Commonwealth v. Mitchell.

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Citation37 A.2d 443,349 Pa. 559
Decision Date22 May 1944

349 Pa. 559
37 A.2d 443


Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

May 22, 1944.

Appeal No. 115, January term, 1944, from the judgment of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania at No. 99, October term, 1944, reversing the judgment of the Court of Quarter Sessions of the County of Philadelphia as of No. 519, September term, 1938; Thomas J. Baldrige, Judge.

Proceeding by Commonwealth of Pennsylvania against John Mitchell, alias Joseph Mitchell, for alleged robbery. From an order granting the defendant his absolute discharge under the two term rule, the Commonwealth appeals to the Superior Court where the judgment was reversed, and defendant ordered to stand trial and defendant appeals to the Supreme Court.



Thomas J. Minnick, Jr., and Angelo L. Scaricamazza, both of Philadelphia, for appellant.

Franklin E. Barr, Asst. Dist. Atty., John H. Maurer, Dist. Atty., both of Philadelphia, for appellee.

The opinion of the Superior Court, Baldrige, J., herewith adopted follows:

This appeal presents this question: Does a discharge of the defendant in a habeas corpus proceeding under the ‘two term’ rule, established by section 3 of the Habeas Corpus Act of February 18, 1785, 2 Sm.L. 275, and re-enacted by section

37 A.2d 444

54 of the Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 427, 19 P.S. § 781, prevent trial, or is it a discharge from imprisonment only?

John Mitchell was arrested September 9, 1938, charged with robbery, held without bail, and seven days thereafter was indicted by the grand jury. On October 1, 1938, he was arraigned and plead ‘not guilty.’ His case was listed for trial several times and he and his attorney in each instance were in court, but it was never reached due to the trial of other cases. On February 6, 1939, Mitchell petitioned the court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging he was entitled to his discharge under the provisions of section 54 of the Act of 1860, supra. On February 9, 1939, he moved the court to quash the indictment. On February 10, 1939, Judge Bok, after a hearing in the habeas corpus proceeding, discharged the defendant. Judge Finletter on June 8, 1942, dismissed the motion to quash the indictment. No further action was taken until March 17, 1943, when the case was again listed for trial. The defendant, with his counsel, appeared in court. Relying on his discharge in the habeas corpus proceeding he moved, through his attorney, for his absolute discharge under the ‘two term’ rule, claiming that he should not be subjected to a trial. Judge Bluett, against the protest of the Commonwealth, granted defendant's motion and this appeal by the Commonwealth followed.

Section 3 of the Habeas Corpus Act of February 18, 1785, supra, was re-enacted with an immaterial addition in section 54 of the Act of 1860, supra. The pertinent portion provides: ‘If any person shall be committed for treason or felony, or other indictable offense, and shall not be indicted and tried some time in the next term, session of oyer and terminer, general jail delivery, or other court where the offense is properly cognizable, after such commitment, it shall and may be lawful for the judges or justices thereof, and they are hereby required on the last day of the term, sessions or court, to set at liberty the said prisoner upon bail, unless it shall appear to them, upon oath or affirmation, that the witnesses for the commonwealth, mentioning their names, could not then be produced; and if such prisoner shall not be indicted and tried the second term, session or court after his or her commitment, unless the delay...

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