Commonwealth v. Montanez
Decision Date | 27 July 2022 |
Docket Number | 2612 EDA 2021,J-S22006-22 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. JOSE L. MONTANEZ Appellant |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Jose L Montanez appeals from the November 17, 2021 order denying his petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"). We affirm.
The PCRA court prepared the following apt summary of the factual and procedural history of this case:
PCRA Court Opinion, 3/14/22, at 2 (cleaned up). Accordingly, Appellant's judgment of sentence became final for the purposes of the PCRA on August 8, 2019, at the expiration of his time in which to seek direct review in this Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).
On April 29, 2021, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) present evidence of self-defense; (2) challenge the credibility of the victim; (3) file a post-sentence motion or a direct appeal; (4) assert a speedy trial claim pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600; and (5) adequately consult with Appellant. See Pro Se PCRA Petition, 4/29/21, at 4. Appellant acknowledged that his petition was filed beyond the one-year time limit of the PCRA but asserted the exception for newly discovered facts at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) applied. Id. at 3. Specifically, he claimed to suffer from a "traumatic brain injury that resulted in significant memory loss and cognitive impairment." Id. The precise nexus between this medical condition and the timeliness of his PCRA petition, however, was not evident from the face of the filing.
PCRA counsel was appointed to represent Appellant. On October 17, 2021, counsel submitted a "no-merit" letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). Specifically, counsel averred that he had concluded that Appellant's petition was untimely and not subject to any of the relevant exceptions. Thereafter, the PCRA court entered notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant's petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. See Notice, 10/20/21. After receiving no response from Appellant, the PCRA court dismissed the petition. See Order, 11/17/21. Ultimately, Appellant's first PCRA counsel was granted leave to withdraw from the case.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and substitute PCRA counsel was appointed to represent him. Both Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with their respective obligations pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant has presented the following issues for our consideration:
Appellant's brief at 5 (cleaned up).
In reviewing a denial of PCRA relief on appeal, "we examine whether the PCRA court's determination is supported by the record and free of legal error." Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 266 A.3d 1128, 1132 (Pa.Super. 2021). Before addressing the merits of Appellant's PCRA petition, we must assess its timeliness. As our Supreme Court has consistently instructed, Commonwealth v. Reid, 235 A.3d 1124, 1140 (Pa. 2020). All PCRA petitions must be filed within one year of the date a defendant's judgment of sentence becomes final. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). As noted above, Appellant's judgment of sentence became final on August 8, 2019. However, the instant PCRA petition was not filed until April 29, 2021, or more than eight months beyond the relevant time limit. Accordingly, Appellant's petition is facially untimely.
A defendant filing a PCRA petition beyond this one-year time limit must allege and prove the applicability of at least one of three statutory exceptions applies to his claims, namely:
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). However, "the PCRA confers no authority upon this Court to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA time-bar in addition to those exceptions expressly delineated in the Act." Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa. 2003). We also emphasize that there is "'no generalized equitable exception to the jurisdictional one-year time bar pertaining to post-conviction petitions.'" Commonwealth v. Vinson, 249 A.3d 1197, 1204 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 943 A.2d 264, 267 (Pa. 2008)).
Although Appellant's petition asserted that the timeliness of his PCRA petition was impacted by a traumatic brain injury, he has abandoned this claim on appeal and concedes that none of the timeliness exceptions delineated above applies in the instant case. See Appellant's brief at 18 ("Appellant acknowledges that his pro se PCRA petition was untimely and does not satisfy one of the time-bar exceptions to the PCRA statute."). Instead, Appellant argues that he was never properly informed of the PCRA time limitations. Therefore, he "asserts that his petition should be deemed timely, in the interest of justice and pursuant to notions of fair play and procedural due process." Id. Specifically, he argues that "procedural due process requires that [a defendant] be advised at sentencing of the one[-]year time constraint of a PCRA petition[.]" Id. at 22. Appellant has cited no procedural rule, statute, or precedent under current Pennsylvania law that would compel such a holding, although he cites Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(C)(3) ( ) and a New Jersey post-conviction statute as inferential support. See N.J.C.R. 3:21-4(i) ("The court shall also inform the defendant of the time limitations in which to file petitions for post-conviction relief.").
As an initial matter, it appears that this claim was never advanced before the PCRA court and was first raised in Appellant's Rule 1925(b) statement. Claims not raised in the PCRA court cannot be...
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