Commonwealth v. Moody, s. 47 EAP 2013

Decision Date27 October 2015
Docket NumberNos. 47 EAP 2013,s. 47 EAP 2013
Parties COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Katrina MOODY, Appellee. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Barbara Ivery, Appellee. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Bernadette Archie, Appellee.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Hugh J. Burns, Jr., Esq., Karen Brancheau Jordan, Esq., Jeffrey Michael Krulik, Esq., Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Bradley Steven Bridge, Esq., Defender Association of Philadelphia, Andrew David Montroy, Esq., Philadelphia, for Barbara Ivery.

Bradley Steven Bridge, Esq., Defender Association of Philadelphia, Joseph James Russo, Esq., Christopher L. Giddings, P.C., for Appellees.

CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY, STEVENS, JJ.

OPINION

Justice EAKIN.

This Court granted review to consider whether the Superior Court erred in vacating appellees' direct criminal contempt convictions. We conclude the trial judge acted appropriately and violated no due process rights; thus, we reverse the order of the Superior Court and remand for reinstatement of the sentences.

On April 6, 2011, Shaun Warrick appeared in the Philadelphia Municipal Court for his preliminary hearing on two homicide charges. Appellees are relatives of the victims, and were seated in the courtroom gallery. Before testimony began, Warrick advised the court his mother had retained private counsel for him and requested a continuance. At the court's request, his mother, escorted by court officer Richard Brandt, came forward to testify. Appellees thereupon verbally and physically assailed Ms. Warrick, and a general melee erupted in the courtroom. Warrick tried to defend his mother, which led to an expanded struggle that required deputy sheriffs and police reinforcements from outside the courtroom to restore order. The courtroom was locked down for three hours.

When court reconvened, the trial court held a summary hearing for direct criminal contempt. The court noted contempt involves conduct in the presence of the court that delays proceedings and determined the conduct here was "about as direct of a contempt as you can ever get." N.T. Contempt Hearing, 4/6/11, at 5. The court "put on the record what happened that [it] observed[,]" as:

[W]e tried to bring [Warrick]'s mother in as a witness to testify as to whether or not she hired an attorney for [him]. That's all.
When the court officer went out to get the mother, a fight broke out in the gallery involving numerous people in which the court officer got stuck in the middle and his arm was hit during the proceeding. He can tell us more about what happened.
Because of that, we had to shut down the court, call the sheriff. Almost every free sheriff in the building came running in here. We locked down the courtroom. [Warrick] went nuts and started banging on the wall because he saw his mother being assaulted. The door got locked. And the sheriff had to wrestle with [Warrick] while all this happened, all because of what happened in the gallery of the courtroom.

Id., at 6–7.

The court officer then testified and confirmed the identity of appellees as the individuals who caused the disturbance. Appellees were not represented by counsel at that time and did not question the court officer. The court asked, "Do any of you ladies have something to say?" Id., at 12. Appellee Archie spoke up and was sworn in, but before she made a statement on the record, the court opted to delay proceedings for the appointment of counsel, given the likelihood of criminal charges and appellees' rights against self-incrimination with respect to those charges. Thus, proceedings ended for the day without testimony from appellees or any other witnesses. The court did make an "initial finding" of direct criminal contempt but deferred "final determination as to what the sentence should be" until appellees could meet with counsel. Id., at 15.

One week later, appellees Moody and Ivery were present with counsel.1 Moody and Ivery submitted a joint continuance request, seeking to locate and interview witnesses to the altercation, arguing summary contempt defendants have a right to present their own witnesses and cross-examine other witnesses. The court denied the request, finding they were not entitled to call and cross-examine witnesses, "especially in extreme instances of contempt that take place in the presence of the [c]ourt." N.T. Sentencing, 4/13/11, at 8. In the court's view, the only process due was appointment of counsel for purposes of allocution before sentencing and to present circumstances that might "mitigate the events[.]" Id., at 9. Regarding appellees' claim of entitlement to cross-examine the court officer, the court stated it could disregard everything the court officer said because the court itself observed the contemptuous conduct. Id., at 10. It explained the court officer was called only to articulate details "for purposes of illustration" on the record, and his testimony was "not necessary as a basis for making [its] finding of contempt because [it] observed [the contemptuous conduct] with [its] own eyes [.]" Id., at 10–11. The court ultimately sentenced each appellee to five to ten days imprisonment.

Appellees appealed, and the three cases were consolidated. In its Pa.R.A.P.1925(a) opinion, the court reiterated its view that, where the judge witnesses the offending behavior, neither appointment of counsel nor further development of evidence is required for a contempt finding; the court declared, "No amount of witnesses or cross examination of the judge or the court officer would convince this [c]ourt, the fact finder, that it does not know what it saw." Trial Court Opinion, 6/24/11, at 16–17. The court also addressed affidavits from witnesses to the brawl, concluding the affidavits conflicted with the events it had witnessed, which illustrated why it is "unnecessary and wasteful" to entertain such evidence in a case where the court itself observed the contemptuous behavior. Id., at 17 n. 8. The court explained, "This is exactly why there was no need for this [c]ourt to hear witnesses to dispute the [c]ourt's version of events prior to making a finding of contempt." Id.

On appeal, appellees claimed: (1) the evidence was insufficient; (2) they were denied their rights to counsel, to cross-examine witnesses, to present evidence, and to testify; and (3) the sentences were an abuse of discretion.2 In a published opinion, the Superior Court viewed the second issue as implicating due process, deemed it meritorious, and vacated and remanded for a new contempt proceeding. Commonwealth v. Moody, 46 A.3d 765, 771, 776 (Pa.Super.2012).3 The court noted appellate review of direct-criminal-contempt matters is " ‘confined to an examination of the record to determine if the facts support the trial court's decision.’ " Id., at 771 (quoting Commonwealth v. Jackson, 367 Pa.Super. 6, 532 A.2d 28, 32 (1987) ). It added that the statute governing summary punishment for contempt requires that the misconduct occur in the court's presence. Id., at 772 (citation omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132(3).4

The court held the record did not support the trial court's position that it had witnessed the contemptuous conduct; rather, it had substantially relied upon the court officer's testimony to determine appellees' identities and the essential elements of contempt. Moody, at 774. The court viewed the record observations of the trial court describing appellees' conduct to be "general and vague[.]" Id., at 775 (quoting N.T. Contempt Hearing, 4/6/11, at 6 ("[A] fight broke out in the gallery involving numerous people in which the court officer got stuck in the middle and his arm was hit during the proceeding. He can tell us more about what happened.")). Because the record did not demonstrate the trial court "personally observed" appellees' actions, the Superior Court held the conduct did not occur "in the presence of the court," as required under § 4132(3). Id. Given its position that review was confined to the record supporting the contempt finding, the court did not discuss the sentencing proceedings or the trial court's opinion in which it described its personal observations.

The Superior Court further reasoned the trial court's reliance on a witness meant the proceeding was not summary but was an evidentiary hearing where appellees "should have been permitted to cross-examine the court crier, and to present their own witnesses[.]" Id. (citation omitted). Because it found the trial court abused its discretion in holding a contempt hearing that violated appellees' due process rights, the court vacated the judgments and remanded for a new contempt hearing.5

We granted allowance of appeal to determine:

(1) Did the Superior Court err in ruling that [appellees'] violent in-court conduct was not summary direct criminal contempt because the trial court supposedly did not observe the conduct?
(2) In cases of summary direct criminal contempt, is a defendant entitled to counsel and to call witnesses?

Commonwealth v. Moody, 622 Pa. 160, 79 A.3d 1093, 1094 (2013) (per curiam ).

Both issues present questions of law subject to a de novo standard of review and a plenary scope of review. See Commonwealth v. Pasture, ––– Pa. ––––, 107 A.3d 21, 27 (2014) (citation omitted). However, as to the first issue, the parties are not in accord regarding what may be considered in determining contemptuous behavior, a dispute that implicates the scope of review.

The Commonwealth contends the Superior Court's conclusion the trial court failed to personally observe the contemptuous conduct was erroneous because appellees waived the issue. It asserts appellees did not raise that argument below; instead, appellees claimed the right to counsel and to call and cross-examine witnesses applies in all contempt proceedings, including summary proceedings. Accordingly, the Commonwealth submits the court improperly addressed the issue sua sponte.

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1 cases
  • Commonwealth v. Moody
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • 27 de outubro de 2015
    ... ... Moody, 622 Pa. 160, 79 A.3d 1093, 1094 (2013) ( per curiam ). Both issues present questions of law subject to a de novo standard of review and a plenary scope of review. See Commonwealth v ... ...

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