Commonwealth v. Neidig
Decision Date | 04 April 2023 |
Docket Number | 1455 MDA 2021,J-S44027-22 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. NEIL ANDREW NEIDIG Appellant |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Neil Andrew Neidig appeals from the judgment of sentence entered following resentencing on his convictions for multiple counts of possession with intent to deliver, criminal use of a communication facility, and corrupt organizations.[1] The court resentenced Neidig as part of its partial grant of his Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") petition. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. He challenges the court's denial in part of his PCRA petition and his sentence. We do not address his challenges to the denial of his PCRA petition, as they are waived, and we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of sentence.
Neidig's original sentence included mandatory minimums for his drug convictions. Neidig appealed and we vacated the judgment of sentence and remanded for resentencing pursuant to Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013). The court resentenced Neidig to an aggregate term of 14½ to 29 years' imprisonment. As part of the imposed sentence, the court ordered Neidig to pay fines and costs of prosecution. See N.T., Resentencing Hearing 2/26/16, at 73, 76; Sentencing Orders, filed 3/4/16.[2] The court also imposed a school zone enhancement for four of Neidig's convictions. See N.T., Resentencing Hearing at 73. Neidig appealed, and we affirmed the judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Neidig, No. 1067 MDA 2016, 2017 WL 4930371, at *1 (Pa.Super. filed Oct. 31, 2017) (unpublished memorandum). Our Supreme Court denied Neidig's petition for allowance of appeal on April 10, 2018. Commonwealth v. Neidig, 183 A.3d 979 (Table) (Pa. 2018).
Neidig filed a timely PCRA petition on December 11, 2018. The court appointed counsel who filed an amended petition. Following evidentiary hearings, the court granted Neidig's petition on the sole issue that school zone enhancements should not have been applied to his sentence. See Order, filed 3/4/21. The court denied the remaining claims of the PCRA petition. See id. The court then scheduled the case for resentencing. Neidig did not file an appeal from the court's PCRA order.
On October 27, 2021, the lower court held a resentencing hearing. The court noted that it had an updated Pre Sentence Investigation ("PSI") report dated July 14, 2021.[3] N.T., Resentencing Hearing, 10/27/21, at 3. It stated that "I will note that it's really not much different than the original - I'm not sure it's different at all from the original PSI because Mr. Neidig was incarcerated that whole time[.]" Id. at 3-4. The court imposed a sentence of 9½ to 29 years' incarceration. It stated that "[a]ll the fines, costs, fees, conditions of the previous orders on all counts remain the same." N.T., Resentencing Hearing, 10/27/21, at 48 (emphasis added). Counsel did not object. While explaining Neidig's appellate rights, the court stated, "[Y]ou can file an appeal with the Superior Court within 30 days of today . . . ." Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
Neidig filed a post-sentence motion raising the following claims:
Post Sentence Motion, filed 11/2/21, at ¶¶ 9-18.
Before the court had ruled on the post-sentence motion, Neidig filed the instant appeal, submitting a single notice of appeal listing both Common Pleas docket numbers. See Notice of Appeal, filed 11/5/21. The lower court then, on November 9, denied Neidig's post-sentence motion.[4]
On appeal, this Court initially issued a rule to show cause why the appeal should not be quashed pursuant to Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018), overruled in part by Commonwealth v. Young, 265 A.3d 462, 477 n.19 (Pa. 2021). In Walker, our Supreme Court held that an appeal should be quashed where the appellant fails to file separate notices of appeal at each docket number, where the order appealed from resolves issues at more than one docket. 185 A.3d at 977. Neidig responded that the PCRA court had told him that he could file "a" notice of appeal. The rule was discharged and deferred to this panel for consideration of the Walker issue.
We decline to quash pursuant to Walker. If the Court of Common Pleas has misinformed the appellant that a single notice of appeal listing more than one docket number is proper, the technical non-compliance with Walker is excused. See Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157, 159-60 (Pa.Super. 2019). Here, the PCRA court advised Neidig that he could file "an" appeal with this Court, even though its order disposed of issues at multiple dockets. The court's misstatement misled Neidig regarding the proper manner to take this appeal. See id. We will not quash.
On appeal, Neidig raises the following issues:
We do not address Neidig's first three claims because they are waived due to his failure to appeal from the order disposing of his PCRA Petition. Rule 341(f)(2) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that in the context of PCRA petitions, "[a]n order granting sentencing relief, but denying, dismissing, or otherwise disposing of all other claims within a petition for post-conviction collateral relief, shall constitute a final order for purposes of appeal." Pa.R.A.P. 341(f)(2) (emphasis added). In such a case, a PCRA petitioner may immediately appeal the order, even if resentencing has not yet occurred. See Commonwealth v. Watley, 153 A.3d 1034, 1039 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2016) ( ); Commonwealth v. Grove, 170 A.3d 1127, 1138 (Pa.Super. 2017) (). As the comment to Rule 341 warns, a PCRA petitioner who fails to timely appeal an order granting sentencing relief but denying other claims waives appellate review of the PCRA court's order. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(f)(2), & cmt.
That is what has happened here. Neidig did not appeal within 30 days after the PCRA court's order granting Neidig's sentencing claim but denying all other claims. Therefore, he has waived review of any issues stemming from the PCRA order. See id.
In his last two issues, Neidig challenges his new sentence. He first maintains that the trial court erred when it resentenced him to the same fines, costs, and restitution as it had imposed at his original sentencing. See Neidig's Br. at 24. He states that despite the passage of nine years since his original sentencing, the court reimposed the same fines and costs "without any record of whether [he] had the ability to pay those fines and costs." Id. He maintains that at the time of his original sentence, he was "in a much different financial position than he is now after being incarcerated for over nine years." Id..
Rule 706(C) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that for mandatory costs, the court "shall insofar as is just and practicable, consider the burden upon the defendant by reason of the defendant's financial means, including the defendant's ability to make restitution or reparations." Pa.R.Crim.P. 706(C)....
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