendant to produce all proofs that may be favorable to him has been violated.’ It is provided by article 12 of the Declaration of Rights of our Constitution that ‘every subject shall have a right to produce all proofs, that may be favorable to him * * * and to be fully heard in his defence by himself, or his counsel, at his election.’ This constitutional guaranty lies at the foundation of liberty under the law and of protection to life and property. It is and must be rigidly enforced. Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, 1, 35, 36, 61 Am.Dec. 381;Commonwealth v. Coyne, 207 Mass. 21, 92 N.E. 1028,20 Ann.Cas. 1069;Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77...