Commonwealth v. Melendez-Negron

• Decision Date: 25 September 2015
• Docket Number: No. 494 MDA 2015,494 MDA 2015
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Jose MELENDEZ–NEGRON, Jr., Appellee.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

123 A.3d 1087

2015 PA Super 205

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant

v.Jose MELENDEZ–NEGRON, Jr., Appellee.

No. 494 MDA 2015

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted Aug. 10, 2015.

Filed Sept. 25, 2015.

Kenneth W. Kelecic, Assistant District Attorney, Reading, for Commonwealth appellant.

Lara G. Hoffert, Reading, for appellee.

Opinion

OPINION BY DONOHUE, J.:

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order of court granting the petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541–9546, by Jose Melendez–Negron, Jr. (“Melendez–Negron”). Following our review, we find no error with the PCRA court's determination that Melendez–Negron was entitled to relief, and so we affirm the PCRA court's order. We further find, however, that the PCRA court erred in the manner in which it granted relief. We therefore vacate Melendez–Negron's guilty plea and remand for further proceedings.

In April 2013, police officers in Berks County responded to a noise complaint at Melendez–Negron's residence. Melendez–Negron allowed the officers to enter his home, at which time the officers observed a firearm on Melendez–Negron, as well as multiple indicia, in plain view, of the consumption and sale of illegal substances. Following the execution of a search warrant in his home, Melendez–Negron was charged with possession of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver (“PWID”), possession of a small amount of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia.¹On July 17, 2013, the Commonwealth gave notice of its intention to invoke the mandatory minimum sentence provision codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712.1based upon Melendez–Negron's possession of a firearm at the time of the offenses in question. On November 15, 2013, Melendez–Negron entered a negotiated plea to PWID, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of a small amount of marijuana. N.T., 11/15/13, at 4. In accordance with § 9712.1, the trial court sentenced Melendez–Negron to five to ten years of incarceration on the PWID conviction, and one year of special probation and a fine of twenty-five dollars on the remaining convictions. Id.at 10.

Melendez–Negron did not file a direct appeal. On July 7, 2014, he filed a pro se PCRA petition. On December 23, 2014, appointed counsel filed an amended PCRA petition, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional, and therefore illegal, in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in U.S. v. Alleyne,––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013), and this Court's decisions in Commonwealth v. Newman,99 A.3d 86 (Pa.Super.2014)(en banc), and Commonwealth v. Valentine,101 A.3d 801 (Pa.Super.2014). Amended PCRA Petition, 12/23/14, at 2–3. The PCRA court granted Melendez–Negron's petition, vacated his sentence and ordered that he be resentenced.²This timely appeal followed.³

The Commonwealth presents two issues for our review:

1. Did the PCRA court err in vacating [Melendez–Negron's] sentence and ordering a resentencing based upon a claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness for advising Melendez–Negron to plead guilty instead of challenging the constitutionality of the mandatory sentencing provision pursuant to Alleyne v. United States,[––– U.S. ––––] 133 S.Ct. [2151] (2013)?

2. Did the PCRA court err in vacating [Melendez–Negron's] sentence and ordering a resentencing because as part of a negotiated guilty plea the mere granting of a new sentence strips the Commonwealth of the benefit of the plea bargain, defeated the Commonwealth's rightful expectations in making the agreement, and frustrated the quid pro quoof the plea bargain process?

Commonwealth's Brief at 4.

“Our standard of review of [an] order granting or denying relief under the PCRA requires us to determine whether the decision of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. The PCRA court's findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Perez,103 A.3d 344, 347 (Pa.Super.2014)(citation omitted).

The Commonwealth first argues that the PCRA court erred in finding that Melendez–Negron's trial counsel (“Counsel”) was ineffective for allowing Melendez to plead guilty to a sentence based on the mandatory minimum sentencing enhancement, § 9712.1a.1. It is well established that to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a PCRA petitioner must prove that the underlying legal claim has arguable merit; counsel had no reasonable basis for his or her action or omission; and that the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result. Commonwealth v. Watkins,––– Pa. ––––, 108 A.3d 692, 702 (2014).

In rejecting the Commonwealth's claim, the PCRA court first notes this Court found § 9712.1unconstitutional in light of Alleyne,drolly cites the Gregorian calendar,⁴and then concludes that because Melendez–Negron's sentencing occurred five months after the decision in Alleynewas announced, Counsel was ineffective for allowing Melendez–Negron to agree to a sentence that was premised on the application of § 9712.1PCRA Court Opinion, 4/16/15, at 3–4 (discussing Commonwealth v. Newman,99 A.3d 86 (Pa.Super.2014)(en banc), and Commonwealth v. Cardwell,105 A.3d 748 (Pa.Super.2014)).

The Commonwealth argues that although Alleynewas decided prior to Melendez–Negron's plea and sentencing, no Pennsylvania appellate court had addressed the constitutionality of § 9712.1at the time, and therefore Counsel “cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to predict the changes or developments in the law.” Commonwealth's Brief at 14 (citing Commonwealth v. Gribble,580 Pa. 647, 863 A.2d 455 (2004)). We cannot agree. First, the Commonwealth is incorrect in that this Court issued an opinion addressing Alleyneand the constitutionality of § 9712.1on October 10, 2013. See Commonwealth v. Munday,78 A.3d 661 (Pa.Super.2013).⁵This was more than one month prior to Melendez–Negron's plea and sentencing proceeding.

Second, in Alleyne,the United States Supreme Court found mandatory minimum sentence enhancements unconstitutional where the facts that increase a mandatory minimum sentence are not submitted to a jury and are not required to be found beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon the issuance of the Alleynedecision in June 2013, Counsel was on notice that the constitutionality of such sentencing enhancements was in question. There can be no reasonable basis for Counsel's failure to recognize this and to advise Melendez–Negron to reject a plea agreement that incorporated a sentence based upon § 9712.1. This is so especially in light of the fact that the application of § 9712.1resulted in a sentence that was more than double the aggravated range sentence Melendez–Negron would have faced.SeeN.T., 11/15/14, at 8–9.⁶In a situation such as this, where the United States Supreme Court has spoken, counsel need not wait for a pronouncement from a Pennsylvania appellate court. By raising such a claim or at least questioning the constitutionality § 9712.1during plea negotiations, Counsel would not be predicting changes in the law, as the Commonwealth contends, but rather conscientiously advancing an argument based upon the logical extension of Alleyneto protect his client's interests.

Further, we are not swayed by the Commonwealth's argument that because Melendez–Negron admitted the element that would trigger the application of § 9712.1(possession of a firearm), there is no Alleyneviolation. Commonwealth's Brief at 12. As this Court has previously concluded,

we see no meaningful difference, for the purposes of Newmanand Valentine,between submitting the element to the jury and accepting a stipulation from a defendant. They both have the purpose of finding a method to impose a mandatory minimum sentence outside the statutory framework, but consistent with Alleyne.However, both Newmanand Valentineunequivocally state that creating a new procedure in an effort to impose a mandatory minimum sentence is solely within the province of the legislature. [ ] While submission to a jury is a more formal and involved procedure, we decline to fracture Newmanand Valentinefurther by concluding that when read together, they only prohibit formal mandatory minimum procedures, but permit informal ones.

Commonwealth v. Cardwell,105 A.3d 748, 754–55 (Pa.Super.2014). Melendez–Negron's admission that he possessed a firearm, which he made for purposes of his plea, is the functional equivalent of a stipulation, and pursuant to Cardwell,it does not remedy the Alleyneviolation inherent to § 9712.1. Accordingly, the Commonwealth's argument cannot succeed.

In its second issue, the Commonwealth argues that the case should not be remanded for resentencing, but that Melendez–Negron “should be returned to the status quoprior to the entry of the guilty plea.” Commonwealth's Brief at 22.⁷The Commonwealth argues that in consideration of agreeing to a five-to-ten-year period of incarceration, it “gave up the opportunity to seek sentences” on the drug paraphernalia and small amount of marijuana charges. Id.By simply allowing resentencing pursuant to the sentencing guidelines, the Commonwealth contends, it is losing the benefit of its bargain. The PCRA court did not agree, as it reasoned that “the Commonwealth is not entitled to the benefit of a plea bargain entered into with a defendant who was misinformed by his attorney and who believed at the time he entered his plea that an illegal mandatory minimum sentencing provision was applicable.” PCRA Court Opinion, 4/16/15, at 4. For the following reasons, we agree with the Commonwealth.

We recognize “the importance of the plea bargaining process as a significant part of the criminal justice system” and that “a defendant is permitted to waive valuable rights in exchange for important concessions by the Commonwealth when the defendant is facing a slim possibility of acquittal.” Commonwealth v. Widmer,120 A.3d 1023 (Pa.Super.2015). The record here reveals that in negotiating...