Commonwealth v. Miller

• Decision Date: 14 May 1917
• Docket Number: 111
• Parties: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Miller, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

101 A. 1006

258 Pa. 226

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Miller, Appellant

No. 111

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

May 14, 1917

Argued April 23, 1917

Appeal, No. 111, Jan. T., 1917, by defendant, from judgment and sentence of O. & T. Cumberland Co., Nov. Sessions, 1916 No. 30, on verdict of guilty of murder of the first degree in case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Archie Miller. Affirmed.

Indictment for murder.

In overruling the defendant's motion for a new trial SADLER, P.J., filed the following opinion:

Archie Miller was indicted for the murder of one Beisser, a railroad officer. He was defended by two of the ablest members of the local bar, assigned by the court under the provisions of the Act of March 22, 1907, P.L. 31, and in addition by counsel from another state selected by his family. The case was carefully presented. The jury rendered a verdict of guilty of murder of the first degree, and in this the court concurs.

Reasons for a new trial and in arrest of judgment have been presented and argued, and are now before us for consideration.

The first three alleged the verdict to be against the law, the evidence, the weight of the evidence, and the charge of the court; and can be considered together. None can be sustained.

The evidence showed that the defendant came from the south and obtained work in Jersey City. While there he determined to return home, and joined with him, as a companion, one Jasper Fletcher. Before starting he procured for the latter a 45 Colt revolver in which lead bullets were used. For himself he purchased a new Colt automatic revolver, and steel jacketed bullets. At that time he declared his purpose to see that no "bull" would get him on his road home. They left Jersey City by freight, finally reaching Highspire. From that point they went by foot to Harrisburg, and thence across the bridge to the Cumberland County side and to the tracks of the Northern Central Railroad. Proceeding to the north, a tramp was met, who told them of being driven off the track, and that if they went on they would be arrested. The defendant used a coarse expression in regard to the "bulls," but proceeded. At that time the officers were not in sight. Miller then put back his cap, removed his revolver from his right pocket -- he was left handed -- took it into his left hand, and there held it under the apron of the overalls he was wearing. Thus prepared, he continued on his way until in sight of the officers. Beisser came from the third to the second track in front of Miller, and when from fifteen to twenty feet away called "where are you going"? In answer, Miller pulled the prepared revolver, and shot, saying "that is where I am going." When the officer was falling he shot him a second time, and then shot the second officer who was on the track above. From the evidence, the jury was clearly justified in finding, as it did, that no other words had passed, and that no attempt had been made by Beisser to either arrest or assault the defendant. After falling, Beisser turned on his side, pulled out his revolver, and shot after the fleeing defendant, until he fell back dead. Miller was captured about one-half mile from the scene of the occurrence. In the meantime he had disposed in some way of his revolver. His companion, Fletcher, who had run at the first shot, was likewise found. He had thrown his revolver into the river. It was found with no bullets exploded. Those in his gun were lead, while Miller used steel jacketed ones, the same as found in the body of Beisser and the leg of Chubb. There was practically no contradiction of any of the facts above narrated. Miller himself did not take the stand.

The defense was insanity. The evidence to support even a suspicion of the same was far from convincing. The mother testified to various acts of badness during the youth of the defendant, and gave it as her opinion that he was insane. And a Doctor Jenkins, keeper of a reformatory in which Miller was confined from the age of twelve to fourteen, gave a like opinion. Doctor Johnston, a colored physician of Charleston, South Carolina, and the family doctor, gave it as his opinion that the defendant was suffering from dementia praecox, and that he could not distinguish between right and wrong when "he had an expansive moment." He had not seen the defendant for three years before the trial, nor had the mother seen him for months, or Dr. Jenkins for years. The mental condition was described as hereditary, and evidence was offered to show that the grandfather became insane at 66, and that a brother was confined in an asylum. The mother and the doctor stated that as a boy Miller was afraid of things without cause. From this the jury was asked to find that he was insane when he shot Beisser, and that he was suffering from some indefinite delusion when he so acted.

Every act and circumstance proven in the case showing the conduct of Miller immediately prior to and at the time of the murder negatived this contention. Two experts for the Commonwealth testified that, admitting as true every fact testified to in defense, there was no indication of insanity in their opinion.

The expert for the defendant declared that he, Miller, could distinguish between right and wrong, except during an "expansive moment," but that such a mental condition was existing when the killing occurred was absolutely without support in the evidence. Though this was the view of the court when the case was tried, and still is, yet every possible instruction which could be of benefit to the defendant was given. In answer to the points on delusion, the jury was permitted to find such, from the evidence, if they could, though the court would have been fully justified under the authorities in withdrawing the matter entirely from its consideration: Commonwealth v. Henderson, 242 Pa. 372.

A careful review of all the evidence leads to the conclusion that the jury was fully justified in finding that the killing was wilful, deliberate and premeditated, and was done by defendant while fully conscious of his act, with power to distinguish between right and wrong, and not under the control of any irresistible impulse or delusion.

Complaint is made of the answers to points 3, 11, 12 and 16 presented by the defendant. These were all affirmed as abstract propositions, and the jury told to apply the legal principle therein stated, if the facts upon which the same were predicated were found to be true. All four were based on the assumption that the evidence justified a finding that the defendant was acting under some delusion that he was in fear of death or great bodily harm. There was nothing in the evidence to justify such a conclusion, though it was left to the jury. The court would have been fully justified in refusing the points: Commonwealth v. Henderson, 242 Pa. 372; Commonwealth v. Calhoun, 238 Pa. 474. Any assumption of delusion would necessarily have been drawn from the proof that Miller as a child was needlessly afraid of things. The testimony as to this covered a period, years before the killing. Not a word to show impaired mental condition was offered for a period more than three years before, while the testimony of the acts and conduct of Miller immediately before and at the time of the killing showed him to be fully conscious of his actions and surroundings. In the answers to the points complained of the defendant received more favorable treatment than he had the right to demand.

The sixth point was affirmed as stated. So that the jury might not get the impression from so doing, that the fact that the weapon was deadly could not be considered by them, we stated that from its use the intention may be inferred. This, in connection with the remainder of the point affirmed, was...