Commonwealth v. Middaugh

• Decision Date: 20 January 2021
• Docket Number: No. 45 MAP 2019,45 MAP 2019
• Citation: 244 A.3d 426
• Parties: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING, Appellant v. Stephen MIDDAUGH, Appellee
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

244 A.3d 426

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING, Appellant

v.Stephen MIDDAUGH, Appellee

No. 45 MAP 2019

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued: March 10, 2020

Decided: January 20, 2021

OPINION

CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR

We allowed appeal to determine whether the Department of Transportation (PennDOT) was precluded from suspending an individual's driving privileges based on a DUI conviction, where there was a lengthy delay between the conviction and the time the driver was notified of the suspension.

I.

In March 2014, Appellee was convicted in the Delaware County common pleas court of driving under the influence ("DUI") pursuant to Section 3802(a)(2) of the Vehicle Code. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(2) (relating to "general impairment" and prohibiting the operation of a vehicle if the driver has a blood-alcohol content between 0.08% and 0.10% within two hours after driving).¹ The Delaware County Office of Judicial Support – the equivalent in that county of a court clerk's office, see Middaugh v. PennDOT , 196 A.3d 1073, 1075 & n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) – was required to send PennDOT a record of the conviction within ten days after its occurrence. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 6323(1)(i). For reasons that remain unclear, that office waited until early August 2016, twenty-eight months after the ten-day deadline had passed, to notify PennDOT of the conviction. When PennDOT received the notification, it sent Appellee a letter, dated August 23, 2016, informing him that his driving privileges would be suspended for one year beginning in late September 2016. See id . § 3804(e) (relating to the suspension of operating privileges upon conviction of a predicate offense such as DUI). The letter added that Appellee had the right to file a timely appeal. See id . § 1550(a).

Appellee exercised that right and filed an appeal in the Delaware County Court, challenging the suspension's validity due to the delay involved. The court held a hearing at which Appellee's driving record was entered into evidence, and Appellee was the sole witness. His testimony centered largely on changes in his life between 2014, when his license would have been suspended but for the Office of Judicial Support's delay in reporting the conviction to PennDOT, and 2016.

Specifically, Appellee testified that: in 2014 he was employed as an information-technology professional and lived with his wife; his car was "totaled" the day he was arrested for DUI, and he waited to buy a new one because he was expecting his driving privileges to be suspended; when it appeared that might not occur, he bought a new car; at the time, he could afford such a purchase because he was employed; had his privileges been suspended in a timely manner, he could have relied on his wife to drive him to appointments in her car; now, however, he is divorced, unemployed, and lives alone; he is 61 years old and classified for Social Security purposes as totally disabled due to a neurological disorder ; his condition has worsened since the time of his conviction; his treatment requires regular visits to five doctors; his only income is a monthly Social Security disability payment of $1,621; he needs to drive to attend doctor's appointments and purchase medicine and groceries, because there is no friend or relative available to help with these tasks; he cannot afford to hire a ride for such purposes because his disability income – which is approximately one third of his income when he was employed – would be insufficient for that expense; moreover, his spending already exceeds his income by about $250 per month. Additionally, Appellee explained that he was expecting his license to be suspended shortly after he pled guilty and did not know the reason for the delay. See N.T., Jan. 24, 2017, at 5-24.

The trial court credited Appellee's testimony and ultimately ruled in his favor. In reaching its holding, the court relied on Gingrich v. PennDOT , 134 A.3d 528 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016), which set forth the following rule for situations where the delay is attributable to a court clerk rather than PennDOT:

[W]here ... a licensee is able to demonstrate all of the following: [(1)] a conviction that is not reported for an extraordinarily extended period of time; [(2)] the licensee has [no further violations of the Vehicle Code] for an extended period; and [(3)] prejudice, it may be appropriate for common pleas to grant relief.

Id . at 535. Applying the standard, the trial court found that the 28-month delay was extraordinary, Appellee did not have any further violations during that period, and Appellee had demonstrated he would be prejudiced by the lateness of the suspension, particularly in view of his medical condition and the impact a suspension would have on it. See PennDOT v. Middaugh , No. 2016-8188, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at 5, ¶¶30-33 (C.P. Del. May 19, 2017).

A divided Commonwealth Court panel affirmed in a published decision. See Middaugh v. PennDOT , 196 A.3d 1073 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (en banc ). The majority initially noted that, where PennDOT is at fault, license suspensions have been judicially set aside where the delay was so protracted that it led the driver to believe no suspension was forthcoming, and the driver relied on that belief to his or her detriment. See id . at 1080-81 (quoting, inter alia , PennDOT v. Green , 119 Pa. Cmwlth. 281, 284, 546 A.2d 767, 769 (1988), aff'd per curiam , 524 Pa. 98, 569 A.2d 350 (1990) ); accord Terraciano v. PennDOT , 562 Pa. 60, 66, 753 A.2d 233, 236 (2000) (citing Fischer v. PennDOT , 682 A.2d 1353, 1355 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) ). The majority observed, however, that when the clerk's office of one of Pennsylvania's sixty judicial districts is responsible for the delay, courts have traditionally been reluctant to provide such relief so as to prevent erosion of the roadway-safety rationale underlying the license suspensions. See Middaugh , 196 A.3d at 1081-82 (discussing cases); accord Pokoy v. PennDOT , 714 A.2d 1162, 1164 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (indicating that only delays attributable to PennDOT can form the basis for relief). See generally infra note 4.

Nevertheless, the majority explained, the advent of electronic reporting has improved the ease with which clerks can transmit notices to PennDOT and detect reporting delays. Thus, the majority continued, it has become more reasonable for reviewing courts to scrutinize lengthy intervals occasioned by a court clerk's failure to notify PennDOT of a predicate conviction within a reasonable time. The majority expressed that this line of reasoning ultimately led to the Gingrich decision and its articulation of the above-quoted three-factor test for delays which are not attributable to PennDOT. See Middaugh , 196 A.3d at 1082 (discussing Gingrich ).²

The majority clarified that, under Gingrich , relief based on a judicial clerk's delay is reserved for "extraordinary circumstances where ‘the suspension loses its public protection rationale and simply becomes an additional punitive measure resulting from the conviction, but imposed long after the fact.’ " Id . at 1083 (quoting Gingrich , 134 A.3d at 534 ). Thus, the court stated that Gingrich , in effect, applied a rationale based on due process and fairness, pursuant to which PennDOT may not suspend privileges where doing so would no longer meaningfully protect the public and would become additional punishment resulting from the conviction. See id . (quoting Gingrich , 134 A.3d at 534 ). It specified, though, that a court clerk's reporting delay can only be deemed "extraordinary" if it exceeds the suspension period (here, twelve months) plus the ten-day window statutorily prescribed for notification to PennDOT. See id . at 1086.³

Applying Gingrich to the present facts, the majority pointed out that, as the 28-month delay exceeded the suspension period plus ten days, the trial court was permitted to view it as extraordinary. It also agreed summarily with the trial court's conclusion that Appellee's suspension "is not in the interest of protecting the public, but rather will be an additional punishment to be imposed years later." Id . at 1087 (quoting PennDOT v. Middaugh , No. 2016-8188, Opinion, at 11 (C.P. Del. June 21, 2017)).

Judge Covey filed a concurring and dissenting opinion, agreeing that Appellee was entitled to relief, but disagreeing with the formula fashioned by the majority for the smallest delay that can be deemed extraordinary. She opined, as well, that the Gingrich test should be abandoned. In her view, because prejudice is inherent to the suspension of driving privileges, it should not be a factor that can give rise to relief. She concluded that a flexible standard aimed at assessing the threat to public safety in each individual case should be used – for example, by giving substantial weight to whether the driver accrued additional Vehicle Code violations after the conviction which triggered the license suspension. See Middaugh , 196 A.3d at 1087-88.

Judge Ceisler dissented, suggesting that Gingrich should be overruled and the court should return to the pre- Gingrich rule exemplified by Pokoy , where only delays attributable to PennDOT can potentially form the basis for relief.⁴ In her view, drivers who are uncertain about the status of a pending suspension can seek information from PennDOT, and unsafe drivers should not receive a windfall simply because a county court's clerical staff failed to comply with its statutory obligations in a timely manner. See id . at 1088-90.

This Court granted allocatur to decide the following issue framed by PennDOT:

Did the Commonwealth Court err as a matter of law and abuse its discretion in affirming the trial court's order rescinding an operating privilege suspension that was imposed less than three years after [Middaugh]’s driving under the influence (DUI) conviction, where the delay was entirely due to the failure of the Delaware County Office of Judicial Support to

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