Commonwealth v. Matthews, 2005 PA Super 92 (PA 3/14/2005)

• Decision Date: 14 March 2005
• Docket Number: No. 2651 EDA 2002.,2651 EDA 2002.
• Citation: 2005 PA Super 92
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. CHAKA MATTHEWS, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 1

2005 PA Super 92

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. CHAKA MATTHEWS, Appellant.

No. 2651 EDA 2002.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Filed: March 14, 2005.

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence dated June 17, 2002, In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Criminal Division at No. 0112-0407 1/1.

Before: DEL SOLE, P.J., HUDOCK, FORD ELLIOTT, JOYCE, STEVENS, LALLY-GREEN, TODD, KLEIN and BOWES, JJ.

Opinion by JOYCE, J.

¶ 1 Appellant, Chaka Matthews, appeals from the June 17, 2002 judgments of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. For the following reasons, we find sufficient evidence of record to sustain Appellant's conviction for aggravated assault. However, we must vacate the sentences imposed on four of Appellant's convictions and remand for resentencing. The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.

¶ 2 On October 19, 2001, at approximately 4:30 a.m., Appellant was working with a crew of carpet installers at the Nine West shoe store in the Franklin Mills Mall. On this particular morning, Appellant argued with his supervisor, demanded to leave, and was ultimately escorted to his car by Dwayne O'Brien, a mall security guard. When O'Brien arrived at Appellant's car, he observed that the car was filled with boxes of Nine West shoes. O'Brien asked Appellant if he could produce receipts for the merchandise. In response, Appellant pushed O'Brien and entered the vehicle. O'Brien responded by spraying Appellant with pepper spray. Appellant then aimed his car directly at O'Brien, struck him and fled the scene. O'Brien sustained injuries to his thumb, knee and shin.

¶ 3 Minutes later, while operating his car on Interstate 95, Appellant lost control of his car and came to rest near a guardrail. George Wachter observed Appellant's crash and stopped his car in an attempt to render aid to Appellant. Mr. Wachter observed Appellant lying unconscious on the front seat and pulled Appellant from the smoking car. In an effort to wake Appellant, Mr. Wachter struck Appellant on the chest and yelled at him. Mr. Wachter noticed that Appellant held a bottle of pills in his hand and placed the pill bottle in the car. When Appellant finally awoke, he said to Mr. Wachter, "Are you a cop, man? Are you a fucking cop?" During this questioning, Appellant also touched Mr. Wachter's chest. Mr. Wachter replied that he was only there to help Appellant. Mr. Wachter also observed that Appellant was very agitated, was sweating profusely and was scratching his own face. Appellant continued to persist in this questioning, and Mr. Wachter responded that he was trying to save Appellant's life. At that moment, Appellant pushed a revolver into Mr. Wachter's throat. Mr. Wachter began to retreat backwards, and Appellant continued the questioning. Mr. Wachter testified that, at this time, he could hear passing motorists screaming. Appellant then took the gun away from Mr. Wachter's throat, continued to point the gun at Mr. Wachter and began rummaging through the car. Periodically, while gathering items from the car, Appellant looked up at Mr. Wachter and pointed the gun at him.

¶ 4 After stashing a number of objects into his sweatshirt, Appellant ran to a guardrail located twenty yards from the rear of his vehicle. Appellant doubled over the guardrail, then ran back to the car to continue his frantic search. While searching, Appellant periodically pointed the gun at Appellant. When a second passerby stopped at the scene, Appellant yelled to Mr. Wachter, "Mother fucker, you're fucking dead. I'm going to fucking kill you." Appellant then leapt over the guardrail and fled. Mr. Wachter testified that, during this encounter, he feared for his life. Additionally, he testified that Appellant uttered to him, between seven to ten times, that he was going to kill him. He further explained that, throughout the encounter, Appellant kept the gun on him "the whole time." N.T. 5/6/02, at 42. Mr. Wachter stated that, every time Appellant briefly turned to look for something, he tried to dial 911 on his cell phone. Mr. Wachter testified that he finally reached the 911 dispatcher but could not speak because he was afraid that Appellant would shoot him.¹

¶ 5 On October 20, 2001, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with, inter alia, retail theft, theft by unlawful taking and receiving stolen property² stemming from Appellant's alleged theft of the store's merchandise. The Commonwealth also charged Appellant with aggravated assault, graded as a felony of the second degree, and simple assault³ as a result of Appellant's interaction with the security guard, Dwayne O'Brien. Finally, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with aggravated assault, graded as a felony of the first degree, simple assault, terroristic threats, possessing an instrument of crime and weapons violations stemming from Appellant's involvement with the motorist, George Wachter.⁴

¶ 6 The case proceeded to a bench trial, and on May 6, 2002, the trial court convicted Appellant of each of the aforementioned offenses. On June 17, 2002, the trial court sentenced Appellant to two and one-half to five years' imprisonment on the aggravated assault conviction (Dwayne O'Brien), two and one-half to five years' imprisonment on the retail theft conviction, five to ten years' imprisonment on the aggravated assault conviction (George Wachter), two and one-half to five years' imprisonment on the terroristic threats conviction, and three and one-half to seven years' imprisonment for carrying a firearm without a license. The trial court informed Appellant that each of these sentences would be served concurrently. Additionally, the trial court suspended Appellant's sentence on the convictions for theft by unlawful taking, possessing an instrument of crime (Dwayne O'Brien), possessing an instrument of crime (George Wachter) and carrying a firearm on the streets. The trial court determined that Appellant's remaining convictions merged for sentencing purposes. Appellant filed timely post-sentence motions, which the trial court denied on July 19, 2002. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a concise statement of matters complained of as directed by the trial court.

¶ 7 In his brief, Appellant raises one issue for our review:

1. Was not the evidence insufficient to support the conviction for aggravated assault, graded as a felony of the first degree, inasmuch as [A]ppellant did not take a substantial step towards specifically committing serious bodily injury nor did he act under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life when he merely pointed a gun and made threats to complainant?

Appellant's Brief, at 4.

¶ 8 In his sole issue, Appellant contends that the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for aggravated assault under Section 2702(a)(1) (attempting to cause serious bodily injury to Mr. Wachter). Appellant's Brief, at 9. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth failed to establish that he possessed the specific intent to inflict serious bodily injury upon Mr. Wachter or that he took a substantial step toward inflicting such injury. Id. Although the Commonwealth presented evidence that Appellant pointed a loaded handgun at Mr. Wachter and threatened him with his life, Appellant emphasizes that he fled the scene of his own volition and did not follow through with his threats. Id. Appellant argues that his flight from the scene demonstrated that he only intended to frighten Mr. Wachter, not to inflict serious bodily injury. Id.

¶ 9 When reviewing a sufficiency claim, we employ the following standard of review:

The standard we apply when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Nahavandian, 849 A.2d 1221, 1229-30 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted). Furthermore, when reviewing a sufficiency claim, our Court is required to give the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 817 A.2d 1153, 1158 (Pa. Super. 2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 744 A.2d 745 (2000). However, "the inferences must flow from facts and circumstances proven in the record, and must be of such volume and quality as to overcome the presumption of innocence and satisfy the jury of an accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Scott, 597 A.2d 1220, 1221 (Pa. Super. 1991). "The trier of fact cannot base a conviction on conjecture and speculation and a verdict which is premised on suspicion will fail even under the limited scrutiny of appellate review." Id.

¶ 10 Under the Crimes Code, a person may be convicted of aggravated assault, graded as a felony of the first degree, if he/she "attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such...