Commonwealth v. Marshall

• Decision Date: 23 April 1974
• Citation: 318 A.2d 724,456 Pa. 313
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Eugene MARSHALL, Appellant (three cases).
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

318 A.2d 724

456 Pa. 313

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Eugene MARSHALL, Appellant (three cases).

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

April 23, 1974.

Robert B. Mozenter, Paul Leo McSorley, McSorley &amp McSorley, T. D. Watkins, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Arlen Specter, Dist. Atty., Richard A. Sprague, First Asst. Dist Atty., Milton M. Stein, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief, Appeals Div., B. H. Levintow, James D. Crawford, Deputy Dist. Atty for Law, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION

MANDERINO Justice.

The appellant, Eugene Marshall, allegedly shot his estranged wife in full view of several eyewitnesses on December 26, 1967. In August of 1968, prior to trial, he was given a psychiatric examination which was ordered by the trial court. The report of that examination stated that the appellant was competent to stand trial but stated '(i)t is recommended that the subject be seen weekly by a psychiatrist in order to allow him to continue to function well, With the understanding that under prolonged stress, he may in fact, deteriorate and become a quite ill individual. Some psychiatric chemotherapy or counseling seems indicated at this time for him to maintain adequate functioning.' (Emphasis added.)

Six weeks later, on October 1, 1968, prior to trial, defense counsel requested funds to hire a psychiatrist. This request was denied. The appellant's trial began a few weeks later, on October 28, 1968. Following appellant's conviction in a jury trial of second degree murder, post-verdict motions were filed. While these motions were pending, the trial court ordered a psychiatric examination for sentencing purposes. Court psychiatrists examined the appellant in October of 1969, and submitted a report to the trial court. This second psychiatric report apparently confirmed the expected deterioration of the appellant's condition indicated in the first psychiatric report made prior to trial fourteen months earlier. This second report diagnosed the appellant as a 'Schizophrenic Reaction, Paranoid Type, Acute,' and recommended 'Incarceration in the Institute for Criminally Insane at Farview.' The report stated:

'It appears that since his incarceration His past defenses have decompensated to the extent that he now only has a tenuous contact with reality, is preoccupied with the physical complaint and somatic delusions, fanatically influenced by bizarre religiosity and engages in private conversation with God.'

(Emphasis added.)

About eight months after the second psychiatric report was submitted, the trial court, on June 12, 1970, ordered a new trial because of error in the trial court's charge to the jury. The error was not related to the appellant's mental competency. When the new trial was ordered, the trial court also granted defense counsel's request for permission to withdraw from the case. The trial court said that new counsel would be appointed and also said that another psychiatric examination of the appellant would be ordered.

New counsel was appointed two weeks later but another psychiatric examination was not ordered. New defense counsel made no request at any time for any psychiatric examination and raised no question about appellant's mental compentency before or during the second trial, although he did request, prior to trial, that he be permitted to withdraw because he was not receiving any cooperation from the appellant in preparing a defense. That request was denied. The record is not clear as to whether new defense counsel knew about the appellant's two previous psychiatric examinations which had occurred prior to his appointment. The prosecution's brief assumes that the first report was given to former defense counsel 'because it is the practice in our courts,' but concedes that the second psychiatric report which recommended the appellant's commitment to Farview was not in the appellant's files since it had been prepared for sentencing purposes prior to the grant of a new trial.

The appellant was released on bail on September 3, 1970, and remained at liberty until his conviction about six months later. During that time, he returned to his former employment as a stock clerk and a taxi driver.

The appellant's second trial began on February 22, 1971, about eight months after the appointment of new defense counsel. During the trial, no evidence was presented by the defense. The appellant was convicted by a jury of second degree murder on Febrary 24, 1971. Post-verdict motions were filed without raising any issues about the appellant's mental competency. While these motions were pending, the trial court ordered a psychiatric examination for sentencing purposes. The examination took place on March 23, 1971, One month after the appellant's conviction. The diagnostic formulation in the report of that examination said '(t)his man is best seen at this time As continuing in a Schizophrenic Reaction of the Paranoid Type with inappropriate affect, delusional ideation and apparently hallucinatory phenomenon of a religious nature.' (Emphasis added.) The report recommended that '(t)his man's interest would best be served by incarceration at Farview State Hospital where he can receive chemotherapy and group therapy and possibly individual therapy until his condition improves.' The report also said the appellant 'displayed poor judgment in refusing to be tested even though it was pointed out to him that he was actually in contempt of court by so doing but, he affably and inappropriately acknowledged that that was the case and it was obvious that He was in reality unable to understand or fully appreciate his situation because of the degree of his present illness.' (Emphasis added.)

After this report was submitted, while post-verdict motions were still pending, defense counsel raised the question of the appellant's mental competency to stand trial. During argument on post-verdict motions, on September 10, 1971, about six months after the appellant's third psychiatric examination, the following colloquy occurred between the trial court and defense counsel:

'THE COURT: It would seem to me (defense counsel), that some testimony would have to be submitted. The Court just could not take your evaluation of the defendant's ability to fully appreciate and understand the nature and consequences of the proceeding.

(Defense Counsel): Yes, and it is within Your Honor's discretion to have a hearing with regard to whether or not the defendant was in fact competent at the time.

THE COURT: It is your duty to offer evidence, psychiatric or otherwise....