Commonwealth v. Montanez

• Decision Date: 27 July 2022
• Docket Number: 2612 EDA 2021,J-S22006-22
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. JOSE L. MONTANEZ Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. JOSE L. MONTANEZ Appellant

No. 2612 EDA 2021

No. J-S22006-22

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

July 27, 2022

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 17, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006985-2018

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM

BOWES J.

Jose L Montanez appeals from the November 17, 2021 order denying his petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"). We affirm.

The PCRA court prepared the following apt summary of the factual and procedural history of this case:

On August 4, 2018, Appellant got into an argument with then-girlfriend Eleni Antonopoulos after [she] told him that she was leaving and began packing a bag. Appellant became irate and attacked Ms. Antonopoulos with multiple knives including a butcher's knife. He stabbed her 22 times. Appellant then chased Ms. Antonopoulos around the home until she barricaded herself in the bathroom. Appellant told the victim that he was going to "gut her like a fish" and "make her look like the Joker." The victim used brass knuckles and a toilet seat cover against Appellant in self-defense. She was eventually able to call 911. Appellant was arrested that night and the victim was taken to the hospital to treat stab wounds and a collapsed lung.

Appellant [was] formally arraigned on October 11, 2018. Appellant then entered a negotiated guilty plea before the Honorable Lucretia Clemons on July 9, 2019[, to charges of criminal attempt-murder and possession of an instrument of crime with intent ("PIC")]. He was sentenced directly thereafter . . . . as follows: ten to twenty years of incarceration at a state correctional institution for [criminal attempt-murder] and two and one-half to five years of incarceration [for PIC]. These sentences [were set to] run concurrently.

Appellant did not file any post-sentence motions or a . . . direct appeal.

PCRA Court Opinion, 3/14/22, at 2 (cleaned up). Accordingly, Appellant's judgment of sentence became final for the purposes of the PCRA on August 8, 2019, at the expiration of his time in which to seek direct review in this Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).

On April 29, 2021, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) present evidence of self-defense; (2) challenge the credibility of the victim; (3) file a post-sentence motion or a direct appeal; (4) assert a speedy trial claim pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600; and (5) adequately consult with Appellant. See Pro Se PCRA Petition, 4/29/21, at 4. Appellant acknowledged that his petition was filed beyond the one-year time limit of the PCRA but asserted the exception for newly discovered facts at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) applied. Id. at 3. Specifically, he claimed to suffer from a "traumatic brain injury that resulted in significant memory loss and cognitive impairment." Id. The precise nexus between this medical condition and the timeliness of his PCRA petition, however, was not evident from the face of the filing.

PCRA counsel was appointed to represent Appellant. On October 17, 2021, counsel submitted a "no-merit" letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). Specifically, counsel averred that he had concluded that Appellant's petition was untimely and not subject to any of the relevant exceptions. Thereafter, the PCRA court entered notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant's petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. See Notice, 10/20/21. After receiving no response from Appellant, the PCRA court dismissed the petition. See Order, 11/17/21. Ultimately, Appellant's first PCRA counsel was granted leave to withdraw from the case.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and substitute PCRA counsel was appointed to represent him. Both Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with their respective obligations pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant has presented the following issues for our consideration:

1) Did the PCRA [court] err in dismissing the PCRA petition where Appellant asserts that he did not enter into the guilty plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily as in the matter for which he was charged he believes he acted in self-defense against a complainant with substantial credibility issues, accordingly, he ultimately wanted to proceed to trial[?] Appellant further asserts that his mental health issues stemming from a traumatic brain injury, diminished his capacity to enter into a voluntary plea and essentially weakened his resolve and was a material factor in what he believes was an [unlawfully] induced guilty plea.

2) Was PCRA counsel ineffective for not raising this issue in an amended petition, and was plea counsel ineffective for allowing Appellant to enter into the plea as Appellant claims in his pro se PCRA petition that he ultimately wanted to proceed to trial and assert self-defense?

3) Appellant filed a facially untimely PCRA petition that does not directly satisfy one of the time-bar exceptions to the PCRA, as Appellant was unaware of the time limitations in which to file a PCRA. As the purpose of Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(C)(3) is to ensure fair sentencing procedures, does due process require that in addition to being advised of the right to file a post-sentence motion and direct appeal, that he should also be advised at sentencing of the PCRA's one[-]year time constraint, and that in the interest of justice and pursuant to notions of fair play, should his petition [be] deemed timely filed, nunc pro tunc?

Appellant's brief at 5 (cleaned up).

In reviewing a denial of PCRA relief on appeal, "we examine whether the PCRA court's determination is supported by the record and free of legal error." Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 266 A.3d 1128, 1132 (Pa.Super. 2021). Before addressing the merits of Appellant's PCRA petition, we must assess its timeliness. As our Supreme Court has consistently instructed, "[i]f a PCRA petition is untimely, neither this Court nor the trial court has jurisdiction over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to address the substantive claims." Commonwealth v. Reid, 235 A.3d 1124, 1140 (Pa. 2020). All PCRA petitions must be filed within one year of the date a defendant's judgment of sentence becomes final. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). As noted above, Appellant's judgment of sentence became final on August 8, 2019. However, the instant PCRA petition was not filed until April 29, 2021, or more than eight months beyond the relevant time limit. Accordingly, Appellant's petition is facially untimely.

A defendant filing a PCRA petition beyond this one-year time limit must allege and prove the applicability of at least one of three statutory exceptions applies to his claims, namely:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). However, "the PCRA confers no authority upon this Court to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA time-bar in addition to those exceptions expressly delineated in the Act." Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa. 2003). We also emphasize that there is "'no generalized equitable exception to the jurisdictional one-year time bar pertaining to post-conviction petitions.'" Commonwealth v. Vinson, 249 A.3d 1197, 1204 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 943 A.2d 264, 267 (Pa. 2008)).

Although Appellant's petition asserted that the timeliness of his PCRA petition was impacted by a traumatic brain injury, he has abandoned this claim on appeal and concedes that none of the timeliness exceptions delineated above applies in the instant case. See Appellant's brief at 18 ("Appellant acknowledges that his pro se PCRA petition was untimely and does not satisfy one of the time-bar exceptions to the PCRA statute."). Instead, Appellant argues that he was never properly informed of the PCRA time limitations. Therefore, he "asserts that his petition should be deemed timely, in the interest of justice and pursuant to notions of fair play and procedural due process." Id. Specifically, he argues that "procedural due process requires that [a defendant] be advised at sentencing of the one[-]year time constraint of a PCRA petition[.]" Id. at 22. Appellant has cited no procedural rule, statute, or precedent under current Pennsylvania law that would compel such a holding, although he cites Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(C)(3) (providing that a sentencing judge ensure that a defendant is advised of various rights at the time of sentencing, which does not include the PCRA time limitations) and a New Jersey post-conviction statute as inferential support. See N.J.C.R. 3:21-4(i) ("The court shall also inform the defendant of the time limitations in which to file petitions for post-conviction relief.").

As an initial matter, it appears that this claim was never advanced before the PCRA court and was first raised in Appellant's Rule 1925(b) statement. Claims not raised in the PCRA court cannot be...