Commonwealth v. Moody
| Decision Date | 29 January 1982 |
| Citation | 295 Pa.Super. 106,441 A.2d 371 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. John L. MOODY, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Submitted Dec. 5, 1980.
Bruce A. Franzel, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
John L Moody, appellant, was convicted at a non-jury trial on April 25, 1979 of attempted rape, indecent assault, simple assault recklessly endangering another person and unlawful restraint. New counsel brought a motion for a new trial and/or arrest of judgment, which was denied, after argument, on August 7 1979. Present counsel then requested and was permitted to file new post-verdict motions, which were denied after argument on October 31, 1979. Moody was subsequently sentenced to a term of three to ten years imprisonment for attempted rape and a two-year probationary term on each other conviction, all to be served concurrently with each other and with the sentence for attempted rape. Reconsideration of sentence was argued and denied on November 14, 1979. This appeal followed. We hold that the judgment of sentence be reversed and vacated in part together with a remand for sentencing.
Moody contends that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction of him for attempted rape, recklessly endangering another or unlawful restraint. He asserts also that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to suppress an identification and in failing to object to the admission into evidence of a photograph used in the identification process. We reverse the recklessly endangering another person conviction and affirm all others.
It is well settled that in passing upon a claim of insufficiency we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. The evidence is sufficient if, accepting as true all the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom upon which, if believed, the jury could have based its verdict, it is sufficient in law to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted. Commonwealth v. Horne, 479 Pa. 496, 388 A.2d 1040 (1978).
Moreover, it is the province of the trier of fact, who is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence, to pass upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded the evidence. Commonwealth v. Valderrama, 479 Pa. 500, 388 A.2d 1042 (1978). Finally, evidence may be sufficient to convict even though wholly circumstantial. Commonwealth v. Holzer, 480 Pa. 93, 389 A.2d 101 (1978).
Commonwealth v. Dreibelbis, 493 Pa. 466, 469, 426 A.2d 1111, 1112-13 (1981).
The evidence when viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth indicates that at about 12 noon on October 11, 1978, Ruthy Johnson, a twelve-year old, was accosted by Moody, while walking down the street in front of her home. Johnson testified that Moody forced her into the basement of a building where he sexually molested her. Moody forced Johnson to stand on a chair while he fondled her genitalia. She stated he eventually began to unzip his pants, whereupon she kicked him in the groin.
Moody then fled the building, only to be followed by Johnson. Moody struck Johnson, in an attempt to keep her in the cellar and then attempted to lock the door to the cellar, thereby trapping Johnson within. However, Johnson told him not to lock the door, which Moody did not. Moody then left the building. Johnson exited the cellar shortly after Moody, alerted others of her situation, and witnessed Moody drive away in a car which had been parked in the street. Johnson then observed the license number, and began to call it out to a friend. However, Moody, realizing what was happening, alighted the car and bent the license plate so as to obscure the number from Johnson's vision. Moody returned to the car and drove off, only to strike another automobile, forcing him to stop and depart on foot. Johnson subsequently identified Moody through a photographic array.
Rape is defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121 as:
A person commits a felony of the first degree when he engages in sexual intercourse with another person not his spouse:
(1) by forcible compulsion;
(2) by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person of reasonable resolution;
(3) who is unconscious; or
(4) who is so mentally deranged or deficient that such person is incapable of consent.
Criminal attempt is defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a) as:
Definition of attempt.-A person commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.
Moody contends that no evidence was presented to support a finding that he intended to use force for the purpose of obliging Johnson to engage in sexual intercourse against her will. We do not agree.
In Commonwealth v. Bullock, 259 Pa.Super. 467, 472, 393 A.2d 921, 923 (1978), we said:
Appellant's final contention, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the charges of attempted rape and two counts of aggravated assault is not meritorious. With regard to attempted rape, appellant contends that ripping Miss Kirby's shirt, pulling down her bra, and attempting to remove her pants was not so substantial a step toward rape to fulfill the requirement of an attempt. Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a) (1973). It should be noted that appellant had already committed the sexual offense of indecent assault under the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(1) when he tore open Miss Kirby's shirt and ripped down her bra. Especially given the awesome evidence of appellant's attack on Miss Kirby, and because he went further and attempted to remove Miss Kirby's pants, it was reasonable for the factfinder to conclude that appellant had taken a substantial step toward rape. Cf. Commonwealth v. White, 232 Pa.Super. 176, 181, 335 A.2d 436 (1975). Indeed, it would appear that the only other reasonable inference which could arise from appellant's conduct was that he intended to commit involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, also a felony of the first degree. Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123. Since orthodox intercourse is the more common act, rape was the more natural inference.
We are not persuaded by Moody's argument and hold that there was clearly sufficient evidence for the trial court to convict him of attempted rape. The evidence herein is as compelling as that found in Commonwealth v. Bullock, supra. Hence, we affirm the trial court's judgment of sentence for attempted rape.
Moody contends also that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of recklessly endangering another person. This offense is defined at 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705 as:
Recklessly endangering another person
A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.
Serious bodily injury is defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301 as:
Bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.
We have determined in Commonwealth v. Trowbridge, 261 Pa.Super. 109, 395 A.2d 1337 (1978), that the crime consists of reckless conduct which caused and resulted in a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. We are unable to conclude that any of Moody's actions, forcing Johnson into the basement, striking her while he attempted to leave the basement, or touching her body in a vulgar and offensive manner, placed Johnson in sufficient physical danger to support a conviction for recklessly endangering another person. Therefore, the judgment of sentence for recklessly endangering another person is reversed.
Unlawful restraint is defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2902 as:
Unlawful Restraint
A person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he knowingly:
(1) restrains another unlawfully in circumstances exposing him to risk of serious bodily injury; or
(2) holds another in a condition of involuntary servitude.
In Commonwealth v. Belgrave, 258 Pa.Super. 40, 45, 391 A.2d 662, 664 (1978), we said:
Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict. "The test for the sufficiency of evidence in a criminal case is whether, viewing all of the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and drawing all reasonable inferences favorable to the Commonwealth, there is sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Bastone, 466 Pa. 548, 552, 353 A.2d 827, 829 (1976); Commonwealth v. Whitfield, 474 Pa. 27, 376 A.2d 617 (1977). Moreover, it is axiomatic that it is within the province of the jury to pass upon the credibility of witnesses and determine the weight to be accorded the evidence adduced. Commonwealth v. Alston, 461 Pa. 664, 337 A.2d 597 (1975); Commonwealth v. Murray, 460 Pa. 605, 334 A.2d 255 (1975). Instantly, I entertain no doubt that Mrs. Washington's testimony was clearly sufficient to prove appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant's argument that the proof was deficient with respect to the crimes of unlawful restraint and false imprisonment because there was no evidence that the victim was forced into the abducting vehicle or restrained from leaving has no merit. Given Mrs. Washington's testimony that her husband was being assaulted in the back seat of the car by several assailants, whom he forcibly resisted, the jury could reasonably infer that the victim was being restrained against his will.
In the instant case, it is clear that Ruthy Johnson was forcibly...
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