Commonwealth v. Mathis

• Decision Date: 22 November 2017
• Docket Number: No. 35 MAP 2016,35 MAP 2016
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Darrin Orlando MATHIS, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

173 A.3d 699

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee

v.Darrin Orlando MATHIS, Appellant

No. 35 MAP 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued: November 2, 2016

Decided: November 22, 2017

Katie Lynee Adam, Esq., Dauphin County District Attorney's Office, Stefanie Marie Flick, Esq., Edward Michael Marsico Jr., Esq., for Appellee.

Jonathan Randle White, Esq., Bradley Adam Winnick, Esq., for Appellant.

Leonard Sosnov, Esq., for Amicus Curiae Pennsylvania Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION

CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR

This discretionary appeal pertains to the authority of parole agents to detain and frisk a non-parolee visitor while performing a routine check at a parolee's home. We also granted review to address whether reasonable suspicion existed to justify the seizure and frisk in this instance.

By way of background, state parole agents' authority and duties with respect to parolees are prescribed by two sections of the Prisons and Parole Code.¹ Section 6152 declares agents to be peace officers and provides them with police power to arrest without warrant any parolee under supervision for violating parole conditions. See 61 Pa.C.S. § 6152. Section 6153 deems parole agents to be in a "supervisory relationship with their offenders," aimed at assisting parolees in rehabilitation and reassimilation and protecting the public. Id. § 6153(a). This section further outlines the procedures and requirements for agents to search the person and property of offenders, see id. § 6153(b)(1), (d), and provides that such searches must comport with the protections of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, see id. § 6153(b)(2). Another provision prevents the exclusion of evidence from parole or criminal proceedings based solely on a violation of the statute. See id. § 6153(c).

Turning to the facts, on December 2, 2013, Pennsylvania Parole Agents Michael Welsh and Gregory Bruner conducted a routine home visit to the residence of parolee Gary Waters.² Agent Welsh characterized the neighborhood as a "high crime" area. N.T., July 28, 2015, at 4. Waters invited the agents into the home, where they immediately recognized the strong odor of marijuana, which increased as they continued through the home. The agents and Waters proceeded through the front room and dining room to the kitchen, where Appellant Darrin Orlando Mathis was seated in a chair, near the rear door of the home, in the midst of receiving a hair cut from Waters. Waters, who was a barber by trade, identified the parole agents to Appellant. Agent Welsh then detained Waters in the front room, questioning him regarding the marijuana odor. Agent Welsh also noticed at this time an ashtray full of marijuana "roaches" sitting on a table in the front room. N.T., July 28, 2014, at 9. However, neither agent witnessed anyone actually smoking, nor was there any particular indication that marijuana had been smoked in the kitchen.

While Agent Welsh dealt with Waters, Agent Bruner maintained visual contact with Appellant. Appellant repeatedly got up from the chair and walked to the kitchen counter, apparently checking text messages on his charging cellphone. Agent Bruner alerted Agent Welsh that Appellant "seemed pretty nervous." N.T., July 28, 2014, at 9. Agent Welsh returned to the kitchen briefly, stating to Appellant, "I prefer you not being on the cell phone for safety reasons. Could you please put that away." Id. at 10.

Thereafter, according to Appellant, Agent Welsh asked him to leave, explaining that "[w]e want to finish talking to parolee. You can come back and get your haircut finished wherever [sic] you want to. ... I don't want to put you through [an] unnecessar[y] search[ ] and all that." Id. at 54 (alterations added). Appellant recalled that "[i]t sounded like [Agent Welsh] wanted me to hurry up and leave," and that he felt he was being "hurried along." Id. at 54–55.

Agent Welsh's recollection differed minimally, as he recalled stating to Appellant that "I want to get you out of here as soon as I possibly can. Could you do me a favor, grab your personal belongings and come to the front room." Id. at 10. Both Agent Welsh and Appellant agreed that Appellant was cooperative with all of the agent's requests. Further, Agent Welsh testified that the encounter, to that point, remained relaxed and conversational, but that Appellant "appeared uneasy[, displaying b]roken eye contact [and] speaking nervously, broken up." Id. at 28 (alterations added); see also id. at 26 (characterizing their interactions as "very light ... [w]e were talking ... other than his nervous behavior, ... he was being cooperative"). The agent explained that he intended to identify Appellant and whether he had any outstanding warrants, so as to confirm with whom Waters was associating. See id. at 10, 23.

As Appellant collected his belongings in the kitchen, Agent Welsh noticed that he picked up his jacket by "real gently plac[ing] a hand underneath the jacket and over top of the jacket and kind of h[olding] it up to his body like it was a football [or] a baby." Id. at 10–11. When Appellant began walking to the other room, he continued to hold the jacket to his side in a "protecting type of grip" while also turning away from the agent, which revealed a bulge in the jacket. Id. at 10–11. These observations caused Agent Welsh to have concerns regarding the agents' safety. He then asked Appellant if he could pat him down for safety reasons, because he "intended [Appellant] not to leave the residence with [a] gun or drugs." Id. at 31. Appellant refused, at which time Agent Welsh again noticed the bulge, described as the size of a cigarette pack or wallet, which further raised Agent Welsh's suspicions that Appellant may be secreting contraband or a weapon. Agent Welsh reached out to the bulge and felt what he believed was the handle of a firearm. He seized the jacket and pulled it forcefully from Appellant, throwing it to the ground. Appellant was then handcuffed and patted down. Thereafter, Agent Welsh noticed a bag of marijuana on the floor between Appellant's feet, while Agent Bruner recovered a handgun from the jacket.

A local police officer reported to the residence, and Appellant admitted to ownership of the weapon and drugs. A criminal history check revealed that Appellant was prohibited from possessing a firearm. The officer arrested Appellant and charged him with possessory offenses of a prohibited firearm, a small amount of marijuana, and drug paraphernalia.³

Appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the physical evidence and his statement to police, asserting that parole agents have no statutory authority over non-offenders and that Agent Welsh did not have reasonable suspicion to detain and frisk him. At the hearing, Appellant, Agent Welsh, and the arresting officer testified, developing the above-recited facts. The trial court denied Appellant's motion to suppress. See supra note 2. Following a stipulated bench trial, Appellant was convicted of all charges and sentenced to thirty-two to sixty-four months' imprisonment. He appealed to the Superior Court.

In a published opinion, a three-judge panel of the Superior Court rejected Appellant's claims that the parole agents lacked authority to perform a protective frisk of a non-parolee visitor and that the agents lacked reasonable suspicion to believe Appellant was armed and dangerous.

See Commonwealth v. Mathis , 125 A.3d 780, 791–92 (Pa. Super. 2015). Initially, the intermediate court acknowledged that, since Sections 6152 and 6153 of the Parole Code only address agents' authority with respect to offenders, parole agents are generally not empowered to act as police officers relative to non-offenders. In this respect, the court found pertinent the decision in Commonwealth v. Scott , 916 A.2d 695 (Pa. Super.), appeal denied , 594 Pa. 713, 937 A.2d 445 (2007) (table).

In Scott , two probation officers conducted a routine home check of a probationer. While they were there, the probationer's nephew attempted to leave with a black bag that belonged to him. The probation officers ultimately opened the bag without the nephew's consent, discovering marijuana and scales.

The Superior Court affirmed the suppression of the evidence, holding that the probation officers possessed police power and authority only with respect to the probationer, and thus, "[t]hey had no right to interact with [the nephew] in any official capacity." Id. at 697–98. The intermediate court continued that, even if there was authority to conduct a Terry stop,⁴ the probation officers had no reasonable basis for detaining the nephew. See id. at 698.

However, the appellate panel explained that the present facts were substantively different and posited that the Scott decision "left unsettled the situation where, as here, a parole officer, while performing his official duties in an offender's home, encounters a person, other than the parolee, whom the parole agent reasonably believes might be armed and dangerous." Mathis , 125 A.3d at 787.

Concluding that other Pennsylvania case law provided little guidance, the appellate panel found instructive State v. Barnes , No. 15149, 1996 WL 501464 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 6, 1996) (unpublished), in assessing the "ancillary authority" of parole agents. Id. at *3. In that case, the Ohio Court of Appeals explained that agents, "in the context of their limited statutory authority to arrest parole violators, ... possess the concomitant authority to conduct a weapons frisk of a non-parolee" when circumstances warrant. Id. at *4. The Ohio court reasoned that "it would be anomalous to hold that parole officers may carry weapons like peace officers, place themselves in peril like peace officers, and conduct lawful arrests like peace officers, yet not protect themselves in the face of apparent danger." Id.

The Superior Court also cited People v. Rios , 193 Cal.App.4th 584, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 96 (2011), in...