Commonwealth v. Morgan

• Decision Date: 07 January 1924
• Docket Number: 207
• Citation: 123 A. 337,278 Pa. 395
• Parties: Com. ex rel. Wilhelm v. Morgan
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

123 A. 337

278 Pa. 395

Com. ex rel. Wilhelm v. Morgan

No. 207

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

January 7, 1924

Argued October 1, 1923

Petition by William Wilhelm, for writ of habeas corpus Supreme Court, No. 207, Misc. Docket, page 4. Relator discharged.

The relator is discharged, costs to be paid by the County of Schuylkill.

Calvin F. Smith, for relator. -- We do not find a reported case in any jurisdiction, where the court, in a light misdemeanor case, after it had suspended sentence, recalled defendant more than four years later and imposed the maximum sentence of imprisonment.

To allow such a power (indefinitely to suspend the imposition of sentence) would place the criminal at the caprice of the judge. If the judge can delay the sentence one year, he could delay it for fifteen years, or any length of time: People v. Barrett, (Ill.), 67 N.E. 24; Ex parte U.S Petitioner, 242 U.S. 26.

The writ of habeas corpus can be effectively invoked here where the record shows no crime committed, or the passing of an illegal sentence: Halderman's Petition, 276 Pa. 1.

M. A. Kilker, with him A. D. Knittle, M. H. Spicker, Assistant District Attorney, and C. M. Palmer, District Attorney, for respondent. -- A court may suspend judgment on criminal cases in toto until another term: Com. v. Mayloy, 57 Pa. 91.

There is an abundance of authority in Pennsylvania where convicts have been illegally sentenced, and many years after the imposition of sentence, on habeas corpus proceedings before the appellate courts, the record was sent back for resentence in accordance with law: Com. ex rel. v. McKenty, 80 Pa.Super. 249; Com. ex rel. v. Francies, 58 Pa.Super. 273; Halderman's Petition, 276 Pa. 1.

Before MOSCHZISKER, C.J., FRAZER, WALLING, SIMPSON, KEPHART, SADLER and SCHAFFER, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE WALLING:

In March, 1919, William Wilhelm, the relator, was convicted of assault and battery, in the court of quarter sessions of Schuylkill County. Thereupon the record shows that: "March 24th, 1919, the court sentenced the defendant, William Wilhelm, to pay the costs of prosecution (sentence deferred)." No further action was taken until June 20, 1923, when the defendant was brought before the court on a capias and, after a hearing, sentenced to pay the costs and "undergo punishment in the Schuylkill County prison for and during the term of one year to commence and be computed from this date." To test the legality of the latter sentence, Wilhelm petitioned this court for the writ of habeas corpus we are now considering. Such writ is a proper remedy where the relator is in confinement under a void or illegal sentence: Halderman's Petition, 276 Pa. 1; and see Com. ex rel. Torrey v. Ketner, 92 Pa. 372; Ex Parte Lange, 18 Wallace 163.

It is relator's contention that the court had no power to impose the sentence complained of, over four years after his conviction. The right to temporarily defer sentence, while the court seeks information or the defendant applies for pardon or for other sufficient reason, is universally recognized. The practice of an indefinite suspension of sentence has also long been in vogue in this and some other states, although in a majority of jurisdictions such right is denied, on the ground that an indefinite suspension of sentence amounts to a pardon, which only the executive can grant: 8 R.C.L. 248. Where such practice is recognized the right to later impose sentence remains with the trial court, and the time of its exercise is a matter for judicial discretion; manifestly, however, it would be an abuse thereof to impose sentence after a great delay. Hence, under any view of the law, sentence must be imposed, if ever, within a reasonable time after conviction.

In view of the decision in Ex Parte United States, Petitioner, 242 U.S. 27, the right to indefinitely defer or suspend sentence, in the absence of statutory authority, is at least doubtful; and see Ex Parte Singer, 284 F. 60. Happily, in Pennsylvania there is no cause for such doubt as the Act of June 19, 1911, P.L. 1055, provides, inter alia (section 1):

"Whenever any person shall be convicted in any court of this Commonwealth of any crime, except murder, administering poison, kidnapping, incest, sodomy, buggery, rape, assault and battery with intent to ravish, arson, robbery, or burglary, and it does not appear to the said court that the defendant has ever before been imprisoned for crime, either in this State or elsewhere, . . . and where the said court believes that the character of the defendant and the circumstances of the case such that he or she is not likely again to engage in an offensive course of conduct, and that the public good does not demand or require that the defendant should suffer the penalty imposed by law, the said court shall have power to suspend the imposing of the sentence, and place the defendant on probation for a definite period, on such terms and conditions as it may deem right and proper, said terms and conditions to be duly entered of record as a part of the judgment of the court in such case.

(Sec. 4). "Whenever a person placed on probation, as aforesaid, shall violate the terms of his or her probation, he or she shall be subject to arrest in the same manner as in the case of an escaped convict; and shall be brought before the court which released him or her on probation, which court may thereupon pronounce upon such defendant such sentence as may be prescribed by law, to begin at such time as the court may direct.

(Sec 5). "Whenever it is the judgment of the court...