Commonwealth v. Mogelinski

Decision Date23 December 2013
Citation1 N.E.3d 237,466 Mass. 627
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. Matthew MOGELINSKI.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Jeffrey S. Brown, Agawam, for the defendant.

Cynthia M. Pepyne, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

John Cushman & Patricia Garin, Boston, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: IRELAND, C.J., SPINA, CORDY, BOTSFORD, GANTS, DUFFLY, & LENK, JJ.

LENK, J.

This case concerns the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court. 1 The Commonwealth filed five delinquency complaints against the defendant when he was seventeen, charging him with rape of a child under sixteen, G.L. c. 265, § 23, and indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen, G.L. c. 265, § 13B, based on an alleged seven-year period of sexual abuse of the victim. Although summonsed into court on those complaints while still seventeen years old, the defendant had turned eighteen by the time of his first scheduled court appearance and arraignment. More than six months later, the Commonwealth obtained youthful offender indictments against the defendant, based on the portion of the alleged abuse that took place when he was between fourteen and seventeen years old.

Pursuant to Mass. R.Crim. P. 34, as amended, 442 Mass. 1501 (2004), a judge of the Juvenile Court reported four questions concerning issues of the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction:

“1. Whether the term ‘apprehended’ as appearing in G.L. c. 119, § 72 [,] and G.L. c. 119, § 72A[,] refers to the time when a complaint is issued against an individual, or to when an individual is summoned for arraignment, or when an individual voluntarily appears in response to a summons or complaint and submits to the jurisdiction of the court at arraignment, or when an individual is arrested, or taken into custody pursuant to a complaint issued by the court?

“2. Whether an individual may be indicted as a youthful offender after he has turned 18, for offenses he allegedly committed between the ages of 14 and 17?

“3. If yes to question 2, would those youthful offender indictments be subject to a hearing pursuant to G.L. c. 119, § 72A[,] or would the individual be proceeded against as a youthful offender pursuant to G.L. c. 119, §§ 54 and 58?

“4. If no to question 2, may the court permit such an indictment to proceed if a delinquency complaint on the same facts against the [d]efendant was filed timely before his eighteenth birthday?”

We conclude that the commencement of process marks the point of apprehension, provided the individual is available to the court at that time. We answer the second reported question in the negative and, therefore, proceed directly to the fourth reported question. In answer to that question, we conclude that a youthful offender indictment may not issue against an individual after his or her eighteenth birthday, regardless of whether a delinquency complaint on the same facts has been filed before the individual's eighteenth birthday.

1. Background and prior proceedings. On May 10, 2011, the State police filed an application for a delinquency complaint in the Juvenile Court against the defendant, after initially being notified of allegations of sexual abuse on December 13, 2010. The application for the complaint alleged two counts of rape of a child under sixteen, G.L. c. 265, § 23, and three counts of indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen, G.L. c. 265, § 13B. An assistant clerk-magistrate allowed the application on the day that it was filed, resulting in the issuance of five delinquency complaints against the defendant. The basis of the complaints was the defendant's alleged sexual abuse of the victim over a seven-year period, from August, 2001, to December, 2008, when the defendant was between eight and fifteen years old. On May 11, 2011, a summons issued, ordering the defendant and his mother to appear in the Juvenile Court on May 31. On May 31, the defendant duly appeared and was arraigned; he was released on personal recognizance, with conditions. When the complaint and summons issued, the defendant was less than two weeks shy of his eighteenth birthday. By the time of his arraignment on May 31, the defendant had turned eighteen years old.

Six months later, while the delinquency complaints were pending in the Juvenile Court, the Commonwealth pursued youthful offender indictments against the defendant pursuant to G.L. c. 119, § 54; the Commonwealth previously had assented to the defendant's motion to confirm Juvenile Court jurisdiction and had agreed not to pursue a transfer hearing. On December 5, 2011, a grand jury returned youthful offender indictments charging two counts of rape of a child under sixteen and three counts of indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen. The indictments allege that the offenses occurred between May 23, 2007, and December 31, 2008, when the defendant was between fourteen and fifteen years old. Due to alleged violations of the release conditions, the Commonwealth moved to revoke bail, and on December 7, 2011, a warrant issued for the defendant's arrest. The defendant was taken into custody on this warrant on December 13, when he appeared at a pretrial conference. Also on December 13, the defendant was arraigned on the youthful offender indictments, and the Commonwealth entered nolle prosequi on four of the five delinquency complaints. A nolle prosequi was entered on the remaining complaint on June 18, 2012, after the defendant had attained the age of nineteen.

On February 2, 2012, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictments, arguing, inter alia, that the Juvenile Court lacked jurisdiction to proceed under G.L. c. 119, § 72, since the youthful offender indictments issued after his eighteenth birthday. That motion was denied; the defendant's subsequent motion to report questions of law was allowed. After a Juvenile Court judge reported four questions to the Appeals Court, we transferred the case to this court on our own motion.

2. Statutory framework. After this case was argued, the Governor signed St. 2013, c. 84, “An Act expanding juvenile jurisdiction,” which amended various provisions of G.L. c. 119. The act confers jurisdiction on the Juvenile Court over cases where the alleged offense was committed up to the point of a defendant's eighteenth (rather than seventeenth) birthday. We analyze this case, however, under the statutory scheme as it existed at all relevant times prior to this amendment.

In general, the Juvenile Court has jurisdiction over children between the ages of seven and seventeen who are alleged to have committed an offense (other than murder) prior to their seventeenth birthday.2G.L. c. 119, §§ 52, 74. The Juvenile Court also retains jurisdiction over children who turn eighteen while their cases are pending, in order to adjudicate “all remands and retrials following appeals from their cases, or during continuances or probation, or after their cases have been placed on file, or for any other proceeding arising out of their cases.” G.L. c. 119, § 72 ( a ) (where proceeding commenced via delinquency complaint). G.L. c. 119, § 72 ( b ) (where proceeding commenced via youthful offender indictment). The Commonwealth may proceed against these children along one of two tracks, each with different procedural protections and sentencing consequences for the juvenile.

First, “if the juvenile is proceeded against by complaint, the juvenile is classified as a delinquent.” Commonwealth v. Dale D., 431 Mass. 757, 759, 730 N.E.2d 278 (2000). Individuals proceeded against as delinquents are afforded protections not available in the adult system, such as the presumptive privacy of court records, G.L. c. 119, § 60A, and pre- or postadjudicatory probation, G.L. c. 119, § 58. Perhaps most importantly, Juvenile Court judges have broad “discretion ... to render individualized dispositions consistent with the best interests of the child,” Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 464 Mass. 807, 808, 985 N.E.2d 1179 (2013), by either “plac[ing] the case on file or ... plac[ing] the child in the care of a probation officer for such time and on such conditions as it deems appropriate or ... commit [ting] him to the custody of the department of youth services.” G.L. c. 119, § 58.

Alternatively, the Commonwealth may seek an indictment against a juvenile for specific types of violent offenses or where the individual previously has been adjudicated delinquent and was between the ages of fourteen and seventeen at the time of the offense; 3 [i]f an indictment is successfully obtained, the juvenile is classified as a youthful offender.” Commonwealth v. Dale D., supra at 759, 730 N.E.2d 278. See G.L. c. 119, § 54. The youthful offender designation, legislatively created in 1996 in “response to societal concerns about violent crimes committed by juveniles,” Commonwealth v. Clint C., 430 Mass. 219, 222–223, 715 N.E.2d 1032 (1999), was intended “to reduce or eliminate certain protections previously available to all juvenile offenders.” Doe v. Attorney Gen. (No. 1), 425 Mass. 210, 212–213, 680 N.E.2d 92 (1997). Although youthful offenders are proceeded against in Juvenile Court, their treatment may, in other respects, resemble that of adult offenders: their court proceedings are not shielded from public inspection; they are eligible for enhanced penalties, including any adult sentence provided for by law; and they can be confined in an adult house of correction or State prison. G.L. c. 119, § 58. Thus, the terms “youthful offender” and “delinquent child” reflect and incorporate different legislative judgments about the accountability of children for certain offenses.

While proceedings under either a delinquency complaint or a youthful offender indictment presuppose that an individual is under the age of eighteen when the proceeding is commenced, the Commonwealth is not precluded from prosecuting individuals...

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