Commonwealth v. Molina

• Decision Date: 29 January 2014
• Docket Number: SJC–11329.
• Citation: 3 N.E.3d 583,467 Mass. 65
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Alexander MOLINA.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

467 Mass. 65

3 N.E.3d 583

COMMONWEALTH

v.Alexander MOLINA.

SJC–11329.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

Argued Oct. 7, 2013.

Decided Jan. 29, 2014.

David Keighley, Fairhaven, for the defendant.

David J. Gold, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Present: IRELAND, C.J., SPINA, CORDY, BOTSFORD, GANTS, & DUFFLY, JJ.

BOTSFORD, J.

Following a jury trial in the Superior Court, the defendant, Alexander Molina, was convicted of murder in the second degree, unlawful possession of a firearm while not at work or at home, and discharge of a firearm within five hundred feet of a building. The defendant appealed, and the Appeals Court affirmed the convictions. See Commonwealth v. Molina, 81 Mass.App.Ct. 855, 969 N.E.2d 738 (2012). We granted the defendant's application for further appellate review, limited to issues concerning the admissibility of statements that the defendant made to the police during an interview conducted at the New Bedford police station on March 30, 2005. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

1. Background. The facts of the case are summarized in the Appeals Court's decision, see Molina, 81 Mass.App.Ct. at 856–857, 969 N.E.2d 738; we describe them briefly here. The victim, James Gauoette, was shot to death at around 5 p.m. on March 30, 2005, near the intersection of Ruth and Salisbury Streets in New Bedford. Three eyewitnesses, who were present near that intersection, testified at trial and provided details about their observations of the shooter. Two of the three testified that the shooter wore a mustard-colored or yellow shirt, and two of the three also stated that soon after the shooting, they observed the shooter in a brown jogging suit or brown sweatshirt. At trial, two of the three witnesses identified the defendant as the shooter.

At approximately 10 p.m. on the same day, the police prepared to tow a bluish-green Mazda Protegé automobile that was within the environs of the crime scene. The defendant and an acquaintance crossed the crime scene tape, and the defendant told State Trooper Ann Marie Robertson that the police were towing his car. In response to Robertson's inquiry, the defendant stated that his name was Orlando Figueroa.¹ Robertson then informed the defendant that the vehicle was not his as it was registered to Alex Molina. The defendant responded that Orlando Figueroa was his father's name and that his name was Alex Molina. After this exchange, one of the police officers present asked the defendant if he would go to the police station to answer some questions, and the defendant agreed to do so. Officer David Brown of the New Bedford police department, with whom the defendant was familiar, drove the defendant to the police station. The defendant was not under arrest or handcuffed. Once they arrived at the police station, Officer Brown remained with the defendant for between thirty and forty-five minutes, but the record contains no evidence relating to any conversation between them.

At around 11:45 p.m., State Trooper Carmelo Serrano, Jr., and Detective Christopher J. Dumont of the New Bedford police department began to interview the defendant at the police station. The interview concluded approximately three and one-half hours later, at 3:15 a.m. on March 31, 2005, after which the two officers drove the defendant back to the area of Ruth Street and dropped him off. Later that same day, after speaking with at least one of the eyewitnesses to the shooting, the police arrested the defendant and he was charged with the victim's murder.

2. The police interview and the defendant's statements. The defendant's interview by Trooper Serrano and Detective Dumont took place in the police station in an apparently windowless room measuring twelve feet by eight feet. The interview was videotaped.² Serrano was the principal interrogator during the entire interview, and for the most part, the interview was conducted in Spanish; Serrano's first language is Spanish, as is the defendant's. The defendant sat to the side of the desk, with Serrano and Detective Dumont sitting across from the defendant closer to the door. At the beginning of the interview, Serrano presented the defendant a written copy of the Miranda warnings in Spanish, and the defendant read them out loud. When he finished reading, the following interchange took place:

Trooper Serrano: “OK. Do you understand your rights?”

Defendant: “Uh-huh, but I just said if I could call my attorney and I was told that it wasn't necessary; that I was coming just to be asked some questions.”

Trooper Serrano: “Uh huh.”

Defendant: “And that I just went to ... I was sleeping and I get a call that my car was being taken and when I go there and I am told that I have to come here, that someone wants to ask me some questions ... I don't know what happened because I truly don't know ... my car was there because it was getting me [ sic ] music equipment.”

Trooper Serrano: “OK, before ... do you, do you want to speak with me now ... I want to ask you some questions; do you want to speak with me now during this time? You understand your rights no?”

Defendant: “Uh-huh, yes I understand.”

Trooper Serrano: “Having understood your rights, you want to speak with me now?”

Defendant: “Whatever you say.”

Trooper Serrano: “OK, then if you please sign here; this is just that you were advised of your rights and that ... you wish to speak with me now.”

Defendant: “[T]hat is not that I am a witness for the town hall ... I have no problem.”

Trooper Serrano: “[A]nd, Detective Dumont, could you please sign ....”

The defendant, Serrano, and Dumont all signed the Miranda waiver form, and the interview began. Serrano initially asked general questions about the defendant, including where he lived, where he worked, the defendant's girl friends, the installation of music equipment in the defendant's car, and why the car had been at the intersection of Ruth and Salisbury Streets. He and the defendant joked some. The questions then began to focus on what the defendant had been doing earlier that day, the sequence of his activities, and especially where he was immediately before and around the time of the shooting—although Serrano had not yet mentioned the fact that a shooting had taken place. The defendant stated that during the afternoon of March 30, he was taking a nap at the home of one of his girl friends, Patricia. The officers then asked the defendant about the yellow shirt he had been wearing earlier.³ The defendant told the officers that he was wearing a yellow shirt while he was working on his car in order to prevent his regular clothes from getting dirty. He stated that a man named Angelo (whose last name he did not know) had lent him the yellow shirt and that it must still be in his car. When the officers asked the defendant to provide additional information regarding the individuals who were with Angelo at that time, the defendant said:

“[I]s it mandatory that I mention a name? Because if I ... truly, if I had known that this would be like this, I honestly would have brought an attorney because I truly don't even know what has happened; I haven't been informed of what has happened and I am being questioned about, really, I mean, it's like my rights are being violated because I am being questioned on something that I truly don't know ... I mean because....”Serrano then informed the defendant for the first time that the officers were investigating a shooting at the intersection of Ruth and Salisbury Streets. Serrano stated that all of them were “grown up men” and that the officers already knew the answers to some of the questions that they were asking. Serrano informed the defendant that if he started lying to the officers, it was the defendant who was going to look suspicious. After that exchange, the officers continued to question the defendant about his clothing, and focused on what he was wearing at various times throughout the day. ⁴

Serrano asked the defendant about his conversation with police officers at a friend's apartment earlier that evening. He pressed the defendant for the reason he had given the name “Orlando Figueroa” to the police officers at that time. The defendant gave conflicting answers. Throughout this portion of the interview, Serrano and Dumont remained seated, with Serrano leaning back in his chair. The defendant appeared relaxed, and the parties' voices were calm.

There was a fifteen-minute break in questioning at around 1:40 a.m. Following the break, Serrano no longer sat while he was questioning the defendant but instead stood close to the seated defendant, talking down at him. His voice was raised, and he interrupted the defendant, not letting him finish his answers to questions. The interview ended at approximately 3:15 a.m. on March 31, 2005; it had lasted approximately three and one-half hours.

The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of the statements he made during the police interview, and it was the subject of an evidentiary hearing before a Superior Court judge (motion judge). The defendant argued that his Miranda waiver was invalid and that he had invoked the right to counsel. The motion judge denied the defendant's motion.⁵ At trial, Serrano testified relatively briefly about the police interview of the defendant, and in particular about some of the defendant's statements, but neither the videotapes nor the bilingual translation of the interview were introduced or proffered.⁶

3. Discussion. In challenging the admission of his statements made during the police interview, the defendant accepts the premise that the right provided by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–445, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)( Miranda ), to have counsel present during a police interview or interrogation only attaches when the interrogation is custodial. His argument in substance is that contrary to the motion judge's conclusion, ⁷ the interview became custodial at a relatively early stage; and...