Commonwealth v. Martin

• Citation: 351 A.2d 650,466 Pa. 118
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Harry Karl MARTIN, Appellant. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. James Evans KEYES, Appellant. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Hector BURGOS, Appellant. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Rafael NIEVES, Appellant. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Warren CANOLES, Appellant. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Dale TROOP, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 29 January 1976
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

351 A.2d 650

466 Pa. 118

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Harry Karl MARTIN, Appellant.

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. James Evans KEYES, Appellant.

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Hector BURGOS, Appellant.

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Rafael NIEVES, Appellant.

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Warren CANOLES, Appellant.

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Dale TROOP, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

January 29, 1976

Argued Jan. 13, 1975.

Theodore S. Danforth, Thomas E. Harting, William C Haynes, Richard C. Shay, Lancaster, for appellants.

D Richard Eckman, Dist. Atty., Louise G Herr, Asst. Dist Atty., Lancaster, for appellee.

Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROBERTS Justice.

These six appeals arise from appellants' convictions in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, for violations of the Uniform Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, ^[1] all of which occurred during the months of April to June, 1972. Appellants raise no objections to their convictions. However, they contend that their sentences were imposed in accordance with a policy agreed to in advance by the three judges of the court and the district attorney's office without reference to either appellants' individual characteristics or to the circumstances of the particular offenses. An equally divided Superior Court affirmed the sentences in a per curiam order. ^[2] Judge Spaeth, in his opinion in support of reversal joined by Hoffman and Cercone, JJ., stated:

'(T)he record demonstrates: That the three judges had agreed in advance that the sentence to be imposed for a sale of heroin should be three to ten years imprisonment plus a fine, without consideration being given to the defendant's individual characteristics, the sentence to be consecutive if more than one sale were proved; and that each of the six appellants was sentenced in accordance with this agreement. From these facts it follows that the sentences were illegal.' ^[3]

We agree and vacate the sentences imposed and remand for resentencing.

I.

Appellants were all charged with the illegal sale of controlled substances. There was no evidence of a conspiracy among the appellants, and no claim is made that the sentences imposed were based on such an allegation.

Appellant Harry Martin appeared before the Honorable Wilson Bucher on September 21, 1972, and pleaded guilty to three sales of heroin. The undercover agents involved gave a brief recitation of the circumstances of the sales, and an inquiry was made into the voluntariness of the guilty plea and of the waiver of trial by jury. Thereafter, defense counsel and appellant's mother were allowed to present evidence concerning appellant's background. ^[4] At 10:00 a.m. the court recessed until 2:00 p.m. ^[5] When court reconvened, Judge Bucher imposed a sentence of three to ten years imprisonment to be served consecutively, and a fine of $2,500 for each of the three sales, i.e., nine to thirty years and $7,500. ^[6]

Appellant Rafael Nieves was tried before the Honorable W. G. Johnstone, Jr., with a jury on September 25, 1972, and was found guilty of five counts of selling heroin. Appellant's attorney, at the outset of the trial, moved for a pretrial psychiatric examination because there was evidence that appellant was insane. He also moved for a change of venue asserting that the court had adopted an illegal sentencing policy. Both motions were denied without comment. At the sentencing hearing, only passing reference was made to appellant's background and mental capacity, and the question whether appellant was an addict, raised by defense counsel, was ignored. ^[7] A sentence of three to ten years imprisonment, to be served consecutively, and a find of $100 for each count, was then imposed, i.e., fifteen to fifty years and $500.

Appellant Warren Canoles was tried before Judge Bucher, sitting with a jury; he was found guilty on September 28, 1972, of three counts of selling heroin. The jury added the words 'with recommendation for treatment' to its verdict form. At the sentencing hearng, testimony was presented to the effect that appellant was addicted to heroin, that he had no prior offenses other than a minor drinking violation, and that he did not sell heroin for profit. These contentions were neither denied nor contradicted, and the court, before imposing sentence, made no further inquiry into any of these matters. During the hearing, the court made the following comments:

'He (appellant) was found guilty here of sales and we treated the others the same way. I shouldn't have to torture myself. The court has already determined it's three to ten years is that it's going to do. Why should I do any different in this case?

The legislature says it's serious and they expect the courts to impose sentences to deter. I haven't heard any reason why we shouldn't give the standard sentence we have been giving this term of court.

The rehabilitation is a legislative and executive matter. I have nothing to do with rehabilitation.

I don't think these sentences mean what they say, either.

I am going to sentence just as we have sentenced in the past.'

These comments were made in response to attempts by defense counsel and an undercover agent to show that appellant Canoles sole only to users; that he was heavily addicted; that he was not a threat to the community; and that he was in need of treatment. These mitigating and extenuating circumstances were deemed irrelevant. The judge sentenced appellant 'just as we have sentenced in the past': three to ten years imprisonment, to be served consecutively, and a fine of $100 for each count, i.e., nine to thirty years and $300.

Appellants Hector Burgos and James Keyes appeared separately before the Honorable W. Hensel Brown on September 29, 1972. Appellant Burgos pleaded guilty to two counts of selling heroin, and appellant Keyes pleaded guilty to three counts of selling heroin, two counts of selling cocaine and one court of selling marijuana.

The court made virtually no inquiry into either the circumstances of the crimes or appellants' backgrounds at either sentencing hearing. ^[8] Appellant Burgos received a sentence of three to ten years imprisonment, to be served consecutively, and a fine of $1,500 for each count, i.e., $3,000 and six to twenty years. The sentence imposed on appellant Keyes was one to two years imprisonment, and a fine of $500 for the sale of marijuana; the same sentence for the two sales of cocaine; ^[9] and three to ten years imprisonment, and a fine of $2,500 for each of the three sales of heroin, the prison terms to be served consecutively, i.e., eleven to thirty-four years and $8,500.

Appellant Dale Troop was the last of the six appellants to be sentenced. He was found guilty of a single sale of heroin in a trial before Judge Brown, sitting with a jury. The sentencing hearing began immediately following the jury's verdict and consisted of statements filling a total of two and a half typewritten pages. The court made virtually no inquiry into the circumstances of the crime or appellant's background, ^[10] and imposed a sentence of three to ten years imprisonment and a fine of $2,500 for the single count.

The record amply demonstrates that the three judges had agreed in advance that the sentence to be imposed for a sale of heroin was to be three to ten years imprisonment plus a fine, and all of the sentences were to run consecutively. ^[11] In no case was a pre-sentence report ordered. No meaningful inquiry was made into the appellants' backgrounds, individual characteristics, relative culpability or prospects for rehabilitation, despite clear evidence that the appellants' offenses were committed in varying circumstances. In short, all appellant's sentences were based on an abstract predetermination of the sentence to be imposed for the particular offense, without regard to the individual circumstances of particular cases.

II.

Mr. Justice Schaefer of the Supreme Court of Illinois has stated:

'The quality of a nation's civilization can be largely measured by the methods it uses in the enforcement of its criminal laws.' ^[12]

Sentencing procedures, which have undergone substantial revision during the last one hundred years, have become a reflection of the effectiveness of that enforcement. At one time, sentencing by a court after a finding of guilt was purely ceremonial, since there was but one penalty at law for any given crime. ^[13] However, during the nineteenth century, when incarceration became the primary mode of punishment, the practice of discretionary sentencing began. ^[14] At first this took the form of executive pardons, and the judge's duty remained only to apply the sentence mandated by law. ^[15] However, discretionary sentencing soon became an integral part of judicial procedure; the sentencing court had increasing discretion in its choice of sentence. ^[16] This development reflected the move toward individualized sentencing, which attempted to rehabilitate, as well as to punish, the offender. ^[17]

The indeterminate sentence won early recognition in Pennsylvania. The Act of June 19, 1911, P.L. 1055 § 6, as amended, 19 P.S. § 1057 (1964), provides in pertinent part:

'Whenever any person, convicted in any court of this Commonwealth of any crime punishable by imprisonment in a State penitentiary, shall be sentenced to imprisonment therefor in any penitentiary or other institution of this State, or in any county or municipal institution, the court instead of pronouncing upon such convict a definite or fixed term of imprisonment, shall pronounce upon such a convict a sentence of imprisonment for an indefinite term: Stating in such sentence the minimum and...