Commonwealth v. Nafus

Citation154 A. 485,303 Pa. 418
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. NAFUS.
Decision Date02 February 1931
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court
154 A. 485
303 Pa. 418

COMMONWEALTH
v.
NAFUS.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Feb. 2, 1931.


Appeal from Court of Oyer and Terminer, Luzerne County; W. A. Valentine, Judge.

154 A. 486

John Nafus, alias Tex Nafus, was convicted for murder, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

Argued before FRAZER, C. J., and WALLING, SIMPSON, KEPHART, SADLER, SCHAFFER, and MAXEY, JJ.

John H. Dando and William A. O'Connor, both of Wilkes-Barre, for appellant.

Thomas M. Lewis, Dist. Atty., and Herman J. Goldberg, Asst. Dist. Atty., both of WilkesBarre, and M. S. De Pierro, Asst. Dist. Atty., of Freeland, for the Commonwealth.

KEPHART, J.

The facts in this case are identical with those in Com. v. Szachewicz, 154 A. 483, handed down this day and need not be repeated except to say that the prisoner admitted he purchased the battery at Nanticoke. He pointed out the clerk from whom the battery was purchased, and the proprietor identified the battery found at the explosion as being one purchased at his store. Defendant also identified a woman in another store as being the clerk from whom he bought a part of the wire. The confession of Nafus was received in evidence although he charged that it was procured by abuse and ill treatment. He denied any connection with the crime, his defense being an alibi.

The only complaint in this court is to the charge of the court below wherein it was stated: "If you are satisfied from the testimony in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the life of Arthur E. Webb was taken in an attempt to perpetrate a robbery, and that this defendant had a part in its commission, then the defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree, and, in the opinion of the court deserves the maximum penalty under the law." The Act of May 14, 1925, P. L. 759 (18 PS § 2222), states that where a person is convicted of first degree murder, the jury trying the case shall, at its discretion by its verdict fix the penalty; that is, whether it shall be death in the manner provided by law or imprisonment for life. It is appellant's contention that the judge should not have given expression to his opinion or attempted in any manner to influence the jury in the exercise of that discretion, and that, if the court guides or directs the jury in this matter, such action is an invasion of the absolute duty devolving on the jury to fix the penalty as directed by the Legislature, and that such action would constitute reversible error.

The court should not attempt to influence the jury...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT