Commonwealth v. Olivo
| Decision Date | 18 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 127 MAP 2014,127 MAP 2014 |
| Citation | 127 A.3d 769 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Jose Luis OLIVO, Appellee. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
John T. Adams, Esq., Reading, Jonathan H. Kurland, Esq., for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Brie Rebecca Halfond, Esq., Leonard Sosnov, Esq., Glenn D. Welsh Esq., Berks Country Public Defender's Office, for Jose Luis Olivo.
Kevin Francis McCarthy, Esq., Allegheny Counter District Attorney's Office, for Pennsylvania District Attorney's Association, Amicus Curiae.
Diane Elizabeth Moyer, Esq., PA Coalition Against Rape, for PA Coalition Against Rape, Amicus Curiae.
OPINION
In this case, the trial court suspended as unconstitutional a recently enacted statute allowing expert testimony regarding victims' responses to sexual violence, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5920.1 The trial court concluded that Section 5920 violated this Court's exclusive control over judicial procedures pursuant to Article V, Section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution.2 Accordingly, we have jurisdiction pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 722(7) (). After review, we conclude that Section 5920 does not infringe on our constitutional authority to govern the procedures of the courts. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court and remand for further proceedings.
The facts in this case are limited as it comes to us on preliminary motions. Appellee–Defendant Jose Luis Olivo was arrested on September 17, 2012, and charged with two counts of rape and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse and one count each of indecent assault, indecent exposure, endangering the welfare of children, and corruption of minors.3 The charges arose from allegations that he sexually abused his paramour's daughter, starting in January 2009 when the victim was four and continuing until February 2012, when she was seven.
On July 26, 2013, four days prior to the scheduled start of trial, Olivo presented a motion in limine to prevent the Commonwealth from presenting expert testimony pursuant to Section 5920 regarding child victim responses to sexual violence. Section 5920 applied to Olivo's September 2012 criminal complaint in the case at bar because the Legislature made it effective for prosecutions filed on or after August 28, 2012. The court continued the trial to allow the presentation of argument regarding the motion in limine.
As will be discussed in detail in the summary of his arguments to this Court, Olivo contended that the statute unconstitutionally infringed this Court's authority over procedural rules pursuant to Article V, Section 10(c). Assuming arguendo that the Legislature could enact evidentiary rules generally, Olivo asserted that Section 5920 was improper because it conflicted with this Court's prior decision in Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 529 Pa. 168, 602 A.2d 830 (1992).
A detailed review of our decision in Dunkle is necessary to understand the arguments presented by Olivo. In Dunkle, this Court held inadmissible "expert testimony concerning typical behavior patterns exhibited by sexually abused children," where that testimony did not relate to the specific child at issue. Id. at 831. Our holding was supported by our consideration of the "Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome," which the Court judged not to be a generally accepted diagnostic tool for purposes of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.1923). We additionally concluded, based on the then-current research in the field, that the evidence regarding the syndrome was inadmissible as it was not specifically probative of childhood sexual assault as opposed to other types of trauma and merely invited speculation. Next, we deemed inadmissible expert testimony concerning delays and omissions in reporting by child victims of sexual assault because we concluded that the delays and omissions were "easily understood by lay people and did not require expert analysis." Dunkle, 602 A.2d at 836.
While the bulk of our analysis focused upon basic evidentiary determinations, we further opined:
[W]e do not think it befits this Court to simply disregard longstanding principles concerning the presumption of innocence and the proper admission of evidence in order to gain a great number of convictions. A conviction must be obtained through the proper and lawful admission of evidence in order to maintain the integrity and fairness that is the bedrock of our jurisprudence.
While arguably dicta, Olivo relied upon this Court's brief reference to the presumption of innocence quoted above to argue that Dunkle constituted an exercise of our constitutional authority over judicial procedure, despite any reference to Article V, Section 10(c) in the text of the opinion.5
The Commonwealth opposed Olivo's motion in limine. As detailed below, the Commonwealth asserted that Section 5920 is consistent rather than in conflict with our rulemaking authority under Article V, Section 10(c) and the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, especially Rule 101(b), which recognizes that rules of evidence may be "governed by statute." Pa.R.E. 101 cmt.6 The Commonwealth additionally refuted Olivo's argument that this Court's decision in Dunkle was based on constitutional concerns, instead arguing that the case primarily addressed the admissibility of specific evidence under our evidentiary rules.
The trial court granted Olivo's motion in limine to bar the expert testimony regarding child victim responses and behaviors offered by the Commonwealth pursuant to Section 5920. Before coming to its conclusion, the court recognized that "[t]he expert would carefully avoid testifying regarding the credibility of this particular victim/witness and only testify as to the general attributes of child sexual assault victims as to delay in reporting, piecemeal reporting and the dynamics of victim's abuse at the hands of older trusted family members." Tr. Ct. Op. at 3.
The trial court interpreted Dunkle as holding that the admission of expert testimony on child victim response and behaviors "would violate the presumption of innocence offered a defendant in every jury trial and notions of fundamental fairness inherent in due process." Id. at 4. The trial court opined that the "proper admission of evidence" was "solely in the province of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court under Article V, [Section] 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution." Id. The trial court recognized that this Court has suspended statutes that impinge upon our rulemaking authority, citing Commonwealth v. McMullen, 599 Pa. 435, 961 A.2d 842, 848 (2008) (), and Payne v. Commonwealth Department of Corrections, 582 Pa. 375, 871 A.2d 795 (2005) ().7
While the court believed that the introduction of the expert witness testimony would be helpful to juries, it felt constrained to suspend Section 5920 because "the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has spoken in this specific area in Dunkle and has indicated their ruling implicated Constitutional precepts." Tr. Ct. Op. at 5. The trial court, nonetheless, signaled that it found the dissenting arguments in Dunkle persuasive in light of the research since Dunkle.
The Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal in September 2013.8 As stated above, this Court has direct review of a trial court's decision to suspend a statute as unconstitutional pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 722(7).
The Commonwealth asserts that the trial court erred in suspending Section 5920 as unconstitutional. First, the Commonwealth addresses this Court's authority under Article V, Section 10(c). It then proceeds to refute the trial court's interpretation of Dunkle. The Commonwealth recognizes this Court's exclusive constitutional authority over rules of procedure. It observes that, while the legislature is tasked with defining substantive crimes, this Court has authority to determine the procedure underlying the adjudication of criminal actions. Commonwealth Brief (Com. Brief) at 12 (). The Commonwealth further concedes that "the enactment of a procedural statute is unconstitutional." Id. at 13 (citing McMullen, 961 A.2d at 848 ).
The Commonwealth maintains, however, that evidentiary rules are exceptions, which this Court has recognized in the comments to the Rules of Evidence and in Commonwealth v. Newman, 534 Pa. 424, 633 A.2d 1069, 1071 (1993). The Commonwealth observes that the comment to Pa.R.E. 101, quoted above, demonstrates this Court's acknowledgement that some rules of evidence are governed by statute. It further highlights our statement in Newman, discussed further herein, that "[s]ubject only to constitutional limitations, the legislature is free to change the rules governing competency of witnesses and admissibility of evidence." Com. Brief at 10 (quoting Newman, 633 A.2d at 1071 ). The Commonwealth asserts that the legislature may enact rules of evidence so long as they are not inconsistent with constitutional limitations. Moreover, it emphasizes that Section 5920 tracks Pa.R.E. 702, addressing the requirements for expert testimony, which further supports the conclusion that the evidence does not offend constitutional principles.9 Accordingly, it maintains that Section 5920 is a constitutional legislative enactment.
The Commonwealth also asserts that the question presented in this case, regarding the constitutionality of the legislative enactment of Section 5920, is distinguishable from the evidentiary decision set forth by this Court in ...
To continue reading
Request your trial